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A EUROPE OF REGIONS?  
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, SUB-NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AND THE  
OPTIMAL SIZE OF STATES

by

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of Doctor  
of Philosophy in the Department of  
Political Science in the Graduate  
School of Duke University

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ABSTRACT

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## **Abstract**

As European countries continue along their path to a deeper and wider Union, the prospect of state fragmentation threatens the traditional boundaries of Europe. But the current literature neglects an important theoretical and empirical question: does European integration increase sub-national mobilization within European Union member states? With the first truly comparative, cross-national quantitative study of the incidence and electoral success of regional political parties, I show that European integration makes regional political parties more likely to compete in national parliamentary elections. Once they enter competition, European integration makes these parties more attractive to voters. The implicit assumption among most scholars that European integration has no effect is, therefore, unjustified and unwarranted.

To explain this relationship, I suggest the following causal mechanism: European integration has created conditions under which regional groups (e.g. the Scottish) may not need the state (e.g. United Kingdom) to survive internationally. For the viability theory to explain this relationship, though, elites and citizens must recognize and take advantage of the new political opportunity structure. For elites, I find that regional political parties are Europhiles, not Euroskeptics, consistent with the theoretical expectations of the viability theory. In Scotland, I find that citizens considered independence a more viable option within the European Union. The “Independence in Europe” option, as favored by the Scottish National Party, explains increased support for independence among Scottish respondents.

By triangulating on the research question with multiple techniques and levels of analysis, I show that European integration does strengthen sub-national

movements. Supranational integration and sub-national fragmentation are not merely coincidental phenomenon but are related in a theoretical and predictable way. Emphasizing the EU as a crucial new explanatory variable, this dissertation contributes to the literature on small parties and regional or ethnic parties theoretically as well as empirically. It also clearly demonstrates that European integration has had a quite significant effect on internal domestic politics of the member states. In the future, therefore, proponents of supra-national integration will be forced to consider a trade-off between the economic benefits of integration and greater sub-national mobilization and fragmentation when evaluating regional integration.

**To my wife, Gretchen, with love**

## Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	iv
<i>List of Figures</i>	viii
<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
1. Introduction	1
<b>Part 1. Theories on European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization</b>	
2. Viability or Fear? Two Views on European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization	12
<b>Part 2. Another Reason to Party? European Integration and Regional Political Parties</b>	
3. The Incidence of Regional Political Parties	41
4. Determinants of Regional Political Party Electoral Success	80
<b>Part 3. Fear, Loathing and the Optimal Size of States: Support for European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization</b>	
5. Assessing Regional Political Party Views on European Integration	111
6. Assessing Public Opinion in the 1979 and 1997 Scottish Devolution Referenda	143
7. Conclusion	167
<i>Appendix A</i>	184
<i>Bibliography</i>	194
<i>Biography</i>	210

## **List of Figures**

3.1	Observations with Regional Political Parties, By Country	60
3.2	Observations with Regional Political Parties, By Decade	61
3.3	Predicted Probability of Regional Political Party Incidence, By European Integration and Language Difference (Model 4)	75
4.1	Expected Vote Share, By Level of Integration (Model 1)	101
4.2	Expected Vote Share, By Language Difference (Model 1)	103
4.3	Expected Vote Share, By Level of Decentralization (Model 1)	104
4.4	Expected Vote Share, By Preference Difference (Model 2)	106
5.1	Support for the European Union, By Party Family	126
5.2	Support for the European Union, By Regional Political Party	127
5.3	Regional Political Party Support for European Union, Across Left/Right Dimension	129
5.4	Regional Political Party Support for European Union, Across GAL/TAN Dimension	130
5.5	Trends in Regional Political Parties: Position on EU, Saliency and Dissent	132
5.6	Support for European Union, By Regional Political Party and Issue Area	134

## **List of Tables**

3.1	Regional Political Parties in Western Europe	57-8
3.2	Observations with Regional Political Parties	59
3.3	Group Differences	67
3.4	Determinants of Regional Political Party Incidence	73
3.5	Robustness Tests, By Different EU Specifications (Model 4)	74
4.1	Determinants of Regional Political Party Success	99
4.2	Robustness Tests, By Different EU Specifications (Model 1)	100
5.1	National Vote Shares of Regional Political Parties	122
6.1	Attitudes and Actual Voting Positions on Devolution in 1979 and 1997	151
6.2	Referendum Positions in 1979 and 1997, By Group Identity	152
6.3	Expected and Actual Voting Positions on Devolution in 1979 and 1997	156
6.4	Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1979	158
6.5	Referendum Positions in 1979, By Preference Ordering	159
6.6	Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1997	161
6.7	Attitudes on Devolution in 1979 and 1997	162
7.1	Typology of Strategies of Central States and Regional Movements	180

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

For many of its founders, the creation of the European Economic Community meant the end of national and ethnic divisions with the possibility of a universalistic European identity. Even in 1990, Eric Hobsbawm predicted that “nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state” (1990, 192). Yet while European integration continues to deepen and extend multi-level governance in the EU area (Hooghe and Marks 2001), so has the number and success of regionalist or separatist movements in European Union member states, such as the Scottish or Basque National Parties. The consensus appears to be that both minority nationalism in general and regional parties in particular are on the rise (Esman 1977a; Lynch 1996; de Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). This apparent contradiction between theory and practice yields the following question: does European integration actually encourage sub-national mobilization within European Union member states?

To pursue this empirical question, I consider the electoral success of regional political parties as a key observable implication. Thus far, relatively little work has been done to explore the connections between regional political parties and European integration.<sup>1</sup> Expanding upon earlier works on niche parties in general and regional political parties in particular, I argue that deeper European political and economic integration increases support for regional political parties.

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<sup>1</sup> Notable exceptions include Lynch (1996), Hooghe and Marks (2001), de Winter and Cachafeiro (2002), and van Houten (2003).

With the first truly comparative, cross-national study of the incidence and electoral success of regional political parties using quantitative analysis, I provide systematic evidence that European integration does in fact significantly influence the domestic politics of its member states, vis-à-vis regional movements. Extending earlier work on regional political parties, I confirm that distinct preferences, in cultural or political-economic terms, encourage support for regional political parties. But controlling for this significant factor, European integration still significantly encourages regional political parties to compete in national elections and voters to support them.

In the following pages, I sketch an outline of the following chapters. First, I develop the viability theory at the heart of this dissertation. Largely following Alesina and Spolaore's *Size of Nations* theory (2003), regional entities are more viable outside their traditional state due to the supranational structure of the EU, which allows them access to a larger market with less direct control than a traditional national government. Hence, the EU is an ally to regional movements who have the goal of an independent state or even more political autonomy, even if it is only as a result of unintended consequences.

In Part 1, using national election data from Western Europe, I demonstrate the validity of the descriptive inference by showing that deeper European integration has indeed led to an increase in the support of regional political parties. In Part 2, I test the competing causal mechanisms to explain why European integration encourages sub-national mobilization. I conclude that regional political parties are decidedly pro-

European Union, suggesting that the regional political parties utilize the EU as an ally in their struggle for autonomy. In addition, using survey data from the 1979 and 1997 devolution referenda in Scotland, I show that European integration does make an independent Scotland more viable and attractive in voters' minds. In the conclusion, I consider extensions to the empirical and theoretical project and draw practical implications from my results for the new EU member countries as well as other regional blocs considering deeper economic and political integration.

***Viability or Fear? Two Views on European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization***

Before turning to the empirical chapters, I begin by laying out the general theoretical framework for the remainder of the dissertation. First, I review the literature on sub-national mobilization in Western Europe, paying particular attention to consistently robust findings. Explaining sub-national mobilization in western Europe remains a topic of great interest to academics as well as politicians (Lynch 1996; de Winter and Türsan 1998; van Houten 2000). Most studies focus on a variety of cultural and political economic factors, but they often neglect European integration as a relevant variable. By doing so, the previous literature omits a crucial variable that helps explain cross-temporal and cross-regional variation.

I then turn to the political economy literature on the size of nations, as a powerful theoretical alternative to the existing literature (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Quite simply, European

integration has created conditions under which regional groups (e.g. the Scottish) may not need the status quo state (e.g. United Kingdom) to thrive internationally. The European Union decreases regional dependency on the nation-state in both economic (e.g. international trade and monetary policy) and political terms (e.g. defense, foreign policy, and minority rights). In other words, the European Union system of multi-level governance increases the viability of smaller states, thereby creating additional incentive for citizens to support regional political parties.

After discussing the strengths and limitations of this causal mechanism, I reconsider the critical advantage of small countries, namely homogeneous preferences, as a means to explain cross-regional variation in support for greater autonomy. From this discussion, I draw the hypothesis that the size of nations theory is a key causal mechanism to explain why European integration leads to more sub-national mobilization.

However, a plausible alternative causal mechanism exists. Regional movements may utilize the threat of encroaching authority of Brussels to rally supporters to its cause. As more and more day to day regulatory issues are decided in Brussels rather than at either the national or regional level, some political entrepreneurs may seize the opportunity to gather electoral strength by assailing this trend. Thus, it may not be that regional groups embrace the EU as a means of making smaller independent countries more viable. Rather, it could simply be that some regional groups are the focal point for opposition to globalization and European integration (van Houten 2003, 113-118). Regional political parties may use this

opposition as a mechanism to draw support to their movement. Fear of assimilation, potential loss of jobs, and animosity towards immigrants each could factor into supporting regional parties. Rather than an ally, therefore, regional political parties could frame the EU as yet another distant government dictating policy to the regions.

Finally, I introduce the observable implications with which I test the descriptive inference that European integration encourages more sub-national mobilization and determine which of the two competing causal mechanisms explain this effect. In addition to demonstrating that European integration does in fact positively affect support for regional parties, it is the task of this dissertation to discern under which conditions each of these causal mechanisms explains the relationship between European integration and sub-national mobilization.

## **Another Reason to Party? European Integration and Regional Political Parties**

### ***The Incidence of Regional Political Parties***

Drawing implications from the work of economists, such as Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and the comparative politics literature on new parties (Kitschelt 1995; Hug 2001; Meguid 2002), I develop hypotheses regarding the incidence of regional political parties, such as the Scottish National Party, the Plaid Cymru, and the Basque National Party. On the demand or ‘push’ side, cultural and economic differences drive the decisions of regional political parties to compete in national-level elections. But the opportunity structure for these parties, or the ‘pull’ factor, matters as well. If the political marketplace is crowded or the mainstream parties

incorporate these demands into their platforms, then the potential regional political party will not materialize. In addition to these domestic factors, I argue that increased European integration actually encourages regional parties to enter political competition.

In the first section, I consider two theories that attempt to explain the strategic interaction of mainstream parties and potential new parties. From this discussion, I draw empirical implications for the incidence of regional political parties. Next, I briefly review the determinants of regional party success in national-level elections. Third, I discuss two plausible causal mechanisms that predict an increased probability of new regional political party (RPP) incidence under a political opportunity structure characterized by deeper European integration.

In the fourth section, using a dataset of all sub-national regions within the EU-14 from 1950-1997,<sup>2</sup> I demonstrate that a deeper EU has indeed encouraged more regional parties to compete in national elections. Using a variety of statistical techniques to deal with the binary cross-section time-series data, I find that deeper integration has a consistent and robust effect on the incidence of regional political parties. I also find that the demand side of the equation, or distinct cultural or political-economic preferences, still largely determines the entry of regional political parties into electoral competition while the political opportunity structure plays a secondary role.

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<sup>2</sup> The dataset excludes Luxembourg. The end point of the time-series is simply the final election collected by Caramani (2000). In future work, I will extend the analysis to include recent elections.

### ***Determinants of Regional Political Party Success***

In this chapter, I approach the descriptive inference by analyzing the observable implication that regional political parties should obtain greater support from the regional electorate as the European Union deepens. Utilizing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, I analyze the electoral support of regional parties. I test the empirical implications with a dataset of district-level electoral data and regional cultural political economic variables in the five European Union member states where regional parties have competed in national elections between 1950 and 1997, including Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Empirically, I find evidence to support the specific contention that deeper integration positively affects electoral support for regional parties. As integration proceeds from a free trade area to a monetary union, deeper European integration is associated with more electoral success for the regional parties. Also, more heterogeneous preferences, in cultural or political-economic terms, are positively correlated with electoral success for regional parties. In particular, when a region has distinct preferences from the rest of the country on multiple dimensions, then its support for regional parties increases. Along with Chapter 3, I provide compelling evidence with this chapter that European integration does in fact positively affect the electoral fortunes of regional political parties.

### **Fear, Loathing, and the Optimal Size of States: Support for European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization**

#### ***Assessing Regional Political Party Views on European Integration***

Next, I turn away from the inference that deeper European integration increases sub-national mobilization and focus on the causal mechanism underlying this relationship. I seek to understand whether regional parties perform better as a result of deeper integration because they see the EU as an ally or as an enemy. As laid out in earlier chapters, there are two competing causal mechanisms, viability or fear, which may explain the finding that European integration increases support for regional parties. In Chapters 4 and 5, I adjudicate between these two theoretical propositions.

Using expert surveys, I assess the views of regional parties on European integration and I find support for the viability hypothesis because regional political parties are consistently pro-European Union across time, space, and issue area. In fact, with few exceptions, they are among the least Euroskeptic party families in Western Europe. In addition to the comparative analysis, I specifically study the evolution of official Scottish National Party views toward European Union. Using Scotland as a ‘most-likely’ case, I demonstrate that the Scottish National Party becomes more pro-European Union precisely when independence in the European Union becomes a viable alternative to remaining in the United Kingdom. With the evidence from Chapter 5, I conclude that regional political parties support European integration, thereby framing the European Union as an ally against the central state.

*Assessing Public Opinion in the 1979 and 1997 Scottish Devolution Referenda*

Extending the analysis of the previous chapter, I utilize public opinion data to determine whether regional citizens are more likely to support regional parties and greater autonomy because they find the idea of an independent region with Europe to be more feasible or because they fear assimilation within an all-encompassing European identity. This analysis of public opinion complements the evidence on regional political party views introduced in Chapter 5.

In this chapter, I take advantage of the quasi-experimental nature of the two referenda in Scotland over devolution in two distinct time periods. In 1979, at a relatively early stage of European integration in the United Kingdom, a slight majority voted for devolution but the margin was not enough to overcome the electoral threshold set by Westminster. But in 1997, the result was overwhelmingly pro-devolution in a much deeper European Union. I utilize public opinion data to test the observable implication that Scottish voters recognize the changes in the political opportunity structure caused by European integration, thereby yielding more support for devolution with deeper integration. I find that voters are more likely to support independence as a viable constitutional option for Scotland, in part because the European Union provides an alternative political opportunity structure to the United Kingdom. This increased support for independence largely explains the dramatic increase in public support for a Scottish Parliament in 1997 compared to 1979. With this analysis, I provide further support for the viability theory.

### *Final Thoughts*

In the final chapter, I have three main goals. First, I summarize the main findings of the dissertation. Next, I briefly consider the empirical and theoretical extensions to this project. Finally, I discuss implications both for the newly expanded European Union as well as other regional blocs of countries which are considering deeper integration. Before agreeing to more integration, the countries may need to consider the unintended consequence of encouraging more sub-national mobilization.

Emphasizing the European Union as a crucial new explanatory variable, this dissertation contributes to the literature on small parties and regional or ethnic parties both theoretically as well as empirically. It also clearly demonstrates that European integration has had a quite significant effect on internal domestic politics of the member states.

But in no sense do I consider this research to exhaust the observable implications of the optimal size of nations theory, as it regards sub-national movements in Europe. In addition to regional political parties, which I concentrate on in this dissertation, there are many other forms of mobilization, including protests, riots, referenda, and even cultural organizations. But I do consider regional political parties to be major players in the bargaining game between the regions and the central government. If regional political parties are stronger, regional movements have more bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the state. If this dissertation provides convincing support for the descriptive and causal inferences, it will have implications for both future academic work as well as regional economic and political regimes.

**Part 1.**

**Theories on European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization**

## **Chapter 2**

### **Viability or Fear?**

#### **Two Views on European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization**

With high-profile examples such as the recent devolution in the United Kingdom and Catalonia's attempt to gain more autonomy from Spain, explaining sub-national mobilization in Western Europe remains a topic of great interest to academics as well as politicians (Lynch 1996; de Winter and Türsan 1998; van Houten 2000). Most studies focus on a variety of cultural and political economic factors, but they often neglect globalization, in general, and European integration, in particular, as a relevant variable. In this chapter, I first analyze the existing literature. In doing so, I draw several hypotheses for the following empirical chapters. However, I implicitly criticize it by turning to the political economic literature on the optimal size of states, as a powerful theoretical alternative to the existing literature. From this literature, I draw the hypothesis that European integration encourages higher levels of mobilization among sub-national groups.

First, I review the literature on sub-national mobilization in Western Europe, paying particular attention for potential necessary or sufficient factors. Second, I introduce the political economy literature on the optimal size of states and explain the main theory underlying this dissertation. Third, I consider alternative theories, including a backlash logic based on fear of lost autonomy to Brussels or increased immigration due to deeper integration. Next, I outline the research design to empirically test the theoretical implications, which I use to guide the remainder of this research project.

### *Sub-National Mobilization in Western Europe*

Certain regional identity groups (e.g. the Scottish, Irish, Basques, and Bretons) have increased calls for national self-determination, or at least greater autonomy, in recent years.<sup>3</sup> This trend contradicts the predictions of classic social theory, which relies heavily on the developmental hypothesis. Over time, this model hypothesizes that Western capitalist development will diminish intra-national cultural differences, leaving a more homogeneous population unmotivated for social action (Nielsen 1980, 76, 1985, 141; Ragin 1987, 133).<sup>4</sup> Evidence to contradict this prediction exists in nearly all of the Western democracies. In fact, Arend Lijphart finds little theoretical value in the developmental perspective and other theories that predicted a decrease in ethnic tension in post-war Europe, contending “there were no adequate theoretical grounds for the expectation that ethnic conflict would gradually disappear” (1977, 55).

As it became increasingly clear that development would not resolve all the sub-national conflicts in Europe, scholars introduced a variety of models to explain its resurgence. In the conclusion of a 1977 edited volume on ethnic conflict in the West, Milton Esman summarizes the factors that led to the resurgence of autonomy movements in Europe (Esman 1977b, 372+). First, the central governments

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<sup>3</sup> Following Scheinman (1977, 67), regionalism includes all sub-national movements which aim for some form of autonomy within or outside the traditional state. These movements can justify their goals with a variety of ethnic, cultural, political, economic, or social claims.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to this version of the developmental hypothesis, an opposing theory contends that development creates an educated elite and competitive opportunities, thereby inspiring ethnic mobilization (Ragin 1979, 622). Michael Hechter’s internal colonialism model in fact predicts that development will not eliminate regional inequalities but encourage their persistence (1975, 10).

expanded their scope and size while the bureaucracy became increasingly technocratic and remote. Second, a combination of industrial rationalization (centralization and concentration) and the communications revolution contributed to a period of more regional grievances and claims for autonomy. Third, security concerns decreased with détente and an associated diminished fear of the Soviet Union (Esman 1977b).

While these factors helped create the environment in which these movements began to grow, none are necessary or sufficient conditions for the politicization of the regional movements. Again, Esman illustrates several of the conditions that were necessary and sufficient, including group identity based on some objective trait; political, economic or cultural grievances; a perception that prospects would be better under an alternative regime; a less effective central government; and political organization (Esman 1977b, 388-395). Each of these conditions existed in Scotland in the 1970s, thereby explaining Scotland's calls for autonomy (Esman 1977c, 284).<sup>5</sup>

Unsurprisingly, Esman is not alone in focusing on grievances as a trigger for these movements. Suzanne Berger contends that objective regional discrepancies in economic success heightened the salience of regional or ethnic issues (1977, 176). In the right context, these grievances led to demands for either autonomy or outright independence (Esman 1977b; McCrone 2001, 25). Similarly, Charles Ragin

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<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that not all observers agree that Scotland has legitimate grievances. Birch notes that Scotland has been chronically over-represented in the House of Parliament and receives much more government expenditure per capita than England (Birch 1977, 102-5); however, he concedes that Scotland has a legitimate claim about "the inescapable evidence of mismanagement by London governments" (Birch 1977, 107).

considers these factors in explicating the reactive ethnicity perspective. Under the reactive ethnicity view, a subordinated ethnic or regional group perceives an uneven distribution of resources that favors the dominant ethnic group. Urbanization and industrialization exacerbates this situation by concentrating members of the same subgroup in similar neighborhoods and social classes (Ragin 1987, 135).<sup>6</sup> This dual subjugation provides the grievances needed by leaders of regional groups to successfully mobilize their populations.

Though by no means complete, the theories described above represent the most popular explanations for increased sub-national demands in post-World War II Europe. Walker Connor summarizes them nicely:

(1) the theory of relative (economic, cultural, and/or political) deprivation; (2) anomie, resulting from a growing feeling of alienation from the depersonalized and dehumanizing modern mass society, leading, in turn, to what is alternately described as a reversion to 'tribalism' or as a new, more relevant alternative; (3) a 'center-periphery' series of relationships in which these newly assertive ethnic groups (the peripheral peoples) are viewed as having remained essentially outside or at the edge of the dominant society and have, therefore, been only marginally influenced by that society's principal currents; and (4) the loss of global prestige suffered by individual European states, as contrasted with their eminence in the prewar period, and a corresponding loss of pride in being viewed as British rather than Scottish, or French rather than Breton (1977, 23-25).

Alienation, economic grievances and, perhaps, a perception that the benefits of belonging to the large post-imperial states of Europe are much diminished all serve as

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<sup>6</sup> Francois Nielsen contends that despite the reactive ethnicity model's usefulness in explaining the resurgence of ethno-national mobilization, the empirical evidence, particularly from Flanders, does not support either the reactive ethnicity model or Hechter's internal colonialism model (1980, 79-89).

reasons why ethnic or sub-national groups may have increased their demands for autonomy.

While grievances must exist for a group to mobilize and overcome the collective action dilemma, expectations for a brighter future after independence or autonomy is the second necessary factor in the equation. Certainly, if group leaders cannot convince their followers that autonomy or even independence would make their lives better, than the movement would be short-lived. But political theorists traditionally espouse a large state bias. Friedrich List, a German economist, contended that a country must have a large population and a territory “endowed with manifold national resources” to be competitive in the world economy. Otherwise, it would have no opportunity to build viable institutions or a competitive industrial sector (Hobsbawm 1990, 30). John Stuart Mill goes further, stating:

Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be ... a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as members of the British nation ([1861] 1998, 395).

According to these theorists, not only can a small state have no hope for economic or cultural success, but below some threshold, a member of such a state will revert to a half-savage, incapable of participating or successfully competing in the larger world.

Ignoring for the moment the falsification of this view demonstrated by the relative success of small states in the late twentieth century, the European Union represents another route for sub-national groups to pursue autonomy without being

left behind in the global economy. In fact, some scholars contend that a true ‘Europe of the Regions’ would be more beneficial because smaller states would be less aggressive. Further, such decentralization may create other advantages due to experimentation with public goods (Tiebout 1956). At the same time, smaller states are more viable than in previous generations due to trade liberalization and less conventional security threats (Anderson 2000, 35). Though scholars continue to debate the cause(s) of the resurgence of regionalist or ethno-nationalist movements in Europe, some ethno-nationalist groups view European integration as one means to reduce the state’s dominance over their region (Cinnirella 2000). If regional groups perceive that it is no longer a choice between economic viability and independence, then they may be more likely to pursue greater autonomy or even independence than they would otherwise.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to the economic viability issue, sub-national groups now have more access to the world community through European Union venues. For example, the Basque movement regularly uses the Hague and the European Commission on Human Rights to focus international attention on their nationalist movement by complaining about human rights violations and other problems. The Irish nationalists also demonstrate the effectiveness of external resources in challenging state borders (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999, 693). Going further, minority nationalist parties formed groups within Europe, such as the Bureau of Unrepresented European Nations or the European Free Alliance, to pursue their political objectives (Lynch

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<sup>7</sup> For instance, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998, 307) contend that several of the new small states of the former Soviet bloc would not have pursued independence if not for an environment of freer trade.

1996, 19). By creating and enhancing these international forums, European integration may actually encourage separatism, albeit as an unintended consequence of supporting minority rights (Olzak 1983, 370). While it is apparent that most of the sub-national movements predate the European Union, the trends toward an integrated “Europe of the Regions” may exacerbate these tensions, in part by increasing hope of achieving their own independent nation-state or at least greater autonomy.

Determining how regional integration affects regionalism should be particularly valuable for the field of ethnic conflict. Some scholars who study the alleviation of ethnic conflict consider regional integration to be a potentially important tool to achieve this goal. Theorists argue that increasing the size and heterogeneity of a political jurisdiction inhibits the chances for any one group to dominate.<sup>8</sup> India provides an ideal case for this model because its society is divided by multiple cleavages (religious, linguistic, caste, sub-caste, etc.) that decrease the opportunity for any particular sub-group to dominate the entire state (Horowitz 1997, 440-1). From the Indian case, some observers infer that regional integration may reduce ethnic conflict. Evaluating the veracity of this claim could prove important as the European Union expands into Eastern Europe and if the world continues to move towards regional blocs (e.g. the Americas, Asia, and Africa). Thus, when considering the advantages of larger markets and freer trade, scholars and practitioners must also consider the impact on regional autonomy movements.

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<sup>8</sup> Horowitz (1985) discusses this argument, and it is also considered by James Madison in *Federalist* #10.

### *European Integration and the Optimal Size of States*

As international groups such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund claim some decision-making authority while domestic regional units seek more autonomy to control their own affairs, the existence of large traditional states is being challenged from above and below (McCrone 2001, 33). Theoretically, a variety of scholars have addressed whether regions need larger state units to thrive (Birch 1978; Horowitz 1985; Hobsbawm 1990; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Eric Hobsbawm notes that the decline of the ‘national economy’ makes smaller states no less viable than larger ones and that it is plausible that regions make more natural sub-units of the European Union than the traditional states (1990, 185). Hooghe and Marks demonstrate that two types of multi-level governance structures, both geographic-based and policy-oriented or functional, offer alternatives to the centralized state (Marks and Hooghe 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2003).

In recent years, economists have brought their analytic tools to bear on the question of secession or the optimal size of states (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). In particular, Alesina and Spolaore attempt to ascertain the optimal size of states based on a trade-off between economies of scale and the ‘costs of heterogeneity.’<sup>9</sup> Whereas a larger country will be able to provide public goods at a lower per capita cost (due to larger populations and economies of scale), decisions will be more politically difficult because the population is more heterogeneous (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Within the

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<sup>9</sup> Most of the political economy literature ignores the intrinsic value in self-determination for certain people.

institutional framework of the supranational organization, European regions see themselves as more capable of providing sustained economic growth than the traditional nation-states (Newhouse 1997, 69).

Though the political economy literature on the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and public good provision is continually expanding (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Miguel 2003), the costs of heterogeneity still tend to be assumed rather than empirically demonstrated; however, Charles Tilly discusses two reasons why cultural homogeneity benefits a state. First, a homogeneous population is less likely to rebel against a government of its own subgroup. Second, and likely a more significant reason for economists, a government of a homogeneous population tends to be more successful at public policies because the day-to-day lives of the people are more similar (Tilly 1975, 79). A third advantage to locally controlled public policy concerns accountability. Regions may achieve greater efficiency if they are able to both cater public policies to the specific area and through easier monitoring (Drèze 1993, 277).<sup>10</sup> Due to this comparative advantage, European regions may see themselves as more capable of providing sustained economic growth than the traditional nation-states (Newhouse 1997, 69).

Yet while large states must pay the costs of heterogeneity, their advantages are numerous and worthy of reconsidering in this era of the European Union:

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<sup>10</sup> In a critique of Drèze's model of regional autonomy, Jeremy Edwards (1993, 290+) questions whether the benefits of smallness are quite so obvious. He argues that geography and preference homogeneity may not be correlated as highly as commonly assumed; thus, any voting system would be unable to make all voters in a region happy with the public good policies. Certainly, this is an empirical question which Alesina and Spolaore simply assume away, but the recent strand of political economy literature suggests that their assumption may have validity.

Larger political jurisdictions bring about several benefits. First, the per capita cost of any nonrival public good decreases with the number of people who finance it. . . . A second benefit of country size is related to the dimensions of markets. In a world of less than perfect free trade, the size of markets is affected by the size of political jurisdictions . . . Third, exposure to uninsurable shocks is more costly for smaller countries. A region of a large country hit by an idiosyncratic, region-specific, negative shock is compensated with redistribution from the rest of the country. . . . Last, but not least, security considerations may be a determinant of size (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1028).

Nevertheless, I contend that European integration diminishes these advantages of large states vis-à-vis small states, making smaller less heterogeneous states more appealing to regional elites (and citizens). Considering both globalization and regional integration, Anthony Birch likewise concludes that the ‘balance of advantage’ between small and large states has shifted to the advantage of the smaller state (1978, 335-6). Below, I consider the advantages of large states as they pertain to European integration, focusing on how integration has diminished these advantages.

The first advantage concerns public goods. The larger a population, the less a public good will cost per capita;<sup>11</sup> thus, larger states have a decided advantage. However, many public goods (e.g. stable monetary policy, foreign policy, trade authority) are increasingly handled at the supranational level. The EU’s Solidarity Fund for Disaster Relief and the Commission’s Rapid Response Centre demonstrate how the EU may provide some of the collective goods for smaller countries. In addition to certain collective goods, the Union also provides regulatory policy. For

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<sup>11</sup> Public goods of this type include: a “monetary and financial system, tax collection and fiscal institutions, a legal and judiciary system, infrastructures, communication systems, law and order, public libraries, national parks, [and] embassies” (Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 20). Admittedly, this statement is not true for all public goods because every type of public good may not benefit from economies of scale. For many public goods, though, size or scale is beneficial.

smaller countries, such guidelines reduce the regulation needed for individual countries, particularly new countries. Moreover, the economics literature is increasingly concerned about the correlations between growth problems, poor public policies and high levels of ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine 1997). At the very least, the scale advantage for larger states is diminishing as integration increases.

The second, perhaps key, benefit of a larger country is the size of economic markets. For countries small and large, access to a larger market is valuable in domestic economic growth. If large barriers to trade exist, countries must expand their state boundaries to gain a larger market. A union among the nations of the British Isles certainly facilitated economic growth during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries (Birch 1977, 41). But the consequence of size of individual countries diminishes as the barriers to trade (both tariff and non-tariff) between European countries continue to decrease. Also, the European Union now serves as a proxy for individual states in many international trade forums, giving smaller countries the advantage of the backing of a larger market (the second largest internationally) to gain access to international markets abroad. In the context of an integrated Europe, the size of the state itself is less critical for economic activity because it no longer relates directly to market size (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1040). Hence, it is no longer necessary to trade local autonomy for access to global or even regional markets (Birch 1978, 335-6).

The third issue is that a smaller state will be more susceptible to regional economic shocks. Usually, federal policies attempt to protect regions from

‘asymmetric adverse shocks’ through redistribution transfers and insurance schemes (Bureau and Champsaur 1992, 88; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Larger states can afford transfers from prosperous areas to subsidize regions suffering from these economic shocks (e.g. industrial decline or weather related disasters). The potential loss of such subsidies actually served to diminish enthusiasm for independence among the Scottish during the 1970s. The Scottish National Party could not convince factory workers that seceding from the United Kingdom would not result in even more unemployment if the subsidies stopped and access to the British market was blocked (Esman 1977c, 266-7).

Increasingly, the European Union seems capable of serving in this capacity to a certain degree (Bureau and Champsaur 1992, 90).<sup>12</sup> For example, structural funds from the European Union have six distinct goals, including assistance to areas affected by low GDP, high unemployment, sparse population, and industrial decline (Allen 1996, 225). Certainly, these European-level transfers are relatively small compared to state-level subsidies, but structural funds, among other European-level initiatives, may alleviate some of the small state disadvantages associated with ‘asymmetric adverse shocks.’

Finally, size traditionally affects the security of states. In Anthony Birch’s analysis, the interdependent international system removed this key advantage of larger ‘multipurpose’ states vis-à-vis smaller states in Europe (1978, 335). As he points out, the Scottish and Welsh nations would be just as protected by NATO,

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<sup>12</sup> In 1992, the EU budget grew at a faster rate than EU GDP and EU member country’s budgets. This growth can be attributed, in large part, to the structural funds.

which acts to protect Europe, and the superpowers if they became independent as they would if they remained part of the United Kingdom. Plus, they may gain by reducing expenditures on defense spending (Birch 1978, 335).<sup>13</sup> Along these lines, the Scottish National Party argues that Scotland could be as safe as Ireland or Norway with fewer per capita defense expenditures. Further, once the Soviet Union collapsed, this argument became decidedly more believable (Esman 1977c, 266).<sup>14</sup> Though Birch referred mainly to NATO in 1978, his point would be even more convincing if the European Union formed its own multinational army.

Though this brief discussion does not address all the advantages and disadvantages of size, I argue that European integration devalues critical roles of the state. Or as Marks and Hooghe contend,

The logical implication of neoclassical theory is that national states are both too large and too small. Too large, because they encompass heterogeneous populations that are best served by local jurisdictions; too small, because they cannot encompass the territorial scope of market exchange or of policies that have international externalities (2000, 799).

By utilizing economies of scale to improve functionality in some issue areas, such as monetary and environmental policy, integration allows sub-national units to claim legitimate authority over other issues that could be better handled at that level. Since the European Union handles many of the functional tasks of the state and reduces a

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<sup>13</sup> The situation may not be quite as simple as presented. New states may be forced to provide armies or support to NATO in return for defense. This type of expenditure may eliminate any advantage gained by ending support for a larger national army.

<sup>14</sup> Alesina and Spolaore find evidence that the disappearance of the Soviet threat may explain the resurgence of regionalism through Europe (1997, 1045).

key advantage of large states, the trade-off between large and small states has shifted in favor of smaller less heterogeneous states.

### *Extending the Model*

The optimal size of states has decreased due to regional integration and broader globalization trends. Based on this analysis, Alesina and Spolaore conclude that European integration has changed the incentives sufficiently to encourage independence movements; however, their model is a theoretical formalization and is not fully tested empirically. Also, the model leaves a puzzle for empirical researchers. If the advantages of smaller states (homogeneous preferences) are so great and the advantages of large states so diminished, then why are so few sub-national groups pursuing outright independence in Europe? Further, does this rational cost-benefit approach towards the optimal size of states offer any explanatory power over the cultural autonomy movements that do not desire independence from the larger state?

A major deficiency in the model is the lack of full consideration on the advantages of smallness. The advantages are attributed to more homogeneous preferences, but little consideration is given to what type of preferences. The economic models are decidedly vague about whether it is cultural, economic, political or some other type of preferences. Rather, they utilize distance from the capital as a simpler proxy for different preferences to observe and model (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). If there are territorial differences in culture, political

preferences, or economic interest, then a region will be more likely to pursue more autonomy from the capital. In those regions that have a combination of these different preferences, an even stronger case can be made for sub-national movements. By exploring these types of preferences more explicitly, I can better explain cross-regional variation.

In the standard model, smaller states have an advantage because their preferences will be more homogeneous and, therefore, their governments will be easier to choose and monitor, making public goods better for their population. But homogeneous preferences by themselves are not enough to warrant sub-national mobilization for independence. The preferences must be (relatively) homogeneous within the region *and* the preferences must be distinct from nearby regions or the larger state itself. For instance, if citizens in Northern England have homogeneous preferences but they are similar to their Southern English counterparts, then there is no reason to pursue autonomy. Or a sub-national group may have homogeneous preferences on one issue (e.g. language in Brittany) but indistinct preferences on many other issues.

In addition, the mobility of the population or the exit option plays a significant role (Hirschman 1970). These additional factors may be crucial in not only explaining why cultural autonomy but not independence, but also why certain cohesive groups desire autonomy whereas others do not. For instance, the issue of preferences may matter less if the population is highly mobile. If people have made specific investments in the region, either cultural or economic, then they will be

relatively immobile. This immobility interacted with distinct homogeneous preferences may explain when sub-national movements take the incentives given by the European Union and pursue some form of autonomy.

For example, Scotland appears to have distinct ideological preferences from the rest of the United Kingdom, particularly England. Scotland's electorate and political elite are much more sympathetic to leftist and socialist causes than those in England. The population in Scotland is relatively homogeneous and their preferences are certainly distinct from the larger state, perhaps more in line with Scandinavian countries. Also, Scotland is a relatively cohesive region with a history of self-government and independence. For language reasons or simply strong ties to the land, moving to Sweden is not a viable option for most Scots. The combination of distinct homogeneous preferences and labor immobility creates an environment where independence is on the agenda, with support from many of the political elite and the population. Further, independence within a deeper European Union is a viable economic option whereas full independence is not.

The Bretons in France are a second example. The Celtic language and customs are one area in which Bretons have distinct homogeneous preferences; however, ideologically and politically, Bretons do not have enough preference differences with the rest of France to actually consider independence. Thus, in Brittany, cultural autonomy is the goal rather than independence. While the European Union may create an environment where an independent Brittany is viable, neither the elites nor the populace has enough incentive to pursue it.

In addition to homogeneous cultural preferences, income distribution patterns may create an advantage for being smaller (see Bolton and Roland 1997). A relatively rich region may consider autonomy worthwhile simply because their region distributes more money to the center than it receives. The Northern League is an obvious recent example. Some Northern Italians support Lega Nord because they resent subsidizing southern Italy and Rome. Ties to the region prevent fluid labor mobility to Switzerland or other neighboring regions outside Italy. As with distinct homogeneous preferences, this combination encourages autonomy movements because the advantage of being small seems clear and obvious. As the deepening of the European Union erodes some of the advantages of being a region within a large state, the cost-benefit analysis may shift to independence or at least greater autonomy.

In other words, as the advantages of a large heterogeneous state diminish, the incentives for regional mobilization should increase. Alesina and Spolaore agree as they discuss two empirical implications of their economic model: “First, political separatism should go hand in hand with economic integration. . . . The second implication is that the benefit of country size on economic performance should decrease with the increase of international economic integration and removal of trade barriers” (1997, 1042). But Alesina and Spolaore do not evaluate the empirical validity of this causal mechanism in Europe. In this research project, I plan to investigate whether regional integration in fact encourages regional autonomy

movements. Below, I will briefly consider alternative theories and the proposed research design to evaluate this theory.

### *Alternative Theories*

In many ways, the main alternative theory is the null hypothesis. In other words, if I do not provide evidence to support the descriptive inference that European integration increases sub-national mobilization, then it would suggest that either integration does not impact ethno-national mobilization or integration has impacted tension in a random, rather than systematic, way.<sup>15</sup> Countering the benefits of homogeneity, the costs of secession could be quite large, including both the transaction costs of seceding and creating a new country and the market uncertainty associated with such upheaval (Young 1992, 124). These costs may discourage some regionalists from pursuing autonomy despite the improved incentives. Research on the interaction of globalization and sub-national autonomy suggest that while globalization may reinforce already assertive regions, it does not necessarily have a general effect on autonomy demands (van Houten 2003).<sup>16</sup> However, much of the

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<sup>15</sup> Potentially, integration may actually discourage further mobilization, which would also serve as disconfirming evidence. According to Yash Ghai:

This diminution of national sovereignty opens up possibilities of new arrangements between the state and its regions. The benefits work both ways: the state feels less threatened by regions in a multi-layered structure of policy-making and administration: and the region becomes more willing to accept national sovereignty, which may be the key to its participation in the wider arrangements. This trend is most developed in the European Union, where it is helping to moderate tensions and border regions previously intent on secession (1998, 158).

<sup>16</sup> Following van Houten, globalization is defined as a “process of economic integration, in which ‘the reduction of barriers to economic exchange and factor mobility gradually creates one economic space from many’” (2003).

research on globalization is limited in looking at only one time period or only considering one dependent variable to measure autonomy demands. Thus, I argue that it is premature to conclude that globalization does not affect sub-national mobilization. Further, I contend that while the EU may simply be an advanced form of globalization, it goes further in political and economic terms than just reducing trade barriers. Nevertheless, I must address this literature's negative findings in my research.

In direct contrast to the main viability mechanism, it may be uncertainty that drives increased ethnic tension. As state sovereignty transfers to the supra-national level, it becomes less clear to ethno-national or regional groups how the state (or supranational state) will manage or treat them in the new situation. Also, groups may be wary of losing cultural identity themselves within a supranational Europe. Furthermore, European monetary integration could provide some disincentive to independence because, even if secession were successful, countries would still not have autonomy over its currency or monetary policy (Lindsay 1991; Lynch 1996, 200-1). This uncertainty might lead to diminished support for the European project rather than the symbiotic relationship predicted above. For these reasons, some parties may even draw support with an anti-EU platform.

While this alternative seems plausible, Peter Lynch finds little support for it among minority nationalist parties. He notes that these political parties show no concern over a potential loss of cultural identity:

Clearly, for minority nationalists, the European Union is no melting-pot destined to turn Basques, Bretons, Catalans and Scots into hyphenated Europeans. Indeed, it seems more likely that the very plurality of European culture and identity – in which there can be no hegemonic culture promoted by the centre of the EU – actually facilitates some of the cultural and political arguments of minority nationalism” (Lynch 1996, 198-9).

Despite this initial skepticism towards this alternative theory, an auxiliary theory also provides an alternative to the viability model.

It may not be that regional groups embrace the EU as a means of making smaller independent countries more viable. Rather, it could simply be that some regional groups are the focal point for opposition to globalization and European integration (van Houten 2003, 113-118). Regional political parties may use this opposition as a mechanism to draw support to their movement. Fear of assimilation, potential loss of jobs, and animosity towards immigrants each could factor into supporting regional parties. And a deeper European Union would only serve to exacerbate these concerns. Regional politicians may utilize this public backlash against the EU to increase support for the movement.

In the following pages, I introduce a research design that will allow me to test the descriptive inference, or that European integration does encourage sub-national mobilization, and the causal inference, or that this link can be attributed to the optimal size of states, or viability, logic rather than fear or xenophobia.

### ***Research Design***

This research design is a quasi-experiment, with the “treatment” being various stages of European integration, including before and after the Treaty of Rome,

Maastricht, and the introduction of the Euro. Thus, the main analysis will be longitudinal, though I will also include relevant non-treatment cross-national cases, such as countries prior to joining the EU. This design allows for variation in the key explanatory variable (integration) as well as the dependent variable (sub-national mobilization). This longitudinal regional study should alleviate the extreme form of selecting on the dependent variable by including regions pursuing various levels of autonomy along with negative examples.

The nature of this research question precludes direct and straightforward testing. So I utilize multiple approaches, such as cross-national quantitative, detailed analysis of party rhetoric, and survey analysis, to triangulate on the problem. Following the advice of *Designing Social Inquiry*, I attempt to falsify my theory through these observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 100). If the evidence supports the theory, it will have implications for policy-makers and academics.

In this project, I divide the empirical work into several chapters, focusing on different units of analysis: political parties, in terms of when and where they compete, their relative electoral success, and their attitudes toward European integration, and individuals. In the following pages, I outline the research design for the empirical chapters.

## *Observing Mobilization*

In the study of sub-national mobilization and regional integration, several observable implications present opportunities to test the viability theory, as well as other key alternative theories. Studying regional parties and individual support for the movements in a variety of ways will allow triangulation on the problem. It seems obvious that no single indicator or operationalization will be convincing by itself. Similarly, neither qualitative nor quantitative analysis is sufficient by itself to adequately investigate this research question. To ensure both external and internal validity, I will use the two methods to complement each other, both by relying on the cumulative knowledge in the literature and in my own empirical research.

Before turning to the observable implications, it may be helpful to explore the control variables that will be used throughout this analysis. While European integration will be the key explanatory variable,<sup>17</sup> it must be emphasized that the

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<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, a measure for depth of European or regional integration is not available off-the-shelf. For this dissertation, I utilize a variety of measures for robustness, including simple dummy variables for the major treaties, an index of these stages, and a Supranational Governance Index drawn from Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe and Marks 2001). In future work, I intend to develop a latent depth of integration variable to track changes in the scope and depth of political and economic integration in regional organizations, guided by the model of economic integration outlined by the economist Bela Balassa:

In a *free-trade area*, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against nonmembers. Establishing a *customs union* involves, besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union, the equalization of tariffs in trade with nonmember countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a *common market*, where not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An *economic union* ... combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of harmonization of national economic policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies. Finally, *total economic integration* presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states" (Balassa 1961, 2, emphasis added).

relative status of a group may complicate the motivations for mobilization. Donald Horowitz considers under what conditions secession is likely for advanced (or backward) groups in advanced countries and advanced (or backward) groups in backward countries. In the case of advanced groups in advanced countries, such as the Basques in Spain or the Northern League in Italy, their grievance tends to be that they are subsidizing poorer regions (Horowitz 1981, 184). The decision to secede for these groups, though, still depends largely on the costs of secession. In this calculation, Basque capitalists tended to reject calls for separatism, as they remained fearful of the economic consequences of competing alone in the world market (Horowitz 1981, 186). As the European Union grows deeper and the costs of secession seem lower, capitalists should be more supportive of independence or at least autonomy.

In addition, I will consider the strategic behavior of both mainstream political parties as well as the state to evaluate the effect on these sub-national movements. States are not innocent bystanders in this process and their evolving relationship with their regional units will affect the movements. Indeed, Rudolph and Thompson find that states are remarkably successful in placating sub-national movements with public sector policies and rather less so when they use repressive tactics (1985). Political options to placate sub-national demands range from output concessions, or public policy changes to resolve some of the grievances of the groups, to changing the constitution to a more power-sharing model, to devolution (Keating 1988, 173). The state can also pursue either ethnic cleansing or ethnic assimilation to eradicate the

differences that contribute to the movements (Roessingh 1996, 27). As fears of traditional inter-state violence among the Western world seem less worrisome, some central political leaders may concede certain levels of autonomy in return for less mobilization and a more docile populace. Certainly, it may be the dominant group in a state as well as the sub-national groups such as the Basques who perceive advantages in smaller more homogeneous states within the European Union; however, the potential “rump state” may be less willing to consider autonomy if the region under consideration is an engine for economic growth and a net government transfer payer. In considering sub-national mobilization, it will be necessary to explore the varied reactions of the traditional states and the incentives for the central political leaders to concede autonomy.

### ***Observable Implications***

Based on this strategic account of elite behavior and the framing of the European Union as a mechanism to make independence more viable, the theory has clear implications for electoral support for regional parties. If parties utilize the European Union as described above, then more citizens will view the region as a viable independent entity within the EU. This realization should fuel more support for regional parties, who generally support greater autonomy for their region, either in terms of cultural autonomy, fiscal federalism, or outright independence. Using a dataset compiled from various sources, including Caramani’s dataset of electoral data (2000), Eurostat’s political economic variables (Eurostat 2004), and the Comparative

Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001), I test this implication at two stages, both when and where the regional political parties decide to compete in national parliamentary elections (Chapter 3) and how well the parties do once they enter competition (Chapter 4).

A corollary to this implication is if regional parties see the European Union as an ally in their quest for autonomy, then party manifestos should reflect a greater level of support for the project as it deepens. Similarly, the rhetoric of party leaders should reflect this rational-choice logic. Contrary to the opportunity mechanism, fear of immigration or economic dislocation associated with economic integration may diminish party support for European integration. Party elites may utilize this fear to attack the European Union. Using elite surveys of party positions, I directly address this empirical question in Chapter 5.

In fact, some evidence already exists to support the viability hypothesis. As far back as the 1920s, the Parti Autonomiste Breton (PAB) stated its objective as political autonomy for Brittany but sought a European federation to preserve military and economic security (Lynch 1996, 87). President Pujol, from Spanish Catalonia, is considered to be an enthusiastic European, in part because he perceives the EU as an ally to help distance his region from Spain (Newhouse 1997, 77).

In Scotland, many Scottish National Party leaders have utilized exactly this type of language over the last 25 years. In 1976, for example, MP Jim Sillars makes numerous linkages between European integration and devolution, justifying this link by theorizing that the European Community eliminates some of the disadvantages

associated with separatism, thereby making independence a more viable option (Lynch 1996, 36). In the 1980s, Sillars convinces the SNP to support a pro-European position as a “mechanism to avoid economic dislocation in the event of secession from the UK” (Lynch 1996, 39). Scottish MP Gordon Wilson apparently agreed with this logic in 1983, describing the Scottish National Party’s support for the European Union as ““a first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of economic dislocation. Within the common trading umbrella the move to independence can take place smoothly and easily”” (Lynch 1996, 38). Thus, activists use the EU to negate the arguments against autonomy based on fears of economic upheaval (Gallagher 1991). This justificatory logic supports the reasoning behind the causal mechanism.

Opinion surveys will provide additional leverage on the research question. Using individual-level survey data from Scotland, I investigate mass support for autonomy movements. If the theory is correct, as the European Union deepens, overall public support for autonomy should increase, *ceteris paribus*. For example, nearly a third of the Scottish population supports independence within the European Union (McMillan 1996, 80). Further, they should consider independence to be a more viable constitutional option, in part because the European Union provides an alternative to the central state.

The distribution of supporters should change as well. Traditionally in the Basque country, the middle class and the lower clergy have been the most ardent supporters while industrialists, fearing the economic disruption that may result from

independence, have been less supportive of Basque nationalism (Linz 1973; da Silva 1975, 241). But capitalists or industrialists should be more supportive of autonomy if the European Union provides more economic security than independence without such a union. Thus, a new “bourgeois regionalism” should emerge in response to the changing economic context (van Houten 2003, 10). Admittedly, support for nationalism in the traditional sense is fairly limited (e.g. 15% in Corsica, 10% in the Basque country) (Crowley 2000, 98-99). Nonetheless, if public opinion data demonstrate that deeper European integration influences support for sub-national autonomy movements, particularly within the economic elites, then the evidence supports the theory. I test these observable implications in Chapter 6.

### *Discussion*

Using the research design described above, I evaluate the validity of the optimal size of states theory in the European context. First, I evaluate the veracity of the descriptive inference. Does European integration actually encourage citizens to support sub-national movements, either in the guise of regional political parties or simply public opinion surveys? The main alternative to the viability theory is simply the null hypothesis, which would suggest that cultural or economic factors affected support for sub-national movements with no input from European integration.

Second, I focus on the causal mechanism. For multiple observable implications, the viability argument and the fear mechanism yield the same prediction. For instance, both mechanisms predict that deeper integration will lead to

more support for regional political parties, albeit for entirely different reasons. But these two mechanisms do have divergent predictions on other observable implications. For both the political party attitudes toward European integration and the individual-level support for autonomy, the viability argument suggests that parties and citizens will be more supportive of integration, and that a positive view of integration will affect the perceptions of the viability of independence. The fear mechanism, on the other hand, predicts that regional political parties will oppose European integration precisely to garner favor with voters skeptical of the project.

In the following pages, I subject these hypotheses to thorough and varied empirical testing. If successful, the dissertation can contribute to a larger research program that can both test the external validity of the theory, in terms of other regional integration projects, and to a greater understanding of the effects of integration for practitioners. Potentially, proponents of regional integration will be forced to consider a trade-off between the economic benefits of integration and greater sub-national mobilization and fragmentation when evaluating regional integration.

**Part 2.**

**Another Reason to Party?  
European Integration and Regional Political Parties**

## Chapter 3

### The Incidence of Regional Political Parties

Even if the EU does not make 80 percent of the decisions that affect European citizens' lives (Moravcsik 2005), there is little question that the EU has a tremendous influence on all aspects of European political and economic life. Yet scholars are just beginning to understand the influence of European integration on the structure of political contestation at the national level (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Further, while efforts to explain success of sub-national, or regional, movements exist, the effects of European integration on sub-national mobilization in general, and regional political parties in particular, remain under-tested and under-theorized, leaving an important empirical question unanswered: does European integration affect the decision of regional political parties to compete in national level elections?

Drawing implications from the work of economists, such as Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and the comparative politics literature on new parties (Kitschelt 1995; Hug 2001; Meguid 2005), I develop hypotheses regarding the incidence of regional political parties, such as the Scottish National Party, the Plaid Cymru, and the Basque National Party. On the demand or 'push' side, cultural and economic differences drive the decisions of regional political parties to compete in national-level elections. But the opportunity structure for these parties, or the 'pull' factor, matters as well. If the political marketplace is crowded or the mainstream parties incorporate these demands into their platforms, then the potential regional political party will not materialize. In addition to these domestic factors, I argue that increased

European integration actually encourages regional parties to enter political competition.

In this chapter, I extend both the literature on new parties in Europe and on regional political parties. Demonstrating that the EU affects the behavior of regional political parties adds to the multi-level governance literature by justifying the conclusion that political arenas are “interconnected rather than nested” (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 4). Also, this analysis contributes to the literature on regional political parties as one of the first time-series-cross-section statistical analysis of the incidence of regional political parties.

In the first section, I consider two theories that attempt to explain the strategic interaction of mainstream parties and potential new parties. From this discussion, I draw empirical implications for the incidence of regional political parties. Next, I briefly review the determinants of regional party success in national-level elections. Third, I discuss two plausible causal mechanisms that predict an increased probability of new regional political party incidence under a political opportunity structure characterized by deeper European integration. In the fourth section, using a dataset of all regions within the EU-14 from 1950-1997,<sup>18</sup> I demonstrate that a deeper EU has indeed encouraged more regional parties to compete in national elections. Nevertheless, the demand side of the equation still largely determines the entry of regional political parties into electoral competition while the political opportunity structure plays a smaller role.

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<sup>18</sup> The dataset excludes Luxembourg. The end point of the time-series is simply the final election collected by Caramani (2000). In future work, I will extend the analysis to include recent elections.

### *Explaining New Parties in Europe*

With the electoral success of Green and New Radical Right parties throughout many West European countries, scholars turned their attention to explaining these movements. Many authors focus on specific types of new parties (Kitschelt 1995), while others attempt to study the general phenomenon (Hug 2001; Meguid 2005; Tavits 2006). From these studies, the determinants of regional party entry can usefully be divided into the problem, or 'push,' and the opportunity, or 'pull' (Rüdig 1990). Though I focus on regional political parties, the lessons from these complementary studies are valuable.

On the demand side, salient new issues create the 'push' for new parties. For Green parties, the controversy over nuclear energy, among other issues, created a push for alternative representation in parliaments (Kitschelt 1989). For new radical right parties, immigration concerns and economic insecurity often fuel support (Hug 2001, 4). Though the introduction of a new issue into the political dialogue is not sufficient to create a new political party, the 'push' factor is clearly critical.

For regional political parties, it is not surprising that regional issues drive demand for new political representation (Hug 2001, 3). However, underlying these demands must be a certain level of preference heterogeneity, either in cultural or economic terms. In other words, citizens who live in a region which is different from the rest of the country are more likely to support regional parties (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; de Winter and Türsan 1998). Thus, the 'push' for regional parties often comes from cultural or economic difference.

Significantly, though, new demand is necessary but it may not be sufficient (Kitschelt 1995; Hug 2001). Successful new party entry also depends on the opportunity, or 'pull.' The opportunity structure includes the political institutions, such as electoral laws, but it also includes the strategies of mainstream parties. Hug argues that most studies of new parties fail to appreciate the importance of mainstream parties (2001, 37), but several recent studies take the strategic opportunity structure seriously when considering new party formation. In fact, Meguid argues that “rising party success is not a mere reflection of the institutional or sociological characteristics of a specific society. It is the result of deliberate strategic responses by actors powerful enough to shape said environment” (2002, 2). These recent studies provide lessons about the potential effect of mainstream party strategies on regional political party entry and electoral success.

Using a spatial model, Kitschelt contends that when the mainstream parties converge, there is space for new parties to enter the political marketplace (1995). In his analysis of the new radical right, Kitschelt argues that whether a successful new radical right party emerges depends on the opportunity structure of party competition (1995, 14). When mainstream parties converge, space is opened up for right-wing entrepreneurs to exploit. It is only when this space is open that political entrepreneurs can attempt to seize the opportunity with a winning strategy of their own (Kitschelt 1995, 14). In different ways, both Meguid (2002; 2005) and Hug (2001) argue that mainstream parties can subvert potential new parties by incorporating their new issue into their platform. By accommodating new issues, the mainstream parties decrease

the 'push' for new parties.<sup>19</sup> Theoretically, Hug contends that mainstream parties can adopt the demands of the potential parties and reduce the likelihood of new entry (Hug 2001, 53); however, he does not directly empirically test whether the mainstream party strategies affect new party entry (Hug 2001, 118). Empirically, Meguid does attempt to test whether mainstream party strategies affect new party entry; her cross-sectional time series evidence confirms that mainstream party strategies do affect the electoral strength of rising parties (Meguid 2002, 20). For all three authors, though, the decision of new parties to enter political competition hinges directly on the strategies of the mainstream parties.

From this brief discussion, several determinants of new party incidence emerge. Both the 'push' and the 'pull' must be considered. From the more general studies of new parties, factors such as economic growth and unemployment often drive demand (Hug 2001; Meguid 2002). For regional political parties, in particular, preference heterogeneity, in terms of cultural or economic difference from the rest of the country, must be included. As discussed above, though, demand is not sufficient. I must also account for the opportunity structure for new parties. Both political institutional factors and the strategic behavior of mainstream parties influence this factor. By utilizing both 'push' and 'pull' factors to explain the decision of regional political parties to enter political competition, I will be able to explain more positive cases.

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<sup>19</sup> Meguid (2002) considers multiple mainstream party strategies, including accommodative, dismissive, and adversarial, but I focus on accommodative strategies in this paper.

### *Evaluating the Determinants of Regional Political Party Success*

Previous attempts to explain the electoral success of regional parties in national level elections focus on cultural variables and political economic variables, with the evidence suggesting that cultural or linguistic difference affects regional party success more than traditional political economic variables (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002).

For regional political parties in Europe, most studies include historical language of the region as an explanatory variable and conclude that language trumps political economic variables as a causal variable (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002). For Fearon and van Houten, among others, language provides a proxy for nationalist potential that is independent of the measure for regionalist political activity (2002, 23). Further, as van Houten argues, many studies of regional mobilization in Europe “consider culture differences to be at least a *necessary* condition to give rise to regional assertiveness” (2000, 8). Cultural difference, in the form of historical language, must be considered a significant potential explanatory variable in any empirical model of regional mobilization.

Relative economic well-being should influence support for regional parties. In the case of advanced groups in advanced countries, such as the Basques in Spain or the Northern League in Italy, their grievance tends to be that they are subsidizing poorer regions or that the center’s economic policies are holding their growth down (Horowitz 1981, 184). Along these lines, the Scottish National Party attempts to garner favor among voters by demonstrating that Scotland is subsidizing the rest of

the United Kingdom (Begg and Stewart 1971, 148). Though theoretical debates remain over whether rich or poor regions will be more assertive (Hechter 1975), extant empirical studies suggest that richer regions are now expected to be the more assertive regions (de Winter 1998; van Houten 2000, 28; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002, 2).<sup>20</sup>

In previous studies of regional political party success, political decentralization is relatively neglected. One exception is Gerring (2005) who finds that minor parties perform better in federal systems, at least in plurality systems which are the focus of his study (Gerring 2005, 80). Yet there are two opposing predictions for the relationship between decentralization and regional political party entry. From Hechter (2000a), there is an expectation that when governments devolve power to the regions, electoral support for regional political parties will diminish. Basically, Hechter argues that when a central government is responsive to the demands of regional groups, it reduces the incentive to support regionalist parties (2000a, 122). But the effect of decentralization is non-linear in this logic. At higher levels of devolution, decentralization may actually increase electoral support for regional political parties. Beyond a certain threshold, more political authority could increase support for regional political parties because it provides regional political leaders resources to combat collective action problems and provides them experience at lower levels of government that increases their likelihood of success at higher levels (Brancati 2004, 2). Thus, political decentralization may decrease electoral

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<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately, consistent cross-regional income distribution data are not available for the full time series (van Houten 2000, 10), so I will not be able to fully test these alternative theories.

support for regional political parties up to a point. Beyond this threshold, though, decentralization will increase support.

A competing logic exists, though. At low levels of devolution, decentralization does not satiate the appetite of proponents of regional autonomy but in fact may increase opportunities for regional political entrepreneurs to gather support. But at a certain level or threshold, the regional proponents achieve their goals and there is reduced demand for this particular form of political representation. Thus, a non-linear prediction remains but in the opposite direction: the relationship between decentralization and regional party incidence would be increasing at low levels of decentralization and decreasing at higher levels.

Finally, several authors attempt to find a relationship between proportional representation (PR) and support for regional parties. Though the general literature on electoral systems predicts that PR should increase the support for small parties, such as regional ones, several authors find that when it has an effect on regional parties, PR actually dampens support for regional parties (de Winter 1998, 219; Gordin 2001, 164; Pereira, Villodres, and Nieto 2003, 11). Generally, plurality systems are expected to discourage small parties in part because voters strategically decide between major parties rather than waste their votes (Pereira, Villodres, and Nieto 2003, 6). But the geographic concentration of regional minorities may explain this somewhat counter-intuitive finding, particularly in Europe. Since regional political parties only compete in six European countries, an electoral system variable would simply be a dummy for the United Kingdom.

Thus, most of the literature focuses on the demand-side of territorial devolution rather than the supply-side.<sup>21</sup> In the next section, though, I argue for the importance of a previously neglected variable: European integration.

### ***European Integration and Regional Parties***

Though European integration is rarely considered a factor when discussing domestic elections and regional parties, there are two plausible causal mechanisms that predict deeper European integration will in fact increase support for regional political parties. First, the European Union makes smaller states more viable by diminishing the advantages of larger state size (Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). For regional political entrepreneurs, this increased viability increases the credibility of their party and demands for greater autonomy. Second, the European Union may provide a focal point for politicians to complain against globalization, immigration, and loss of sovereignty. Regional movements may utilize the threat of encroaching authority of Brussels to rally supporters to its cause. In addition to yet another distant government informing regions what to do, increased labor mobility from outside Western Europe threatens the cultural homogeneity of regions. After briefly reviewing each causal mechanism, I will discuss the observable implications for electoral success of regional political parties.

Quite simply, European integration has created conditions under which regional groups (e.g. the Scottish) may not need the status quo state (e.g. United

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<sup>21</sup> For a longer literature review on the electoral success of regional parties, see Chapter 4.

Kingdom) to thrive internationally. The European Union decreases regional dependency on the nation-state in both economic (e.g. international trade and monetary policy) and political terms (e.g. defense, foreign policy, and minority rights). In other words, the European Union system of multi-level governance increases the viability of smaller states, thereby creating additional incentive for citizens to support regional political parties. For economists, the theoretical result is a smaller optimal size of states in Europe under the umbrella of the European Union and a system of free(er) trade (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg 1998; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000; Wittman 2000; Casella and Feinstein 2002; Alesina and Spolaore 2003).

In historical terms, several factors encouraged economically larger states (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). First, in a world of relatively large barriers to trade, the size of the state was also the size of the economic market. Thus, the larger the market, the more successful was the economy. But in a world of (relatively) free trade, small countries may be prosperous (Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 82). Despite the continued prevalence of non-tariff barriers to trade, such as anti-dumping claims (Kramer 2004), barriers to trade have diminished in recent years. This trend is nowhere more developed than in the European Union, which is a common market for goods, services, and labor. Thus, so long as a country belongs to the EU, market size is not simply the size of state. Or as Hooghe and Marks note: “The single European market reduces the economic penalty imposed by regional political autonomy because regional firms continue to have access to the European market” (2001, 166).

By breaking the link between state size and market size, the European Union diminishes a significant advantage of larger states.

Second, larger state size is advantageous because public goods benefit from economies of scale. Similarly, larger states are more capable of providing insurance for regional economic shocks, due to natural or economic disasters, such as earthquakes or deindustrialization (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Though the EU has not replaced the need for large states in these two areas, it certainly has diminished the advantage as the EU provides numerous public goods, such as monetary and trade policy, and subsidizes less developed regions with cohesion and structural funds.

Finally, security concerns often encourage larger state size. But with NATO and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fears of invasion by a foreign country are much diminished. Furthermore, the EU itself is considering a multi-national military. For Western European countries and regions, it is less likely that security concerns would drive decisions about optimal state size.

According to Alesina and Spolaore, the optimal size of a state “emerges from a trade-off between the benefits of scale and the costs of heterogeneity in the population” (2003, 175). Via membership in the European Union, though, the advantages of large states vis-à-vis small states are diminished. But the key cost of a larger state, namely heterogeneity of preferences, remains. Political economists find that economic growth and public policies suffer with greater ethnic heterogeneity

(Easterly and Levine 1997).<sup>22</sup> A government of a homogeneous population tends to be more successful at public policies because the day-to-day lives of the people are more similar (Tilly 1975, 79), while larger states are less efficient at public good provision (Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore 1996, 701). Due to this comparative advantage, European regions may see themselves as more capable of providing sustained economic growth than the traditional nation-states (Newhouse 1997, 69), yielding political separatism as an unintended consequence of economic integration (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1042).

Astute regional political entrepreneurs utilize these trends to argue more convincingly that the region is less dependent on the rest of the country by “fram[ing] their demands in European terms” (Keating 1995, 7). In Scotland in the 1970s, for instance, the Scottish National Party (SNP) could not convince factory workers that seceding from the United Kingdom would not result in even more unemployment if access to the British market was blocked (Esman 1977c, 266-7). In the 1980s, though, former SNP MP Jim Sillars convinced the SNP to support a pro-European position as a “mechanism to avoid economic dislocation in the event of secession from the UK” (Lynch 1996, 39). Scottish MP Gordon Wilson described the Scottish National Party’s support for the European Union as ““a first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of economic dislocation.

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<sup>22</sup> The argument put forth by the economics literature on ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth implies that the disadvantages associated with preference heterogeneity, measured by ethnic fractionalization, outweigh potential benefits from diversity, such as cross-cultural learning, innovation, or creativity. The point is obviously debatable, from either (or both) a normative or empirical perspective. But that issue would be a separate research enterprise than the current one.

Within the common trading umbrella the move to independence can take place smoothly and easily” (Lynch 1996, 38). Thus, activists use the EU to negate the arguments against autonomy based on fears of economic upheaval (Gallagher 1991).

However, it may not be that regional groups embrace the EU as a means of making smaller independent countries more viable. Rather, it could simply be that some regional groups are the focal point for opposition to globalization and European integration (van Houten 2003, 113-118). In other words, integration creates new representation demands, such as a fear of economic competition, which regional parties rise to meet. Similar to the political entrepreneurs of the radical right parties (Kitschelt 1995), regional political parties may use this opposition as a mechanism to draw support to their movement. Fear of assimilation, potential loss of jobs, and animosity towards immigrants each could factor into supporting regional parties. And a deeper European Union would only serve to exacerbate these concerns. Regional politicians may utilize this public backlash against the EU to increase support for the movement.

Though both these mechanisms yield the same observable implication for this research question, namely that deeper European integration will increase support for regional political parties, other observable implications allow for testing under which conditions each mechanism is at work. In Chapters 5 and 6, I explore political party attitudes toward European integration as well as public opinion in Scotland on independence and autonomy to adjudicate between these two theories.

But there is suggestive evidence that the viability theory is correct. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Scottish National Party adopted a policy of independence in Europe, precisely because the EU allowed for political autonomy without fear of economic dislocation (Lynch 1996, 38). Similarly, the Plaid Cymru supported a policy of independence in the EU while encouraging the EU to evolve into a true Europe of the regions (Lynch 1996, 76). Across Europe, Kurzer found that regional politicians are generally enthusiastic about a federal Europe (1997, 43).

Nevertheless, these two divergent causal mechanisms yield similar predictions for the relationship between the European Union and regional political parties. In both cases, deeper integration, in terms of the depth of EU policies or the extent to which the country is experienced with the EU, increases support for regional political parties. As noted above, in the second part of this dissertation, I test under which conditions each of these causal mechanisms is at work. But for the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to note that the observable implications for the incidence and electoral success of regional political parties are the same.

Although there are theoretical reasons to predict an effect of European integration on regional political party electoral success, the literature does not often mention or test for an effect of European integration on support for regional parties. Lancaster and Lewis-Beck test an indirect effect by regressing support for the European Union on evaluation of national party economic policy. They find that EU supporters tend to be less supportive of national party policy, which contributes to a vote for a regional party (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, 39). But European

integration can have a direct effect as well. As more qualitative work suggests, European integration can make the regional party's self-government goals more realistic and, therefore, more attractive to voters (de Winter 1998, 221; Dardanelli 2001, 25). Or in terms of a bargaining model, European integration makes regional parties more attractive both by improving the perceptions of the economic implications of independence as well as the bargaining leverage of regional parties (Fearon and van Houten 2002, 22; Garrett and Rodden 2003, 94). Unfortunately, except for the indirect test of Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, this potential determinant is neglected in the empirical studies. In the next chapter, I find a direct effect of deeper European integration on regional political party success at the district level. Below, I extend this work by considering the factors that affect the incidence of regional political party competition in national elections in regions throughout Western Europe.

### ***Explaining the Incidence of Regional Political Parties***

In the next section, I introduce the dataset and methods I use to test the theoretical propositions regarding regional political party entry. After reviewing the structure of the data and the dependent variable, I discuss the explanatory variables and specific hypotheses. Then, I introduce the model specifications and analyze the incidence of regional political parties in national political competition.

## *Measurement and Hypotheses*

For this dataset, I compiled electoral data for each region in the EU-14 starting in 1950 or the earliest election after democratization.<sup>23</sup> In building the dataset, the first step was to determine the appropriate universe of regions in the fourteen countries because the ‘zeros,’ or non-events, in this case are as important to explaining regional political party entry as those cases where parties do exist.<sup>24</sup>

After matching the regional level in each country with its corresponding EU designated NUTS code, I made an inclusive list of regional parties in Western Europe that competed in national elections between 1950 and 1997. I include parties with a regional agenda, not necessarily parties that only compete in particular regions. Table 3.1 lists those political parties and their respective regions, countries, and elections that are included in this analysis.<sup>25</sup> I include relevant political parties that competed

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<sup>23</sup> Following the Assembly of European Regions, I simply define the region as the “territorial body of public law established at the level immediately below that of the state and endowed with political self-government” (Assembly of European Regions 1996).

<sup>24</sup> In a recent *APSR* article, Mahoney and Goertz contend that the selection of negative cases is a central challenge for qualitative researchers, but also presents problems for other methods such as large-*N* quantitative work, Boolean algebra, and fuzzy-set analysis (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). I am especially sensitive to this issue because I only analyze current EU members. But while all the countries in the sample are current EU members, there is variation in depth of integration across time. Since some countries join later than others, 43% of the entire sample is actually at the no EU level. The time-series allows variation on the key explanatory variable, level of European integration, while maintaining the cross-sectional focus on EU-14 countries. The advantages to this focus are many. First, I want to maximize the level of unit homogeneity within the sample as much as possible. By including the EU-15 countries, excluding Luxembourg, I can control for numerous international variables. Second, the European Union collects cross-national economic data for all EU countries, making the analysis of these variables both easier and more consistent.

<sup>25</sup> The list of regional parties is based on de Winter and Türsan (1998), Caramani (2000), and Pereira, Villodres, and Nieto (2003). Included in my dataset are any parties on these lists for which district-level election data was collected by Caramani. 1997 was the last election year included in the Caramani dataset. Several parties were later incorporated into other regional parties or competed as part of a coalition. These parties are also included, bringing the total to fifty-seven.

in national elections between 1950 and 1997. This coding yielded the dependent variable, which is simply a dichotomous variable across regions in all fourteen countries measuring one if a regional political party competed in the national election held that year.

Table 3.1 Regional Political Parties in Western Europe

Region	Political Parties (English labels)	Contested Elections
<b>Belgium</b>		
Flanders	Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc)	1991-95
	Volksunie (People's Union)	1954-95
Region Wallonne	Front Democratique des Francophones (Democratic Front of Francophones)	1968-91
	Rassemblement Wallon (Walloon Rally)	1968-81
<b>Finland</b>		
	Svenske Folkpartiet (Swedish People's Party)	1951-95
<b>France</b>		
Brittany	Union Democratique Bretonne (Breton Democratic Union)	1986
Corsica	Union di u populu corsu (Union of Corsican People)	1986
<b>Italy</b>		
Northern Italy	Lega Nord, including liga veneta and Lega Lombarda (Northern League)	1983-96
Sardinia	Partido Sardo d'Azione (Party of Sardinia)	1983-87, 1996
Trieste	Associazione per Trieste (Association for Trieste)	1979-83
South	Lega d'azione meridionale (League for Southern Action)	1996
South Tyrol	Südtiroler Volkspartie (South Tyrol People's Party)	1953-92
Valle d'Aoste	Union Valdotaïne (Valdostian Union)	1958-63, 1972-87, 1994-96

Table 3.1 (cont.) Regional Political Parties in Western Europe

Region	Political Parties (English labels)	Contested Elections
<b>Spain</b>		
Andalucía	Partido Andalucista and Partido Socialista de Andalusia (Andalusian Party)	1979, 1989, 1996
Basque Country	Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party)	1977-96
	Eusko Alkartasuna and Euskal Ezkerra (People's Unity)	1989-96
	Herri Batasuna (Basque Solidarity)	1979-96
Canaries	Coalición Canaria (Canarian Coalition)	1986-96
	Union del Pueblo Canario (Union of Canarian People)	1979
Catalonia	Convergencia i Unió, including Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya & Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana de Catalunya (Convergence and Union)	1977-96
	Coalición electoral esquerra de Catalunya (Electoral Coalition of Left in Catalonia)	1977
	Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia)	1979-82, 1993-96
Galicia	Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (Galician Nationalist Bloc )	1996
Aragon	Chunta aragonesa (Aragonese League)	1996
	Partido Aragonés Regionalista (Aragonese Regionalist Party)	1979, 1986-93
Navarre	Union del pueblo navarro (Union of the Navarrese People)	1979
	Convergencia democràtica de Navarra (Democratic Convergence of Navarre)	1996
Valencia	Union valenciana (Valencian Union)	1986-96
<b>United Kingdom</b>		
Northern Ireland	Social Democratic and Labour Party	1974-97
	Irish Independence Party	1979
	Nationalists (and Independent nationalists)	1951, 1966
	Republican Labour	1964, 1970
	Republicans and Republican Clubs	1950, 1964-66, 1974-79
	Sinn Féin	1950, 1955-59, 1983-97
Scotland	Scottish National Party	1950-97
	Scottish Labour Party	1979
	Scottish Militant Labour	1992
	Scottish Socialist Alliance	1997
Wales	Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales)	1950-97
	Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (Welsh Republican Movement)	1950

For this analysis, the observation is the region-level result of a national election, or rather, whether a regional political party competes in a given national

election in a particular region or not. Table 3.2 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variable across countries. Since 1950, regional political parties only compete in six countries in Western Europe, including Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The total number of cases is simply the sum of the number of regions and elections in each country.

Table 3.2 Observations with Regional Political Parties

Country	# of Regions	# of Elections	Total Observations	Observations with RPPs
Austria	9	14	126	0
Belgium	3	15	45	38
Denmark*	15	20	292	0
Finland	6	13	78	39
France	22	13	286	4
Germany**	16	13	147	0
Greece	13	9	117	0
Ireland	2	15	30	0
Italy	20	12	240	83
Netherlands***	12	14	158	0
Portugal	7	9	63	0
Spain	17	7	119	41
Sweden	21	16	336	0
United Kingdom	12	14	168	42
EU14 total	175	184	2205	247

Notes: \* In Denmark, no elections for Roskilde until 1971 (12 total).


\*\* In Germany, no elections in Saarland until 1957 (12 total) and 6 German regions only included since 1990 (3 total).

\*\*\* In Netherlands, no elections for Flevoland until 1986 (4 total).

As Table 3.2 shows, only six countries have regional political parties that compete in national elections, including Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. For those countries that have competitive regional political parties, Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of total observations, or number of national parliamentary elections measured at the region, in which these parties compete. This histogram also

represents the dependent variable as each observation in which a regional political party competes is counted as a one in the dependent variable. All other countries and regions without a regional political party are counted as zeroes.

Figure 3.1 Observations with Regional Political Parties, By Country



For Belgium, nearly all region-election years are counted as having regional political parties because the party system is nearly entirely regionalized. In France, regional parties compete in national elections only in 1986 in Bretagne and Corsica, while in the United Kingdom, regional parties compete in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in nearly every election since 1950. For both Italy and Spain, regional political parties compete in certain regions, such as Basque Country, Catalonia, and South Tyrol, in every election, but parties begin to compete in other parts of the country as time progresses.

Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 demonstrate that variation occurs across space. Among the cases where regional political parties do compete, there is distribution

over time as well. Figure 3.2 provides a histogram showing the percentage of regions in which regional political parties compete across decades.

Figure 3.2 Observations with Regional Political Parties,  
By Decade




Figure 3.2 shows that regional political parties compete in more regions as time progresses. These simple figures demonstrate that variation over time and space exists, and that regional political parties compete in more regions as time passes. It is this variation I seek to explain in the following pages.

For the ‘push’ side of the equation, I operationalize several potential factors that may drive demand. First, I include cultural or historical language difference. The Language Difference variable is an indicator based on the *Ethnologue’s* classification of languages into language families. Rather than compare the most commonly used language in the region to that of the capital, Fearon and Laitin introduce a variable called Language Family (2000). Basically, they utilize the *Ethnologue’s* (2006) categorization of languages into different language families to determine how similar the region’s language is to the capital’s language. In addition, they use the traditional language used in the region rather than the most commonly used language today.

Using the historic language rather than the current language allows the measure to serve as a proxy for cultural differences in a way that using current language does not because it may underestimate preference differences due to linguistic but not cultural assimilation (Fearon and Laitin 2000).

By following the guidelines, I coded each region's Language Family from the *Ethnologue* database.<sup>26</sup> Following Fearon and van Houten, I also convert the Language Family variable to Language Difference by using the reciprocal (2002). This simple conversion emphasizes the differences that are earlier in the family trees (e.g. Spanish is more different from Basque than Catalan), both because branches earlier in the family tree are more significant and because larger differences between languages are more reliably coded in the *Ethnologue*.<sup>27</sup>

Not only is the language variable a proxy for regionalist sentiment but it also provides some leverage on the preference issue central to the optimal size of nations argument. Alesina and Spolaore and others generally tend to assume heterogeneous preferences based on distance from the center (1997; 2003). Linguistic

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<sup>26</sup> Basically, the coding works as follows: Each language has a classification designated by Grimes *Ethnologue*. The Language Family variable simply measures the level at which the region's language branches off from the capital's language. For example, English's classification is Indo-European, Germanic, West, English while Scotland's code is Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Goidelic. The two languages branch off at the second level, so the code is two. Another example is Spanish (Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian) and Basque (Basque), which gives Basque a code of one. If two languages are identical, the Language Family code is ten, which is one level higher than the most similar but still distinct languages. Examples of regions coded ten are Andalusian and Canaries (both utilize Spanish). For a more complete discussion of the coding guidelines, see Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Fearon and van Houten (2002).

<sup>27</sup> My coding of the Language Family variable is provided in Appendix A with the language classifications drawn from the *Ethnologue* (SIL International 2006). Language Difference is simply the reciprocal of Language Family, or  $1/\text{Language Family}$ .

distinctiveness of the region from the country's center, as a proxy for cultural differences and heterogeneous preferences, is one way to test whether heterogeneous preferences affect support for regional parties (Fearon and van Houten 2002).

Following Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Fearon and van Houten (2002), I measure the linguistic difference between the historical language of the region and that of the country [Language Difference]. I expect that as language difference between the region and the rest of the country increases, support for the regional political parties will increase both in terms of competing in the elections in the first place and electoral success.<sup>28</sup>

*Hypothesis 1. As language difference increases, support for regional political parties will increase.*

In addition to language difference, I also include other 'push' factors as controls, including level of GDP per capita. If GDP per capita falls, support for alternative representation increases (Gerring 2005, 93). As this type of factor influences demand for all types of new parties (Hug 2001; Meguid 2002; Meguid 2005), I expect them to similarly influence regional political parties.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Economic difference between the region and the rest of the country would be an additional useful 'push' variable, as preference heterogeneity from income differentials could also encourage regional mobilization (Bolton and Roland 1997, 1059). Unfortunately, Eurostat only collects data at the regional level back to 1980.

<sup>29</sup> Relative GDP/capita should have a different effect than national GDP/capita. While demand for alternative representation increases in times of bad national economic performance, demand for regional political party representation may actually increase if a region becomes wealthier vis-à-vis the rest of the country. For example, when Scotland found oil in the 1970s, a surge of support for the SNP followed. In future iterations of the empirical work, I will test for this relationship directly.

For the ‘pull’ variables, I do include both political decentralization and a squared decentralization term to test the two competing decentralization hypotheses [Regional Governance Index],<sup>30</sup> but I focus on the strategies of mainstream parties. From Kitschelt (1995), I expect that when mainstream political parties converge, there is more space for new parties to enter the market. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project data (Budge et al. 2001),<sup>31</sup> I simply subtract the cumulative right-left ideological score for the largest party from the second largest party [Party Divergence].<sup>32</sup> If the ideological distance between the two main parties decreases, implying convergence in the spatial model, then regional political parties will be more likely to enter competition.

To test the strategic line of reasoning (Hug 2001; Meguid 2002), I consider whether the party system has accommodated the goals of the regional political parties, via more positive views on decentralization. If the mainstream political parties incorporate a more positive position on decentralization, as coded in the

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<sup>30</sup> Created by Hooghe and Marks, this index measures the formal regional governance structures in European countries on four criteria across four time period: constitutional federalism, special territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government, and whether regional assemblies use direct or indirect elections (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 192).

<sup>31</sup> Admittedly, the Comparative Manifesto Project has numerous legitimate critics. For my purposes, the most relevant criticism is that the CMP measures salience rather than position. The advantage to the data, of course, is that it is available for the full time-series-cross-section and it does correlate with some of the expert measures of party positions. Nevertheless, in future iterations, I will consider alternative measures of the strategic party variables, such as expert surveys or party supporter position, to cross-validate these results.

<sup>32</sup> The Party Divergence variable is a proxy, at best, for the concept I am trying to measure. In many party systems, the number of relevant mainstream parties may be greater than two. I will also consider alternative measures of the Party Divergence variable, such as party system ideological polarization. One potential way to measure this concept is to sum the distance from each party’s left-right score to the party system average.

Comparative Manifesto Project, then I expect voters to express less support for regional political parties.<sup>33</sup> To capture whether a major party accommodates the regional party position, I use the decentralization score for either the largest or second largest party, whichever has the higher decentralization position [Party Accommodation].<sup>34</sup>

*Hypothesis 2. If the two largest parties converge in ideological space, then regional political parties will be more likely to compete in the election.*

*Hypothesis 2a. If the mainstream political parties adopt a more pro-decentralization position, then support for regional political parties will decrease.*

In order to test the EU hypothesis, I consider a variety of operationalizations. First, I create a simple index of different treaty stages in EU history. In other words, the index is coded 0 if the country is not a member of the EU, a 1 if the country is a member of the EU under the Treaty of Rome, a 2 if the country is a member of the EU under the Single European Act, and a 3 if the country is a member of the EU under the Treaty of European Union, or Maastricht. However, the characteristics of this index are less than ideal. The simple European integration index is not necessarily, or even probably, interval and ordinal in nature. To protect against the

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<sup>33</sup> This strategic move on the part of mainstream parties can be either pre-emptive or reactive. In other words, mainstream parties can either accommodate the issue, thereby subverting potential regional political parties, or they can react to regional political party success and undercut an existing movement by accommodating their main issue. Either way, the logic suggests the move would decrease the likelihood of regional political party incidence.

<sup>34</sup> This is one operationalization to test this theory, but is by no means the only one. It is plausible to simply test the largest party's position on decentralization, for instance. I will consider alternative specifications when testing the results for robustness.

results being an artifact of this measure, I therefore test additional integration measures.

For robustness, I include the National and Supranational Governance scale defined in Hooghe and Marks' *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration* (2001, Appendix 1). This scale considers the level (i.e. national or EU) at which policies are made in twenty-eight issue arenas, including economic, social and legal policy as well as international relations. A policy arena receives a one if all decisions are made at the national level, a two if only some decisions are made at the EU level, a three if policy decisions are made at both levels, four if most policy decisions are made at the EU level, and a five if all decisions are made at the EU level. Evaluations were made at various points in European Union history, including 1950, 1957, 1968, 1992, and 2000.<sup>35</sup> To aggregate the data in a useful way for this project, I simply averaged the scores for all twenty-eight issue areas and rescaled it from zero to one [SupraGovIndex].<sup>36</sup> This new Supranational Governance Index is an additional operationalization of the key explanatory variable.

While neither of these measures is ideal,<sup>37</sup> the combination should provide a robust picture of the effect of EU membership on regional political parties. If the

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<sup>35</sup> Based on expert surveys, this scale is disputable, as Hooghe and Marks readily admit (Hooghe and Marks 2001, xi); however, the additional indicator provides a robustness test for the key explanatory variable. Also, the EU index and the Supranational Governance Index are highly correlated, lending some confidence to the measures.

<sup>36</sup> The values for the rescaled and aggregated National and Supranational Governance scale are as follows: 1950 (or no EU): 0 (447 cases); 1957: 0.063 (57 cases), 1968: 0.17 (1,043 cases), 1992: 0.357 (1,078 cases).

<sup>37</sup> A potential problem for each index is that neither considers that some countries may be more integrated at the same time-point than other EU members. In other words, some countries opt out of

theory has validity in this implication, then the effect of integration on regional party success should be significant, positive, and consistent across the various indicators.

*Hypothesis 3. As European integration deepens, support for regional political parties should increase.*

Based on these variables, a simple analysis of the group means demonstrates there are obvious differences between those regions where regional political parties compete and those where they do not. Table 3.3 provides an illustration of these group differences.

Table 3.3 Group Differences

	Regional Party Incidence	
	Yes	No
EU Index	1.360	0.939
Language Difference	0.381	0.139
Observations	247	1,958

On average, regional political parties compete where integration is deeper and there is far more historical linguistic difference. Nevertheless, this bi-variate analysis is at best incomplete; thus, I will proceed to develop a model to explain under what conditions regional political parties compete and then what explains their electoral success in those regions.

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certain treaty components and some countries simply do not enact all the legislation introduced by the EU. In the future, I will consider interaction variables that combine depth of integration and compliance rates or opt-outs. But this issue is not as problematic as it might be because regional political entrepreneurs are not necessarily looking at the specific integration patterns of their home country, but rather general patterns of integration. For example, there is no reason why Scotland would have to opt-out of the Euro if they joined as an independent country.

### *Model Specification*

In this section, I examine under what conditions regional political parties are more likely to compete in national-level elections. The data is a cross-sectional time-series and the dependent variable is a simple dummy variable, where a 1 means that at least one regional political party competed for a national Parliamentary seat in that region.<sup>38</sup> This binary cross-section time-series dataset presents certain statistical challenges, including duration dependence and clustering by region. As Beck and Katz point out, there is no panacea in the shape of a Stata command that simply and comprehensively handles any problems with this type of data (2004, 3). Thus, I consider a variety of techniques to deal with these challenges. Then I will discuss the results of the models and robustness across the various model specifications.<sup>39</sup>

Traditionally, analysts simply used standard logit or probit to deal with this type of data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). However, the assumptions of independence across units and across time are clearly too stringent for this type of data. Using the cluster option in Stata, I created robust standard errors clustered by region. This changes the assumptions of probit so that independence is assumed across units but not necessarily within units. In Table 3.4, I include a base probit

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<sup>38</sup> Regional political parties competed in 247 cases. In 73% (177 cases) of these observations, only one party competed in the election. In 22% (53), two regional political parties competed, and in less than 5% of cases, either 3 or 4 parties competed.

<sup>39</sup> While I think the advantages of testing for robustness in this way are numerous, I am wary of curve-fitting and losing degrees of freedom by testing many different model specifications. To protect against this potential problem, I have followed the advice of Beck, King, and Zeng (2004) and de Marchi, Gelpi and Grynaviski (2004) and created an out-of-sample test set from my complete sample (~10% of the total). I will later use this test set to determine whether the model can successfully predict out-of-sample.

model (Model 1) with a variety of explanatory variables with their robust clustered standard errors. Unfortunately, this simple model ignores any potential problems associated with the time series nature of the data, thereby committing omitted variable bias and potentially biasing the actual coefficients.

In some ways, introducing a lagged dependent variable, or an autoregressive term, seems an intuitive way to deal with the problems inherent in this dataset. It allows for explicit modeling of the dynamic nature of the dependent variable (Keele and Kelly 2004). The lagged dependent variable is a powerful predictor of future performance and in fact may even swamp the coefficients of other variables (Achen 2000). If there are omitted variables in the model, the lagged dependent variable will likely pick up some of their effects because the variables are part of the equation to explain the lagged dependent variable itself. While Achen argues convincingly against relying too much on lagged dependent variables (2000), including a lagged term is one response to the temporal problem. But as Achen notes, “The point is simply that autoregressive terms cannot be used to control for serial correlation without taking account of their impact on other coefficients” (2000, 25). In other words, if the explanatory variables of interest appear statistically insignificant, the result is not necessarily damning. Nevertheless, the case against lagged dependent variables implies that including one makes a tougher test for any explanatory variables of interest.<sup>40</sup> As long as it makes it harder for explanatory variables to attain statistical significance, then it is a valuable model to run to control for time series

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<sup>40</sup> Keele and Kelly contend that lagged dependent variable models have been much maligned in recent years and that the potential bias associated with them is often trivial, at worst (2004, 4).

problems. I include a lagged dependent variable in Model 2, with robust clustered standard errors.

Beck, Katz and Tucker argue for a new and fairly simple way to treat the temporal dependence problems common in binary time-series-cross-section data (1998). Recognizing that binary time-series-cross-section data are actually grouped duration or event history data, Beck, Katz and Tucker (BKT) propose adding either a series of dummy variables or splines to a standard logit or probit analysis to correct for temporal dependence (1998, 1261). In my data, temporal dependence seems obvious: whether a regional political party competes in a particular election depends on the electoral history of that party. Once a party enters competition at one election, it is easier to compete in future elections. Unfortunately, the bias from duration dependence is potentially significant. Per Beck, Katz and Tucker, standard logit and probit can underestimate variability by 50 percent or more (1998, 1263). To test whether there is temporal independence, I included the temporal dummies and conducted a standard likelihood ratio test (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1269). After confirming the existence of temporal dependence, I include the temporal dummies in Model 3 of Table 3.4.<sup>41</sup>

Adding numerous temporal dummies is not necessarily ideal, though, because the loss of degrees of freedom can affect the precision of the estimates. So, Beck,

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<sup>41</sup> Using BTSCS in Stata (Tucker 1999), I created the temporal dummies to correct for duration dependence. Basically, the program creates a series of dummy variables equal to the maximum number of events since the last incidence. In my data, the temporal dummies extend to 19 elections. These dummies equal 1 if the event occurs at that time point, and 0 otherwise. In other words, if a party does not compete until the 5<sup>th</sup> election,  $k_1-k_4$  and  $k_6-k_{19}=0$ , but  $k_5=1$ . The technique is described and justified in detail in Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

Katz and Tucker prefer to use natural cubic splines to correct for duration dependence, but expect no significant difference for the explanatory variable coefficients (1998, 1721).<sup>42</sup> As above, I utilize robust (Huber/White) standard errors, clustered at the regional level, to correct for the lack of independence within units. Following Beck, Katz and Tucker, I include both the temporal dummy and the spline model but will interpret the results from the spline version, or Model 4.<sup>43</sup>

In Model 5, I include a conditional fixed effects logit. By incorporating a fixed effects model, we assume away any unit effects and can focus on the European Union variable less fearful of omitted regional variables, such as relative wealth. But the presence of fixed effects limits the ability to explore all the explanatory variables, since language difference varies across region but not over time. Also, the fixed effects significantly diminish the degrees of freedoms in the model and they ignore information from those regions that either always or never have competitive regional political parties. I include the fixed effects model simply to test the explanatory variables for robustness in the presence of fixed effects.

While we can test the robustness of the EU variable with a fixed effects model, we cannot evaluate properly the effects of time-invariant variables, such as language difference. To do so, I use random effects probit in Model 6. This model

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<sup>42</sup> Tucker's software, BTSCS, also creates the temporal splines from the data (Tucker 1999).

<sup>43</sup> This particular dataset presents an additional complication. While most event history analysis only has one 'failure' per unit, political parties can compete in multiple elections, and in fact should be expected to do so more frequently if they have an electoral history. Though imperfect, I follow Beck, Katz and Tucker's advice and test the models with a control variable which counts the number of previous events (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1272). This variable does not change the substantive results of the models.

utilizes information from both the within-unit and between-unit models to yield coefficients and uncertainty estimates. These models are typically more appropriate when there are more units than time points, which is not true in this case where the two are nearly equal. Thus, I do not rely on these estimates to interpret the results, but simply to test for robustness.

In Table 3.4, I estimated the several models discussed above. In discussing the results, I will focus on Model 4 because I think it is the most theoretically appropriate for this particular dataset. This decision is supported by the fit and model comparison statistics. Though it had a slightly weaker  $R^2$  and Bayesian Information Criteria statistic than the lagged dummy variable and the random effects probit, the statistical justification for this model is stronger. I will utilize the results from the other models to discuss the relative robustness of the results.

Table 3.4 Determinants of Regional Political Party Incidence<sup>44</sup>

Explanatory Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Base Model Probit	Lagged DV Probit	Probit Dummy (BKT)	Probit Spline (BKT)	Conditional Fixed Effects Logit	Random Effects Probit
	Coefficient (Robust Std Errors clustered by region)				Coefficient (Standard Errors)	
EU Index	0.154* (0.081)	0.072 (0.063)	0.362*** (0.086)	0.341*** (0.078)	1.557*** (0.362)	0.553*** (0.118)
Language Difference	3.857*** (0.788)	2.560*** (0.424)	2.647*** (0.597)	2.642*** (0.580)	dropped	8.743*** (0.832)
Party Accommodation	-0.037** (0.018)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.007 (0.016)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.162 (0.129)	-0.096* (0.052)
Party Divergence	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.010** (0.004)	0.014 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.006)
PR	0.601* (0.326)	0.846*** (0.257)	0.539 (0.378)	0.590 (0.365)	7.641*** (1.606)	3.444*** (0.480)
RegGovIndex	0.456*** (0.115)	0.321*** (0.109)	0.440*** (0.108)	0.459*** (0.103)	2.202*** (0.505)	1.736*** (0.226)
RegGovIndex2	-0.057*** (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.059*** (0.013)	-0.061*** (0.013)	-0.291*** (0.069)	-0.222*** (0.031)
Lagged DV		2.478*** (0.264)				
Temporal Dummies			Included			
Elections Since Last Incidence				-0.984*** (0.212)		
Spline 1				-0.052 (0.039)		
Spline 2				-0.037 (0.024)		
Spline 3				0.051*** (0.018)		
Constant	-2.679*** (0.426)	-3.100*** (0.340)	-3.061*** (0.450)	-1.720*** (0.455)		-9.769*** (0.980)
N	1985	1985	1424	1985	353	1985
Pseudo R2	0.3568	0.6195	0.5286	0.5635		0.314
AIC	0.449	0.27	0.423	0.312	0.484	0.249
BIC	-14136.27	-14486.37	-9653.998	-14387.35	-1876.708	-14533.79

<sup>44</sup> For robustness, I also ran models controlling for GDP per capita, national unemployment, effective number of electoral parties, and the number of previous events. These control variables did not affect the significance or signs of the explanatory variables. I also included the lagged dependent variable in Models 5 and 6 with no change to the coefficients. The McFadden R<sup>2</sup> for Model 6 and the AIC/BIC for Models 5 and 6 calculated by author.

The results of the model largely support the hypotheses, especially the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ variables. As European integration deepens, the likelihood that a regional political party competes in a national election increases.<sup>45</sup> Using *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) on the results from Model 4, this effect is demonstrated in Figure 3.3. I estimated three separate curves for this figure to represent those cases in which the region has average or higher levels of language difference.

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<sup>45</sup> This finding is consistent across different specifications of the European integration variable also. Using the EU index, the Supranational Governance Index, a simple EU membership dummy, the EU index split into separate treaty dummies, or a membership duration count variable, European integration has a consistently significant effect. In future work, I intend to develop a more accurate and discriminant measure for depth or extent of European political and economic integration. But the consistent robustness across measures does provide confidence in the results. The results of these robustness tests are provided in Table 5 below:

Table 3.5 Robustness Tests,  
By Different EU Specifications (Model 4)

Model	EU Measure	Coefficient
1	EU Index	0.341***
2	EU Dummy	0.883***
3	Supranational Governance Index	3.001***
4	Treaty of Rome	0.535***
	Single European Act	1.368***
	Treaty of EU	0.744***
5	EU Membership Duration	0.017**

Figure 3.3 Predicted Probability of Regional Party Incidence, by European Integration and Language Difference




Figure 3.3 demonstrates that as European integration progressed from pre-Treaty of Rome to Maastricht, the likelihood of regional political parties competing in electoral politics increased in all three cases. Compared to higher levels of language difference, regions with average levels have very low probabilities. The mean of language difference is actually quite low on the scale (0.164) and implies a difference akin to a dialect of the national language rather than a different language or culture. Examples include Calabria or Sicily in Italy or Aragon in Spain. For these culturally similar regions, the likelihood of a regional political party competing in national elections is small under any circumstances and varying European from the minimum to the maximum only increases the probability from 0.2% to 0.65%. For average levels of language difference, the increase is statistically significant but of minor magnitude.

By increasing language difference to 0.5, which is the classification for Bretagne in France or Trentino Alto Adige in Italy, the probability of a regional party competing increases with European integration from a marginal 0.37% at no European integration to 4.2% at the highest level of integration. The third line represents the highest level of linguistic or cultural difference, representing regions such as the Basque country in Spain. Here the effect of European integration is clear and dramatic. At low levels of integration, the probability of regional political parties competing in national elections is only 7.5%, even in those regions that are highly culturally different from the rest of the country. But at the highest level of integration, the likelihood is over 29%. In other words, in those regions that are culturally different, deeper European integration has a highly significant positive effect on the incidence of competition. With this increase, Figure 3 provides strong evidence in support of the main hypothesis of this chapter.

Further, the effect is consistent across very different statistical model specifications. Only in the lagged dependent variable model (Model 2) did the coefficient fail to achieve statistical significance, and that result is not surprising considering the effects of lagged dependent variables on other coefficients. I reiterate that I do not expect the EU to be the largest determinant of either the incidence or success of regional political parties, especially when compared to the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ variables; nonetheless, theoretically, the significant and positive effect matches theoretical expectations.

As expected, the language difference variable is a robustly significant predictor of regional political party entry in electoral competition. Regardless of the controls included or the model specifications attempted, the effect is significant and positive.<sup>46</sup> The models demonstrate that as the language difference between the region and the rest of the country increases, the probability of a regional political party competing increases. At average levels of language difference, the likelihood of a regional political party competing is less than 1%. But at the highest value on the scale, where regions such as Pais Vasco are scored, the chances of a regional political party competing are nearly 14%. Along with Chapter 4, these results buttress previous studies that found the significance of a cultural or language difference variable to be an extremely powerful predictor of regional mobilization in Europe (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; van Houten 2000; Fearon and van Houten 2002).

For the strategic party hypotheses, though, the results are less consistent. In Model 4, Party Accommodation is insignificant and has the incorrect sign. There is some statistical support for it in Models 1 and 6, but the lack of robustness across model specifications prevents any strong conclusions about its effect.<sup>47</sup> But the results support the Party Divergence hypothesis. If the top two parties diverge in their

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<sup>46</sup> The predicted probabilities suggest the effect of language difference on regional political party incidence may be better understood as meeting a threshold of difference. Beyond that threshold, the likelihood of a regional political party dramatically increases. In future work, I will consider alternative operationalizations of the language difference variable to consider this possibility.

<sup>47</sup> Party attitudes towards decentralization do not affect whether regional political parties compete, but actual decentralization may be a more tangible mechanism for mainstream parties to accommodate and undercut potential regional political parties. Thus, the presence of a political decentralization variable may actually be serving as a proxy for strategic behavior.

left-right positions, then they eliminate room for minor parties to enter the competition. Holding all else constant, the probability of an RPP competing drops from 0.2% to 0.02% if the Party Divergence score changes from the minimum to the maximum. Obviously, the substantive magnitude of this variable is minimal, but the effect is statistically significant and in the predicted direction. This result suggests that mainstream party strategies do indeed affect the likelihood of minor regional political parties entering national elections.

The political decentralization variables are significant and support the second hypothesis. Model 4 indicates that the probability of an RPP competing is increasing at lower levels of decentralization, and decreasing at higher levels. Rather than the Hechter logic, the simpler logic for decentralization fits these robust results. Eventually, a national government can actually meet the demands of the autonomy-oriented regional citizens. Thus, beyond a threshold, decentralization does diminish enthusiasm for regional political parties. It will be interesting to reanalyze these results in the post-1997 era of devolution in Scotland and Wales, where citizens were granted much greater decentralized authority.

### ***Conclusions***

Similar to previous studies, I find that the ‘push’ of cultural difference greatly influences both the selection and outcome models. As Fearon and Laitin (2000), among others, have found, language difference is nearly a necessary if not sufficient condition for regional mobilization in Europe. I also find that the opportunity

structure affects when regional political parties compete, though work remains to be done to disentangle the strategic interaction between mainstream political parties and potential regional political parties. As one of the first truly comparative quantitative studies of when and where regional political parties compete in national parliamentary elections, I confirm and extend earlier work on new or niche parties, in general, and regional political parties specifically.

Significantly, the wide range of statistical specifications provides consistent and robust results for the main explanatory variables of interest: deeper European integration does encourage regional mobilization, in terms of where and when regional political parties compete. In the next chapter, I extend this analysis to consider whether European integration also affects how successful these parties are, once they do decide to compete.

## Chapter 4

### Determinants of Regional Political Party Success

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that European integration has a significant effect on the likelihood that regional political parties compete in national elections. But the main theory of this dissertation, namely the optimal size of states logic, also has implications for the electoral success of those parties once they do enter competition. Just as a more viable small state makes regional political parties themselves more viable and, therefore, elites more likely to enter into parliamentary competition, citizens should be more likely to support these parties if the regions themselves are more viable. Another observable implication of the theory, then, is the electoral success of regional political parties in parliamentary elections.

In this chapter, I approach the empirical question of whether European integration affects sub-national movements by analyzing the observable implication that regional political parties obtain greater support from the regional electorate as the European Union deepens. First, I briefly consider the extant literature on the electoral success of regional political parties. Second, drawing hypotheses from this discussion and from Chapter 2, I analyze the electoral support of regional parties. I test the empirical implications of the model with a dataset of district-level electoral data and regional political economic variables.<sup>48</sup> Constituency-level electoral data provides an opportunity to explore in detail the cultural, economic, and political factors

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<sup>48</sup> As far as I know, this is the first attempt to explore the determinants of regional party success at the district-level. This novel use of district-level electoral data provides a robustness test for earlier research that used different aggregations of electoral data. Also, it dramatically increases the number of observations available for empirical tests.

contributing to regional party success, in addition to testing whether European integration increases support. This cross-national time-series analysis adds considerably to the literature on regional political parties, extending both the single case (country or region) quantitative studies as well as the qualitative research.

### ***Regional Political Parties in Western Europe***

Most observers conclude that voting for regional parties in national elections has increased in the last few decades, perhaps even substantially (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989; Gordin 2001; Pereira, Villodres, and Nieto 2003). Yet, as Hearl, Budge and Pearson complain, simply looking at the dramatic cases, such as Scotland and Catalonia, obscures the broader trends (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996, 168). Even if the data supports the notion that support for regional parties is on the rise, though, the larger question remains: are there factors that can systematically explain variation in regional party vote shares?

Thus far, much of the best work on regional parties in Europe utilize the case study method and focus on particular regions (Lynch 1996; de Winter and Türsan 1998). While these detail rich studies provide insightful looks into individual parties, they do not readily lend themselves to generalizations. Recently, though, quantitative analysts have begun to isolate factors that determine electoral success of regional parties. Briefly, I review their hypotheses and results before testing whether European integration increases regional party vote shares.

Analyzing regional voting in Spain, Lancaster and Lewis-Beck outline the different types of variables that may explain support for regional parties (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, 33+). Potentially relevant socio-cultural factors include class, education, language and religion. Alternatively, if voters follow a rational voting calculus, then they should vote for the parties that (they perceive) will provide them the most benefit (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, 34). Thus, most of the work focuses on the demand-side of territorial devolution rather than the supply-side. This literature review should serve to explain the specific demand-side conditions under which we expect greater mobilization.

For studies of regional parties in Europe, language looms large as the cultural variable of choice. Most studies include historical language of the region as an explanatory variable and conclude that language trumps political economic variables as a causal variable (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002). For Fearon and van Houten, among others, language provides a proxy for nationalist potential that is independent of the measure for regionalist political activity (Fearon and van Houten 2002, 23). Whether language is a proxy for nationalist sentiment or it is a focal point for regional mobilization of protest votes (Gordin 2001, 153), it is highly correlated with regional party existence and success. As demonstrated in an analysis of nine advanced industrial countries, 91 per cent (twenty out of twenty-two) of the regions where regional parties competed did have a distinct language; however, 62 per cent (thirty-two out of fifty-two) of the regions with distinct languages did not have regional parties competing in elections (Fearon

and van Houten 2002). These simple statistics highlight the near necessity of language difference as a determinant of regional parties but they also show that a different language is by no means sufficient for a regional party (Fearon and van Houten 2002, 20).<sup>49</sup> In other words, while nearly all regions that have a regional party also have a distinct historical language, more than half of the regions with a distinct language do not support a regional party.

In addition to language, political economic variables serve as significant determinants of regional party success across most studies. Hearl, Budge, and Pearson find that regional distinctiveness is associated with factors such as unemployment, regional GDP, and regional economic problems. The basic logic is simple: high unemployment contributes to dissatisfaction with the current government, which leads to a higher likelihood of a protest vote. Extending the logic, unemployment provides an opportunity for protest votes while language contributes to regional parties being the outlet of choice, rather than another non-mainstream party (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 178-9). Similarly, Zirakzadeh finds that a rise in regional unemployment increased support for regional parties in every Basque province (1989, 327). Hearl, Budge and Pearson also find the percentage of the regional population employed by agriculture and industry to be significantly and positively related to regional party electoral success (1996, 179), but there is little a

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<sup>49</sup> Gordin's Boolean analysis comes to the same conclusion about language's necessary but not sufficient relationship with regional party success. In other words, in almost all cases where a regional party exists, the region has a distinct language, but the presence of a distinct language does not, by itself, guarantee a regional party (Gordin 2001).

priori justification given for why the reader might expect the relationships to be causal.

Relative economic well-being should influence support for regional parties. In the case of advanced groups in advanced countries, such as the Basques in Spain or the Northern League in Italy, their grievance tends to be that they are subsidizing poorer regions or that the center's economic policies are holding their growth down (Horowitz 1981, 184). Along these lines, the Scottish National Party attempts to garner favor among voters by demonstrating that Scotland is subsidizing the rest of the United Kingdom (Begg and Stewart 1971, 148). Though theoretical debates remain over whether rich or poor regions will be more assertive (Hechter 1975), extant empirical studies suggest that richer regions are now expected to be the more assertive regions (de Winter 1998; van Houten 2000; Gordin 2001; Fearon and van Houten 2002).

Potentially, voter opinions on issues may be driving the vote for regional parties. While available studies demonstrate that left-right ideology has no effect on support for regional parties (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, 35), views on particular issues may affect vote choice. Lancaster and Lewis-Beck find that when a voter is dissatisfied with a national party's economic policy, they will be more likely to vote for a regional party (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, 38). Since survey data for regions across the time series of this sample are unavailable, I include two measures that proxy for voter discontent with the government, unemployment and turnout, in an attempt to control for this variable's effect.

Finally, several authors attempt to find a relationship between proportional representation (PR) and support for regional parties. Though the general literature on electoral systems predicts that PR should increase the support for small parties, such as regional ones, several authors find that when it has an effect on regional parties, PR actually dampens support for regional parties (de Winter 1998, 219; Gordin 2001, 164; Pereira, Villodres, and Nieto 2003, 11). Generally, plurality systems are expected to discourage small parties in part because voters strategically decide between major parties rather than waste their votes (Pereira, Villodres, and Nieto 2003, 6). But the geographic concentration of regional minorities may explain this somewhat counter-intuitive finding, particularly in Europe. Since the sample is only six countries and an electoral system variable would mostly be a dummy for the United Kingdom, I simply include country dummies to control for electoral system, among other system-specific factors. In a larger study of advanced industrial countries, electoral system factors would be crucial explanatory variables.

Not only is the literature on regional political parties small, but it is also limited in several crucial ways. As noted above, the theoretical justifications for certain variables are underspecified. Further, there has been limited hypothesis testing of these variables (Gordin 2001, 151). Most likely, the lack of empirical testing is due to data concerns. Through the Eurostat REGIO database (Eurostat 2004), the European Union does collect regional economic data but it is only available for many indicators since 1980. Further complicating the matter, there are only a small number of countries within the European Union that have active regional movements. While

scholars build datasets based on a variety of regional definitions that allow them to increase their ‘N,’ or number of observations, they still must contend with only a few political parties to explain. Finally, other than the studies discussed above, few attempts have been made to make generalizable claims about the determinants of regional party success in Western Europe. In the following pages, I attempt to improve on this earlier work; in particular, I present empirical evidence that European integration is an omitted variable in the previous literature that has a clear and positive effect on regional party success.

### ***European Integration and Regional Political Parties***

In addition to the weaknesses outlined above, this literature also omits a potentially significant explanatory variable: European integration. Previous studies do not often mention or test for an effect of European integration on support for regional parties. Lancaster and Lewis-Beck test an indirect effect by regressing support for the European Union on evaluation of national party economic policy. They find that EU supporters tend to be less supportive of national party policy, which contributes to a vote for a regional party (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989, 39).

But European integration can have a direct effect as well. European integration can make the regional party’s self-government goals more realistic and, therefore, more attractive to voters (de Winter 1998, 221; Dardanelli 2001, 25). Or in terms of a bargaining model, European integration makes regional parties more attractive both by improving the perceptions of the economic implications of

independence as well as the bargaining leverage of regional parties (Fearon and van Houten 2002, 22; Garrett and Rodden 2003, 94). Unfortunately, except for the indirect test of Lancaster and Lewis-Beck, this potential determinant is neglected in the empirical studies.

In Chapter 2, I presented the optimal size of states causal mechanism, which predicts that support for regional parties, such as the Plaid Cymru (Wales), the Scottish National Party (Scotland), or the Herri Batasuna (Basque country), should increase as the European Union deepens and regional party leaders take advantage of the new political opportunity structure. *Ceteris paribus*, I expect deeper integration to be associated with greater electoral support for regional political parties. If true, this hypothesis would provide additional support for the viability or optimal size of states logic. In addition, it would highlight the omitted variable bias in previous studies and suggest that scholars should focus more attention on the supranational context in future empirical studies.

### ***Measurement and Hypotheses***

In building the dataset, the first step is to make an inclusive list of regional parties in Western Europe that competed in national elections between 1950 and 1997. I include parties with a regional agenda, not necessarily parties that only compete in particular regions. Table 3.1 lists those political parties and their respective regions, countries, and elections that are included in this analysis. In this chapter, I analyze only those districts where there is an active regional political party,

thereby excluding cases where the regional party share is zero. Including each political party's vote share in each district election in which it competed yields 2,623 observations on the dependent variable (a regional party's share of district-level vote in a national election).<sup>50</sup>

To directly evaluate the observable implication that European integration encourages regional party success, I test for any direct influence of European integration on the electoral success of regional parties. To that end, I created a series of simple dummy variables for simply being a member of the European Union (EU), as well as one for the Treaty of Rome (ToR), the Single European Act (SEA), and the Treaty of European Union (TEU or Maastricht). I also use a simple index of integration measuring 0 for no EU, 1 for Rome, 2 for SEA, and 3 for TEU [EUind]. However, the characteristics of this index are less than ideal. The simple European integration index is not necessarily, or even probably, ordinal in nature. To protect against the results being an artifact of this measure, I therefore test additional integration measures.

For robustness, I include the National and Supranational Governance scale defined in Hooghe and Marks' *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration* (2001, Appendix 1). This scale considers the level (i.e. national or EU) at which policies are made in twenty-eight issue arenas, including economic, social and legal policy as well as international relations. A policy arena receives a one if all decisions are made at the national level, a two if only some decisions are made at the EU level,

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<sup>50</sup> To be clear, the electoral data is the share of the district-level vote in national or Parliamentary, not regional or local, elections.

a three if policy decisions are made at both levels, four if most policy decisions are made at the EU level, and a five if all decisions are made at the EU level. Evaluations were made at various points in European Union history, including 1950, 1957, 1968, 1992, and 2000.<sup>51</sup> To aggregate the data in a useful way for this project, I simply averaged the scores for all twenty-eight issue areas and rescaled it from zero to one [SupraGovIndex].<sup>52</sup> This new Supranational Governance Index will be an additional operationalization of the key explanatory variable.

The combination of these variables should provide a robust picture of the relationship between European integration and support for regional parties. If the theory has validity in this implication, then the effect of integration on regional party success should be significant, positive, and consistent across the various indicators.

*Hypothesis 1: As the European Union deepens, support for regional parties should increase.*

In addition to simply determining the influence of integration itself, I also test for the effects of different preferences on support for regional parties. The theory outlined above clearly relies heavily on preferences as a mechanism to explain cross-temporal and cross-regional differences in electoral support. As discussed, there are two distinct preference factors: cultural and political-economic interests. These factors will be considered individually and in conjunction. The theory therefore leads

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<sup>51</sup> Based on expert surveys, this scale is disputable, as Hooghe and Marks readily admit (2001, xi); however, the additional indicator provides a robustness test for the key explanatory variable. Also, the EU index and the Supranational Governance Index are highly correlated, lending some confidence to the measures.

<sup>52</sup> The values for the rescaled and aggregated National and Supranational Governance scale are as follows: 1950 (or no EU): 0 (447 cases); 1957: 0.063 (57 cases), 1968: 0.17 (1,043 cases), 1992: 0.357 (1,078 cases).

to an obvious testable hypothesis. If regions have different preferences, in terms of culture or political-economic views, their citizens will be more supportive of regional parties.

*Hypothesis 2: As preferences of a region diverge from those of the rest of the country, the region will be more likely to support regional parties.*

I utilize the Language Difference variable developed in Chapter 3 as a proxy for regionalist sentiment.<sup>53</sup> Language Difference provides leverage on the preference issue central to the optimal size of nations argument. Alesina and Spolaore and others generally tend to assume heterogeneous preferences based on distance from the center (1997; 2003). Linguistic distinctiveness of the region from the country's center, as a proxy for cultural differences and heterogeneous preferences, is one way to test whether heterogeneous preferences affect support for regional parties (Fearon and van Houten 2002). Based on the theory outlined above, I expect language to be a consistently significant positive predictor of electoral success for regional parties.

*Hypothesis 2.1: Regional political parties will perform better in those regions with a higher degree of linguistic distinctiveness (LangDif).*

Previous studies demonstrate convincingly that cultural differences are a key predictor for regional party support (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996; Fearon and van Houten 2002), but cultural differences are not the only preferences that can affect support for regional autonomy. The dramatic rise of the Lega Nord in Italy highlights another factor that can create grievances for a region: political-economic preferences.

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<sup>53</sup> Coding guidelines for this variable are discussed in Chapter 3 and the coding itself is provided in Appendix A.

Predictions vary about whether relatively poor or rich regions should seek autonomy; however, based on the idea that divergent preferences lead groups to seek autonomy, I predict that regions with greater economic differences from the rest of the country will be more supportive of regional parties, ceteris paribus. This variable is simply measured as the difference in the income of a region from the national average.<sup>54</sup>

With this measure, I argue that regions with either higher or lower than average GDP have different political-economic preferences than the rest of the country.<sup>55</sup>

As a control variable, I also include the relative GDP of the region. In contrast to the economic difference variable, this continuous variable measures whether a region is poorer or richer than the center. From the literature, I expect that richer regions will be more supportive of autonomy, and therefore regional parties, than poorer regions.

*Hypothesis 2.2: Regional parties will receive greater electoral support in regions with greater differences in economic interest (EconDif).*

In addition to the expectations about each individual preference dimension outlined above, I also predict that those regions that have high degrees of difference along multiple dimensions will be even more likely to support regional parties. In other

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<sup>54</sup> Specifically,  $EconDif = \text{abs}(\text{RelGDP} - 100)$  where Relative regional GDP (RelGDP) is simply the ratio of regional GDP to national GDP \* 100. So a region that has the same GDP as the country would have a 100. A relatively poor region (Andalusia) would score below 100 (72.7) while a relatively rich region (Basque) would score higher (128) on the RelGDP variable. Thus, EconDif increases as a region is either richer or poorer than the national average.

<sup>55</sup> Ideally, I would be able to measure differences in political ideology between each region and the rest of the country; however, measuring this concept would be difficult at best. For instance, survey data would be imperfect because there are not adequate numbers of respondents in all regions within a country to create a proper measure. Further, sufficient survey data does not exist across the cross-sectional time series; hence, I utilize the Economic Difference variable as a proxy.

words, if cleavages, in terms of culture or economics, are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting, then regional citizens have more incentive to support regional parties, which contributes to greater bargaining leverage for these parties in negotiations with the central government.<sup>56</sup>

*Hypothesis 2.3: In those regions with a high degree of preference differences on multiple dimensions, regional parties should achieve greater electoral support.*

While the European integration model depends partly on providing a new political opportunity structure for regional movements, I also consider an alternative political opportunity structure as a main determinant of regional party success, decentralization. Either political or fiscal decentralization could affect the success of the regional parties. If the central government or the mainstream parties perceive a threat from autonomy movements, then they may move to undercut the movements by providing a degree of decentralization. As Hechter argues, when a central government is responsive to its various distinctive national groups, it reduces their incentive to demand sovereignty (Hechter 2000a, 122).

While the strategic logic suggests that greater levels of decentralization or support for decentralization among mainstream parties will subvert regional party supporters, the effect may not be linear. In addition to the hypothesis that decentralization will reduce support for sovereignty movements, theories on

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<sup>56</sup> In addition, for many individuals, a vote for the regional party is a signal that they support autonomy. The Glasgow Area Survey from the 1970s finds that 63.1% of SNP supporters want independence, whereas only 29.1% of Labour and 7.8% of Conservatives do (Brand 1978, 162). The 1979 Scottish Election Study finds 35.4% of SNP supporters in favor of independence compared to 3.8% and 3.4% for Labour and Conservatives, respectively (Miller and Brand 1981). By 1997, 72.1% of SNP supporters favored independence (Mitchell et al. 1998).

federalism also suggest that decentralization could encourage regional movements.<sup>57</sup>

Contrary to the goals of the concession strategy, devolution could succeed in ‘whetting [regional party leaders’] appetites for even greater powers and privileges’ (Hechter 2000a, 140). Further, if regional parties have some success at the local or regional level, then the marginal cost of competing in national elections is smaller, thereby encouraging a stronger presence of regional parties (Brancati 2004).

Unfortunately for central government leaders, it may be the case that too much decentralization could in fact lead to support for autonomy movements, while too little decentralization could encourage even more violent struggles for sovereignty (Hechter 2000a, 152). Thus, leaders must be capable of finding the optimal balance of decentralization to placate regional leaders while reducing incentives for seeking autonomy.

This theoretical discussion yields a non-linear prediction. Support for regional parties should be high in those countries with low levels of decentralization. Support should decrease along with a rise in decentralization, as the concessions subvert the regional movement. At a certain level of decentralization, though, the negative relationship should reverse as regional political movements gain resources from decentralization, thereby reducing the costs of collective action (Hechter 2000b).

In this study, I measure decentralization in two ways, political and fiscal. For political decentralization, I utilize the Regional Governance Index created by Hooghe

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<sup>57</sup> While not directly addressing district elections, Chhibber and Kollman do find that decentralization is associated with a higher effective number of parties, suggesting by extension that the hypothesis that greater decentralization will encourage regional parties may have some merit. (1998)

and Marks [RegGovIndex] (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The index is based on the authors' evaluation of formal regional governance structures in European countries on four criteria at four time points: constitutional federalism, special territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government, and whether regional assemblies use direct or indirect elections (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 192). For fiscal decentralization, I follow Rodden (2002) and simply utilize the measure for sub-national expenditures as a share of total public sector expenditures [expshare].<sup>58</sup> Based on the theoretical predictions of the literature, I expect to find a non-linear relationship between centralization and support for regional parties. Along with the null hypothesis, changes in the domestic political opportunity structure, in terms of decentralization, serve as the main, albeit not necessarily mutually exclusive, alternative hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 3: There will be a non-linear relationship between decentralization and support for regional parties, with a negative relationship at lower levels of decentralization and a positive one at higher levels.*

Similarly, mainstream political parties could pursue an accommodative strategy and support decentralization, thereby reducing the electoral appeal of regional parties (Meguid 2002; Meguid 2005). Or, as Kitschelt articulates about new radical right parties, the strategic behavior of the mainstream parties largely determines whether there is space in the political marketplace for new parties to

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<sup>58</sup> The fiscal decentralization indicator is calculated from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook of the International Monetary Fund. For robustness, I also run models using alternative measurements of decentralization taken from the GFS, such as sub-national revenues as a percent of total government revenues [revshare] and sub-national expenditures and revenues as a percent of GDP [expGDP; revGDP].

represent these new demands (Kitschelt 1995, 257). Therefore, in addition to levels of decentralization, I want to include variables to test whether mainstream parties undermine regional parties by taking an accommodative strategy, or co-opting their main issue. For that purpose, I determined the mainstream party that received the highest vote total in the general election in each country. Next, I utilized the Comparative Manifestos Project data to determine each leading party's attitudes toward decentralization (and centralization) (Budge et al. 2001). Finally, I compiled an index for the mainstream party's overall views on decentralization by subtracting the party's score on centralization from its score on decentralization [LeadingPartyDecentIndex]. Following Meguid, I expect this accommodative strategy of the mainstream party to reduce support for regional parties (Meguid 2002; Meguid 2005).

*Hypothesis 4: As the leading party takes a more positive view on decentralization, support for regional parties should decrease.*

From the literature review, I also selected those few variables that produce consistent results to serve as control variables. These include political economic variables, such as regional unemployment and a region's percentage of agricultural employment.

The hypotheses for these variables are fairly straightforward. Unemployment should serve to increase support for regional parties as an outlet for protest votes, if nothing else. Also, previous studies find that higher levels of agricultural employment encourage regional voting, in part because it implies a more traditional social structure (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996, 178).

In addition to these variables, I include several other control variables that may determine regional party success. I include turnout to try to capture a degree of protest vote. Also, I include a dummy variable for whether other regional parties compete in that district in that election year.<sup>59</sup> By definition, if more than one regional party competes in an election, then the marketplace would be crowded. Thus, other regional parties should reduce the vote share for the particular regional party in the observation. I calculated the age of the political party as a control. Basically, I expect older parties to be more successful partly based on the logic that their ability to compete in multiple elections is a reflection of previous success or at least an ability to survive in the political marketplace.<sup>60</sup> Finally, I include the size of the region itself, in terms of square miles. For similar rational cost-benefit reasons as discussed above regarding the EU and the advantages of larger states, I expect parties in larger regions to gain more support than their smaller counterparts.

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<sup>59</sup> In 500 cases, the regional party has at least one regional party competitor. For robustness, I also tested the models with the number of other regional parties, a simple count variable, and the effective number of other regional parties. The formula for effective number of other regional parties [ENORP]

is as follows:  $1 / \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i)^2$ , or the inverse of the sum of the squared vote share of the other regional

parties in the district election. This index has been widely used in comparative politics, for both ethnic fragmentation and effective number of political parties, since being introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Not only are these measures highly correlated with the dummy variable, because most districts that have multiple parties only have two, but the regression results do not change with the different measures.

<sup>60</sup> Rather than measure a party's age by the length of time since their founding, I instead measured the length of time since they first competed in an election. This decision not only greatly simplifies the coding standards, but it also eliminates the need to subjectively decide whether a party that does not compete in an election is an interest group or a party and when they make the transition.

### *Determining Electoral Support for Regional Parties*

In order to increase the validity of my results, I follow the advice of Beck, King, and Zeng and de Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski and consider the out-of-sample forecasting performance of my model (2004; 2004). To do so, I split my sample into two parts, a test set and a replication set, before I conducted any analysis.<sup>61</sup> This procedure helps ensure that the model reflects a relatively accurate picture of the data generating process rather than simple curve fitting (de Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski 2004, 373).

In the following pages, I provide statistical results and evaluate the validity of the hypotheses. But first, I must discuss a severe limitation of the dataset. The dependent variable, a regional party's share of the district vote in a particular national election, is available since 1950 as are several key explanatory variables, such as language difference, turnout, existence of other regional parties and the leading party's attitudes toward decentralization; however, political economic variables at the regional or local level, such as economic difference, unemployment, gross domestic product, and percentage of the population employed in agriculture, are only available in a standardized form since around 1980. This limitation forces me to evaluate the hypotheses using two separate time series. For those variables available since 1950, I consider the hypotheses for the entire dataset, yielding 2,373 observations. For the more fully specified model with political economic variables, there are a significantly

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<sup>61</sup> The observation in this dataset is the individual regional party's vote share in a particular district in a particular election year in which it competed. The original sample is 2,623 which I then split using a simple random draw based on a uniform distribution into two parts consisting of 2,373 (~90 per cent) and 250 (~10 per cent).

smaller number of observations (1,621) and the time series is only from 1977 to 1997, which obviously means less variation in the EU explanatory variables.

Nevertheless, I first tested the hypotheses on the entire time series using Ordinary Least Squares regression. The results for Model 1, as well as the summary statistics, are reported in Table 4.1. In this model, I did not include economic variables so as to maximize the number of observations. In Model 2, I consider a more complete political economic model with fewer observations in a shorter time series.

Table 4.1 Determinants of Regional Political Party Success

Explanatory Variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	p-value	Coefficient	p-value
EU index	3.3170*** <sup>62</sup>	0.000	2.0606***	0.000
Language Difference	10.4611***	0.000	13.6763***	0.000
Economic Difference			20.1764***	0.000
Culture * Economic			-31.9748***	0.000
Decentralization	-4.0097***	0.001	-1.6021	0.228
Decentralization <sup>2</sup>	0.5182***	0.002	0.1879	0.292
Leading Party Decent. Index	-0.0700	0.705	-0.6252**	0.017
Other Regional Parties	-2.9288***	0.000	-2.6035***	0.002
Turnout	-0.1510***	0.001	0.0174	0.738
Square Miles (2003)	0.0010***	0.000	0.0016***	0.000
Party Age	-0.0031	0.860	-0.0081	0.643
Per Cent Employed by Agriculture			-0.1887	0.279
National Unemployment			-0.3978**	0.026
Relative GDP			0.1672***	0.000
Fifties	6.9236***	0.007		
Sixties	6.3598***	0.008		
Seventies	10.5957***	0.000		
Eighties	2.4944	0.147		
Belgium	-8.2276***	0.002	-18.1627***	0.000
France	-18.9179**	0.017	-26.6924***	0.001
Italy	-2.8031	0.353	-23.3166***	0.000
Spain	-14.4351***	0.000	-22.3903***	0.000
UK	-8.0582***	0.000	-18.6598***	0.000
Constant	24.3628***	0.000	11.1772	0.107
N		2373		1621
Adj. R-squared		0.0938		0.1355
AIC		7.934		7.679
BIC		495.293		575.595

The various control variables behaved largely as expected, with two exceptions. As expected, the size of the region had a positive effect on the dependent variable. Also, the dummy variable for whether other regional parties compete in that constituency in that year was negative, as expected. Contrary to expectations, though, turnout had a strong negative effect. Rather than proxying for protest against the mainstream parties, perhaps turnout is simply tracking the closeness or competitiveness of the

<sup>62</sup> Significant at the 1 per cent level (\*\*\*), 5 per cent level (\*\*), and 10 per cent level (\*).

national election. Surprisingly, the party age variable had an insignificant coefficient in all iterations of the two models.<sup>63</sup>

Regarding *Hypothesis 1*, the statistical results show that European integration has a positive effect on regional party electoral success. Regardless how one measures integration, the coefficients are consistently positive and significant.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the magnitude of the effect is large. In fact, the average or summary effect of the variable is nearly 6 per cent more votes for the regional party, an effect that is quite substantively significant when you consider the average vote share for regional parties is only 14.9 per cent.

To further evaluate the magnitude of changes in European integration, I calculated the expected value of the dependent variable using *Clarify*, holding all other variables at their mean values (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). These

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
<sup>63</sup> This variable was included to control for exogenous factors that made certain regional parties more successful. Success in multiple elections may imply that those parties found a niche in the electoral marketplace. The consistently insignificant results suggest that this hypothesis is not necessarily valid. For robustness, I tested the same model without party age and found consistent coefficients for the other variables.

<sup>64</sup> This finding is consistent across different specifications of the European integration variable also. Using the EU index, the Supranational Governance Index, a simple EU membership dummy, or the EU index split into separate treaty dummies, European integration has a consistently significant effect. In future work, I intend to develop a more accurate and discriminant measure for depth or extent of European political and economic integration. But the consistent robustness across measures does provide confidence in the results. These robustness tests are provided in Table 4.2 below:

Table 4.2 Robustness Tests,  
By Different EU Specifications (Model 1)

Model	EU Measure	Coefficient
1	EU Index	3.317***
2	EU Dummy	6.561***
3	Supranational Governance Index	38.534***
4	Treaty of Rome	6.571***
	Single European Act	6.205***
	Treaty of EU	10.676***

expected values represent a more informative way to present the statistical results than simply reporting the coefficients and the standard errors (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). As Figure 4.1 clearly demonstrates, if one holds all variables constant and only changes the level of integration, support for regional parties increases fairly dramatically.<sup>65</sup> With no European Union, support for regional parties is approximately 9 per cent. Steadily rising with integration, support is nearly 19 per cent with the Maastricht Treaty.<sup>66</sup> Thus, even if one incorporates the uncertainty associated with the simulations involved in *Clarify* and the regressions themselves, the upward trend is clear.



Significantly, even though I could not include economic variables in this model, a fixed effects model, controlling for all 207 different NUTS3 levels in the dataset, provides a similar result for level of integration.<sup>67</sup> Using a fixed effects version of the

<sup>65</sup> The line, or whisker, within each bar represents the 95 per cent confidence interval around these estimates.

<sup>66</sup> The 95 per cent confidence interval is plus or minus 2.5 per cent for no European Union and plus or minus 1.8 per cent for the TEU.

<sup>67</sup> The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is the EU classification system for subdividing each member states (European Union 2004). As the NUTS number increases, the size of the

model or different measurements of time did not affect the key results, suggesting that the effects of integration are indeed significant and not simply artifacts of a time trend.


I also find evidence to support the contention that regions are more supportive of regional parties when their preferences diverge from the rest of the country (*Hypothesis 2*). As the literature suggests, differences in language between the center and the peripheral group encourage regional parties (*Hypothesis 2.1*).<sup>68</sup> Again, relying on *Clarify* to create Figure 4.2, I demonstrate the expected vote shares of regional parties at various levels of language difference. *Ceteris paribus*, raising language difference from a standard deviation below the mean to a standard deviation above the mean increases the expected vote share of a regional party from 12.6 per cent to 17 per cent.

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sub-division decreases. For example, NUTS1 levels include regions with three to seven million people, while NUTS3 groups, which are sub-divisions of NUTS1 and NUTS2, include 150,000 to 800,000 citizens.

<sup>68</sup> Economic Difference is excluded in this discussion because the economic variables do not span the entire sample space. I will return to *Hypothesis 2.2* when I discuss model 2.

Figure 4.2 Expected Vote Share,  
by Language Difference (Model 1)




Supporting previous studies, I find that the more culturally distinct a region, the greater the support for regional parties.

While the cultural or language variable serves as a proxy for regional cultural difference, it would be interesting to include an objective measure for the relative strength of regional movements in extra-partisan arenas. In other words, the ability of regional groups to overcome collective action problems outside legislative elections would increase the probability of success in the electoral arena. Unfortunately, though, such measures of the strength of regional movements across Europe and the entire sample are not available.

For *Hypothesis 3*, the statistical results support the non-linear prediction for decentralization. At low levels of decentralization, the relationship is negative between support for regional parties and decentralization. In other words, if a country is centralized and provides a degree of devolution, then support for regional parties diminishes. At higher levels, though, the sign reverses as expected and

decentralization encourages support for regional parties. This effect is demonstrated in Figure 4.3 below.

Figure 4.3 Expected Vote Share,  
by Level of Decentralization (Model 1)



These results suggest that a certain amount of concessions, in the form of more autonomy, do in fact subvert support for regional parties and their associated movements; however, beyond a certain level, further political decentralization actually encourages the movements.


Finally, in the full sample regression, I do not find evidence of a strategic effect of mainstream party strategies. In *Hypothesis 4*, I predicted that when mainstream parties accommodate regional movements by adopting a more positive view on decentralization, support for regional parties would decrease. In none of the statistical models on the full test sample did I find a statistically significant coefficient. As the results from the previous chapter suggest, the strategic effect of leading parties on regional parties may in fact affect whether a party enters the competition in the first place rather than how well it does when it does enter.

In addition to the fixed effects models and the model variations for the full time series, I retested the data using economic variables. As discussed above, the availability of regional economic data reduces the observations in the sample substantially; however, the number of observations is sufficient to retest the model above and add the relevant economic variables. For this model, I include controls for unemployment, the percentage of the population employed by agriculture, and the relative GDP of the region. Also, I test *Hypothesis 2.2*, which predicts that greater levels of economic difference also result in more support for regional parties. The results for this model (Model 2), with political economic variables, are also located in Table 4.1.

As with the earlier model, the results in Model 2 confirm that increased levels of integration do in fact increase support for regional parties. The effect of the coefficient is positive and the magnitude is large. The effect does not differ greatly from Model 1, so the interpretation is consistent. Using more control variables, I find additional evidence that *Hypothesis 1* is correct, namely, that higher levels of integration do encourage support for regional parties.

This evidence also further validates *Hypothesis 2*. As a region becomes more distinct from the country along multiple dimensions, support for regional parties increases. However, the results of the interaction yield an interesting story. In general, as regions become more economically distinct from the rest of the country, either poorer or richer, the citizens support regional parties more. But as Figure 4.4 demonstrates, regions with high levels of cultural difference are more supportive of

regional parties regardless of their economic context. Similarly, regions with high levels of economic difference, and by extension, political-economic interests, have higher support for regional parties regardless of the cultural context.



At low or average levels of economic or cultural difference, though, the degree of difference on the other preference dimension matters greatly. In other words, if a region has low levels of language difference, then support for regional parties increases as the economic interests diverge from the rest of the country. Likewise, at low or average levels of economic difference, support for regional parties increases as the region increases in linguistic difference. Thus, in some ways, the two different preference dimensions act as substitutes rather than reinforcing factors. Since the two factors have very low correlations in this sample (-0.0546), the significance of these results cannot simply be attributed to multi-collinearity.

Unlike Model 1, I find insignificant results for the decentralization variables,<sup>69</sup> although the signs remain supportive of the non-linear prediction. This may be a result of less variation during the shorter time series. Compared to the full time series, the average level of decentralization from 1977 to 1997 is 15 per cent greater. This higher average level may account for the insignificance of the variables. Regardless, I do not find further evidence to support *Hypothesis 3*, which leaves some doubt about the relationship between decentralization and support for regional parties.

Surprisingly, the strategic variable becomes significant in the more fully specified model. As leading party's views on decentralization become more favorable, support for regional parties decreases, by an average of 1.8 per cent. This coefficient supports *Hypothesis 4*, but the insignificant result in Model 1 does not allow for as much confidence as with the EU and the preference results.

As for the additional economic controls, the results largely confirm previous studies. Richer regions are more supportive of autonomy and regional parties than their poorer counterparts. Also, regions that have high agricultural employment are less supportive of regional parties. The unemployment coefficient is somewhat contradictory, though. Unlike previous studies, unemployment actually negatively affects regional party vote shares. In large part, this result may be attributed to the inclusion of turnout. Hearl, Budge, and Pearson and others consider unemployment

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<sup>69</sup> For this model, I test the Regional Governance Index as well as the economic variables used by Rodden (2002). The results are not consistent as they are insignificant in most of the model variations. I ran the models with different indicators of decentralization measures, as well as fixed effects models for the political economy models, with similar results.

largely to be a proxy for protest voting (Hearl, Budge, and Pearson 1996). Turnout acts in a similar way. Thus, unemployment may be serving as a proxy for other factors or perhaps citizens who live in these regions consider economic issues to be the most pressing concern, which leads to more votes for mainstream parties.

The variations of Models 1 and 2, including alternative operationalizations of key variables and fixed effects models, do provide a certain level of confidence in the robustness of the results. I also conducted a split sample test to ensure that I did not simply, albeit unintentionally, curve fit. Using the coefficients from Model 1, I calculated the root mean square error for the replication set. The root mean square error in the replication set (250 cases) is only 1.2 per cent different than the test set (2,375 cases). The difference is minimal, suggesting that the model is successful at out of sample prediction, thereby providing at least a reflection of the true data generating process rather than simply fitting the data.

### *Discussion*

Empirically, I find evidence to support my specific contention that deeper integration positively affects support for regional parties. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients tell a consistent story. As integration proceeds from a free trade area to a monetary union, deeper European integration is associated with more electoral success for the regional parties. Also, more heterogeneous preferences, as measured by language or economics, increase vote shares for regional parties. In particular,

when a region has distinct preferences on multiple dimensions, then its support for regional parties increases.

These results bolster the broader theoretical argument put forward in this paper. Deeper integration does in fact encourage autonomy movements, as demonstrated by the increased support for regional parties. With this analysis, I clarify under what conditions the EU leads to more regional parties competing in national elections as well as greater success in those elections.

In the next section, I intend to analyze regional party attitudes toward European Union to determine which causal mechanism is at work. The statistical analysis above yields an additional observable implication. If the size of nations theory is true in this instance, then regional political parties should recognize the advantage of European integration and become more supportive over time. Alternatively, if regional party views on integration do not change or even worsen, then it supports the second causal mechanism. It will be critical to determine under what conditions these two mechanisms are shown to be at work. Combined with the analysis above, I will use these extensions to further validate the hypothesis that European integration has in fact encouraged sub-national mobilization. Considering both the enlargement of the EU into Eastern Europe and the development of regional regimes in other parts of the world, understanding this unintended consequence of regional integration is crucial for both academics and politicians.

**Part 3.**

**Fear, Loathing and the Optimal Size of States:  
Support for European Integration and Sub-National Mobilization**

## Chapter 5

### **Fear, Loathing, and the Optimal Size of Nations: Assessing Regional Party Views on European Integration**

In a Europe characterized by multi-level governance, two causal mechanisms might explain why deeper integration at the European Union level contributes to increased support for sub-national movements, and therefore regional political parties, in national elections. In one argument, European integration decreases the necessity of traditional large states, thereby making smaller more homogeneous states more viable (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Therefore, the EU may be an unwitting ally of sub-national groups against central governments. In the other line of reasoning, it is not decreased dependence on the central government but rather fear that drives the relationship between integration and regional political party support. Fear of yet another foreign authority encroaching on local sovereignty and loathing of immigrants could drive regional voters to leave mainstream parties and support alternative parties. In regions with distinct cultural or linguistic histories, regional political parties provide a focal point for these feelings. For both theories, then, deeper integration leads to more sub-national mobilization in the form of support for regional political parties.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I demonstrated that deeper integration does in fact increase both the probability of regional political parties competing in national parliamentary elections and their vote shares once they enter competition. In this chapter, I seek to understand whether regional parties perform better as a result of deeper integration because they frame the EU as an ally or as an enemy. This

research contributes to the growing literature on party positioning on the EU by concentrating on an under-studied party family, the regional political party (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Marks et al. 2006). Also, though topically limited in its focus on European integration, this in-depth analysis of Scottish National Party manifestos contributes to the party manifesto literature because the Scottish National Party is typically excluded from both manifesto collections and analyses (Budge et al. 2001). Finally, this research project extends the multi-level governance literature by focusing attention on the interaction between the supra-national and sub-national levels (Marks and Hooghe 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001).

First, I outline the basic causal mechanisms that predict a relationship between integration and sub-national mobilization. I also explain the use of political party positions on the EU as an appropriate research domain. Second, I introduce the expert survey data and present the analysis of regional political party attitudes toward the European Union. Finally, I consider the official positions of the Scottish National Party on European integration as a crucial-case study. To preview the analysis, I assess the views of regional parties on European integration and find evidence to support the viability argument by showing that regional political parties are not Euroskeptical; rather, they are generally supportive of the European project. In the Scottish case, the Scottish National Party explicitly uses the European Union to frame independence as a more viable constitutional option to garner support for their movement.

### *Viability or Fear? Two Paths to Greater Sub-National Mobilization*

Though European integration is rarely considered a factor when discussing domestic elections and regional parties, two theories predict deeper European integration will in fact increase support for regional political parties. First, the European Union makes smaller states more viable by diminishing the advantages of larger state size (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). In the past, “[t]he types of arguments used against minority nationalist and regionalist demands have often centered around the impracticalities of upsetting administrative and political traditions constructed around central institutions” (Lynch 1996, 12). Thus, for regional political entrepreneurs, European integration increases the credibility of demands for greater autonomy and therefore their parties’ credibility.<sup>70</sup>

Second, the European Union may provide a focal point for politicians to complain about globalization, immigration, and loss of sovereignty. Regional movements may utilize the threat of encroaching authority of Brussels to rally supporters to their cause. Significantly, the alternative explanations yield the same observable implication: deeper integration leads to great support for regional political parties. After discussing each mechanism, I introduce the research design to evaluate under which conditions each explanation holds true.

Following Alesina and Spolaore’s size of states argument (1997; 2003), I argue that European integration has created conditions under which regional groups

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<sup>70</sup> These demands do not necessarily mean independence, but could mean support for devolution, home rule, or even cultural autonomy (Lynch 1996, 4).

(e.g. the Scottish) may not need the status quo state (e.g. United Kingdom) to thrive internationally. The European Union decreases sub-national dependency on the nation-state in both economic (e.g. international trade and monetary policy) and political terms (e.g. defense, foreign policy, and minority rights). In other words, the European Union system of multi-level governance increases the viability of smaller states, thereby creating additional incentive for citizens to support regional political parties. For economists, the theoretical result is a smaller optimal size of states in Europe under the umbrella of the European Union and a system of free(er) trade (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg 1998; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000; Wittman 2000; Casella and Feinstein 2002; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Thus far, though, many of the empirical implications of these theoretical models have largely remained untested.

In historical terms, several factors encouraged economically larger states (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). First, in a world of relatively large barriers to trade, the size of the state was also the size of the economic market; therefore, the larger the country, the more successful was the economy (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). By breaking the link between state size and market size, therefore, the European Union diminishes a significant advantage of larger states. Or as Hooghe and Marks note: “The single European market reduces the economic penalty imposed by regional political autonomy because regional firms continue to have access to the European market” (2001, 166).

Second, larger state size is advantageous because public goods benefit from economies of scale. Third, larger states are more capable of providing insurance for regional economic shocks due to natural or economic disasters, such as earthquakes or deindustrialization (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). Though the EU has not replaced the need for large states in these two areas, it has diminished large states' advantage as the EU provides numerous public goods, such as monetary and trade policy, and subsidizes less developed regions with cohesion and structural funds.

Finally, security concerns often encourage larger state size. But with NATO and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fears of invasion by a foreign country are much diminished. Further, by diminishing the military rivalries that led to intermittent conflict in Europe for centuries, the European Union decreased the significance and relevance of large military defense. For Western European countries and regions, it is less likely that security concerns would drive decisions about state size.

According to Alesina and Spolaore, the optimal size of a state “emerges from a trade-off between the benefits of scale and the costs of heterogeneity in the population” (2003, 175). Via membership in the European Union, the advantages of large states vis-à-vis small states are diminished. But the key cost of a larger state, namely heterogeneity of preferences, remains. Political economists find that economic growth and public policies suffer with greater ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine 1997).<sup>71</sup> A government of a homogeneous population tends to

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<sup>71</sup> The argument put forth by the economics literature on ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth implies that the disadvantages associated with preference heterogeneity, measured by ethnic

be more successful at public policies because the day-to-day lives of the people are more similar (Tilly 1975, 79), while larger, more heterogeneous, states are less efficient at public good provision (Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore 1996, 701). Due to this comparative advantage, European regions may see themselves as more capable of providing sustained economic growth than the traditional nation-states (Newhouse 1997, 69), yielding political separatism as an unintended consequence of economic integration (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1042).

Astute regional political entrepreneurs utilize these trends to argue more convincingly that the region is less dependent on the rest of the country by “fram[ing] their demands in European terms” (Keating 1995, 7). In Scotland in the 1970s, for instance, the Scottish National Party (SNP) could not convince factory workers that seceding from the United Kingdom would not result in even more unemployment if access to the British market was blocked (Esman 1977c, 266-7). In the 1980s, though, former MP Jim Sillars convinced the SNP to support a pro-European position as a “mechanism to avoid economic dislocation in the event of secession from the UK” (Lynch 1996, 39). Scottish MP Gordon Wilson described the Scottish National Party’s support for the European Union as ““a first class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of economic dislocation. Within the common trading umbrella the move to independence can take place

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fractionalization, outweigh potential benefits from diversity, such as cross-cultural learning, innovation, or creativity. The point is debatable, from either (or both) a normative or empirical perspective. But dealing with that issue would be a separate research enterprise than the current one.

smoothly and easily” (Lynch 1996, 38). Thus, activists use the EU to negate the arguments against autonomy based on fears of economic upheaval (Gallagher 1991).

Though this brief discussion does not address all the advantages and disadvantages of size, it should highlight that European integration devalues critical roles of the state. Integration allows sub-national units to claim legitimate authority over issues that could be better handled at that level. The balance between large and small states has shifted in favor of smaller less heterogeneous states. Based on these arguments, regional political parties will support the European Union as an ally against the national state.

Along similar lines, Gary Marks and co-authors derive hypotheses about party positions on European integration from the cleavage literature (Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). Analyzing the classic class, religious, and center-periphery cleavages yields predictions about whether party families support European integration. The center-periphery cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), on which regional political parties contest, yields two predictions. First, regional political parties should be more supportive of European integration precisely because the EU threatens national sovereignty (Marks and Wilson 2000). Furthermore, the EU may be a friendlier environment for sub-national groups because the European Union is multi-cultural with no single dominant or pan-European identity (Lynch 1996, 15), where the group will be one of many minorities in Europe rather than a permanent minority in their home country (Marks and Wilson 2000, 438-439). These considerations lead regional political parties to be more pro-EU, *ceteris paribus*.

Hence, the extension of cleavage theories to explain attitudes toward European integration provides theoretical support for *Hypothesis 1*.

*Hypothesis 1. Regional political parties will be strongly supportive of European integration.*

But the viability argument is not the only theory that predicts a positive relationship between European integration and sub-national movements in the form of regional political parties. An alternative causal mechanism exists. It may not be that regional groups embrace the EU as a means of making smaller independent countries more viable. Rather, it could simply be that some regional groups are the focal point for opposition to globalization and European integration (van Houten 2003, 113-118). In addition to yet another distant government informing regions what to do, increased labor mobility from outside Western Europe threatens the cultural homogeneity of regions. In other words, integration creates new representation demands, such as a fear of economic competition or immigration, which regional parties rise to meet. Similar to the political entrepreneurs of the radical right parties (Kitschelt 1995), regional political parties may use this opposition as a mechanism to draw support to their movement. While mainstream parties have little incentive to 'rock the boat' on European integration, extreme or fringe parties desire to restructure the dimensions of contestation to try to gain electoral votes (Taggart 1998, 382; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 123). Fear of cultural assimilation or economic competition and animosity towards immigrants each could factor into supporting regional parties. Thus, regional political parties could mobilize electoral support by

framing the EU in negative terms of fear and loathing. This logic yields an empirical implication directly contradicting *Hypothesis 1*.

*Hypothesis 2. Regional political parties will be strongly Euroskeptical.*

While both theories seem feasible, there is qualitative evidence that the viability theory is correct. As mentioned above, the Scottish National Party adopted a policy of independence in Europe in the 1980s, precisely because the EU allowed for political autonomy without fear of economic dislocation (Lynch 1996, 38). Similarly, in 1989, the Plaid Cymru supported a policy of independence in the EU while encouraging the EU to evolve into a true Europe of the regions (Lynch 1996, 76). Further, regional political parties apparently do not fear the loss of regionalist identity to a supra-national European identity (Lynch 1996, 198-9). Across Europe, Kurzer found that regional politicians are generally enthusiastic about a federal Europe (1997, 43).

Nevertheless, it is important to understand whether variation in support for European integration within the regionalist party family occurs and whether this variation is territorial, temporal, or issue-based. As the EU evolves from simply the 'negative integration' of opening markets to the potential 'positive integration' of social and welfare policy (Scharpf 1996, 15), party families may change their level of support for the European project. For instance, social democratic parties have become more supportive of European integration as the agenda has turned from simply market integration to 'regulated capitalism' while right-wing parties have gone in the opposite direction (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 129). It could be that

some regional groups supported a form of “independence in Europe” as long as the integration was mainly economic in nature, yielding economic benefits without threats to political sovereignty, but when economic integration completed and the attention turned to political matters, the groups perceived a greater threat. In other words, *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2* may both be valid in different contexts.

Observationally, these two causal mechanisms, viability and fear, are equivalent in terms of predicting greater electoral support for regional political parties as European integration deepens. Having demonstrated in earlier chapters that there is in fact a relationship between depth of integration and support for regional political parties using cross-section time-series analysis, I must now adjudicate between the two theories. Using expert surveys, I analyze the level of support of regional political parties for the European project, in terms of general integration and specific policy areas, and how this support changes over time and between regional political parties. With this analysis, I evaluate the conditions under which each mechanism works by disentangling whether temporal or territorial differences explain more variation within the regional party family. To further test the internal validity, I then analyze the official positions of the Scottish National Party.

### ***Why Expert Surveys?***

To evaluate these hypotheses, I utilize expert evaluations of party positions on the European Union. Collected by scholars at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the surveys request country experts to evaluate each party on several key

questions, including each party's position on European integration. Leonard Ray's original survey included the following years: 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 (1999). The UNC Chapel Hill Center for European Studies replicated the surveys in 1999 and 2002 (Marks et al. 2006).<sup>72</sup>

Several factors contribute to the decision to use this particular data. First, the surveys cover a wide range of years and political parties, including 23 regional political parties across five West European countries. Table 5.1 lists these parties and their vote shares in the national election prior to the surveyed years.

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<sup>72</sup> For more technical information on the dataset as well as access to the data, codebooks, and questionnaire, see <http://www.unc.edu/~gwmaks>.

Table 5.1 National Vote Shares of Regional Political Parties<sup>73</sup>

Country	Party	National Vote Share					
		1984	1988	1992	1996	1999	2002
Belgium	Democratic Front of Francophones (FDF)	4.2	1.2	1.5	2.9	2.6	-
	ID21 (ID21)	-	-	-	-	0	-
	Flemish Bloc (VB)	1.1	1.9	6.6	7.8	9.9	9.9
	People's Union (VU)	9.9	8	5.9	4.7	5.6	5.6
Finland	Swedish People's Party (SFP)	4.6	5.3	5.8	5.5	5.1	5.1
Ireland	Sinn Fein (SF)	3.3	1.9	1.6	1.6	2.5	6.5
Italy	Northern League (LN)	0	1.8	8.7	10.1	10.1	3.9
	Sardinian Action Party (PsDA)	-	-	-	-	0.7	-
	South Tyrol People's Party (SVP)	-	-	-	-	1.7	-
Spain	Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG)	0.2	0.3	0	0.9	0.88	1.3
	Canarian Coalition (CC)	-	-	-	-	0.88	1.1
	Convergence and Union (CiU)	3.9	5	5	4.6	4.6	4.2
	Basque Solidarity (EA)	-	0	0	0	0.46	0.4
	Catalan Republican Left (ERC)	0.7	0.5	0	0.7	0.67	-
	Herri Batasuna (HB)	1	1.2	1.1	0.7	0.73	-
	Initiative for Catalonia (IC)	-	-	-	-	0	-
	Andalusian Party (PA)	0.4	0.5	1	0	-	0.9
	Aragonese Regionalist Party (PAR)	0	0.4	0	0	0.2	-
	Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.27	1.5
	Valencian Union (UV)	0	0.3	0	0.4	0.37	-
United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru (Cymru)	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7
	Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP)	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	-	-
	Scottish National Party (SNP)	1.1	1.3	1.9	1.9	2	1.8

<sup>73</sup> There are a few discrepancies between my coding and the Chapel Hill coding of regional political parties. The Chapel Hill data codes the VB as a new radical right party, but consistent with earlier work, I recoded them as a regionalist party. In Northern Ireland, the SDLP is coded socialist in the dataset, but I include them as a regionalist party. Finally, Sinn Fein in Ireland is coded as a regionalist party. In earlier work, I include Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland as a regionalist party but not Sinn Fein in Ireland. Since I am doing descriptive data analysis, I do not consider the coding problematic, but I will reconsider the inclusion (exclusion) of these parties in the future. For discussion of the coding of regional political parties, see Chapter 3.

The table demonstrates that the majority of regional political parties are merely fringe parties at the national level. By not competing throughout the entire country, even larger regional political parties have relatively small national vote shares, which explains their exclusion from most datasets, such as the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001). Second, the experts not only ordered the parties' attitudes toward the European Union, but also the relative salience of the issue and the level of internal dissent. Third, when compared to other available datasets for the years collected, the expert surveys prove to be reliable and valid measures for political party support for European integration (Ray 1999).

Finally, for the study of regional political parties, in particular, there are simply not many alternatives. The comparative manifesto project provides an invaluable resource for the study of party manifestos over time (Budge et al. 2001). But as Ray discusses (1999), several problems with this data persist. Two crucial problems prevent the use of that data for this analysis. First, parties have incentive to strategically neglect an issue in their manifesto either due to low salience or internal dissent. In other words, parties can adopt a 'dismissive strategy' for a variety of reasons (Meguid 2002, 7). This strategic behavior would affect the manifestos and therefore the coding.

Second, and more logistically significant for this analysis, the manifesto project only includes electorally significant parties. While regional political parties are often significant electoral contenders at the regional level, even for national offices, their aggregate national vote totals are generally too low to warrant inclusion

in the dataset. Thus, not even relatively significant regional political parties, such as the Scottish National Party or the Plaid Cymru in the United Kingdom, are included (Budge et al. 2001).

Unfortunately, using public opinion data to infer party positions has similar problems. First, based on the research thus far, a significant disconnect exists between party positions on the EU and their partisans' attitudes (Taggart 1998; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Voters have preferences on European integration, and there appears to be genuine variance or dispersion in their attitudes (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 37+). Parties, on the other hand, offer little in the way of choice on this issue. This fact is particularly true if one includes only mainstream or electorally significant parties. This disconnect, while raising interesting research questions about cueing and representation (Carrubba 2001), suggests that using partisan attitudes to infer party positions on the European Union would be a highly skeptical proposition. Further, the Eurobarometer and other multi-national surveys do not yield sufficient survey respondents in each region to allow for a study of regional political parties. Thus, as with manifesto data, the logistical problems complicate any analysis of regional political parties' views using survey data.

### *Analyzing the Data*

In this section, I analyze the expert survey data to test the hypotheses. The small number of regional political parties makes traditional regression analysis less reliable for explaining differences between regional political parties. Instead, I


analyze the data and present descriptive statistics and graphs.<sup>74</sup> With this analysis, I draw conclusions about the validity of each hypothesis.

To evaluate the first two hypotheses, or whether regional political parties are Europhiles or Euroskeptics, I initially compare the regionalist party family to other party families in Western Europe. Figure 5.1 demonstrates that regional political parties are consistently more pro-European Union than most other party families. The exceptions are mainstream party families, such as the Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the Socialists. This confirms earlier multivariate regression results regionalist party family dummy to be a significantly positive predictor of support for European integration (Marks et al. 2006). This figure also suggests that a convergence in opinion may be occurring. Other than the mainstream parties, the Euroskeptical party families seem to be increasing in support while support among Conservatives and Regionalists has diminished.

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<sup>74</sup> All data for the analysis is from the UNC Chapel Hill expert survey on EU party positions and can be obtained from <http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks>. I conducted all descriptive data analysis and created all graphs using Stata8.


Figure 1. Support for European Union  
By Party Family



Nevertheless, Figure 5.1 supports *Hypothesis 1*, which predicts that regional political parties will be strongly supportive of European integration. On average, regional political parties are highly supportive of the European Union and hold similar attitudes as the mainstream parties. While this figure and the regression results suggest that *Hypothesis 2* is not generally accurate, this aggregation at the party family level may be hiding significant variation within the regional party family.

Figure 5.2 breaks down this aggregate data by individual regional political party, with the average position for all parties, in the regionalist and other party families, included as the dotted line. The figure shows that nearly all of the regional political parties are more supportive of the European Union than the average party in the EU.

Figure 2. Support for the European Union  
By Regional Political Party




Only a few exceptions exist: Herri Batasuna in the Basque region of Spain, Sinn Fein in Ireland, and the Vlaams Blok, or Vlaams Belang, in Belgium. Each of these parties is ideologically extreme. Herri Batasuna and Sinn Fein are the two most extreme left-wing regional political parties in Europe and Herri Batasuna is actually the most left-wing party in Spain. On the other end of the spectrum, the Vlaams Blok is the most right-wing regional political party and is in fact only slightly less extreme than the National Front in France. Thus, another predictor of party attitudes toward European integration may explain the outliers: ideology.

The literature on party position provides a clear expectation for the effect of ideology on party support for the European Union: an inverted U-curve, which places extreme left and right-wing parties in opposition to European integration while centrist parties support it (Marks 2004, 238). Mark Aspinwall argues that centrist

parties support the EU as a 'fait accompli' and perceive it as a positive development in European history (Aspinwall 2002). Empirically, mainstream parties, or parties in the government, are relatively absent from lists of 'soft' or 'hard' Euroskeptic parties in Western Europe (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001). As one might expect, the reasons for opposition on the left and right are much different. Extreme left-wing parties oppose the EU either on the basis of 'old politics' anti-market socialism or 'new politics' anti-centralist activism while right-wing parties oppose any attempts to diminish the state's autonomy, in cultural or economic terms (Aspinwall 2002, 86-7). Thus, ideology matters but it is mainly the extremism of ideology that determines the position of the party on European integration, yielding a curvilinear relationship.

Figure 5.3 simply shows an unweighted scatterplot of the regional political parties with ideology on the X-axis and support for European integration on the Y-axis.

Figure 3. Regional Political Party Support for European Union Across Left/Right Dimension




Let me reiterate that there is only a small number of regional political parties from which to draw inferences. With a small number of observations, outliers have an even larger probability of skewing conclusions. With this qualification in mind, the graph indicates that the inverted U-curve holds for regional political parties, at least at the aggregate level. The most extreme left-wing parties, Herri Batasuna and Sinn Fein, and the most right-wing parties, Vlaams Blok and Lega Nord, are relatively Euroskeptical while the centrist parties have higher levels of support for European integration. This finding reinforces much of the literature on party positions on the EU.

While traditional left/right ideology structures contestation on the European Union with an inverted U-curve, the 'new politics' dimension is more straightforward, both theoretically and empirically. Whether called green/alternative/libertarian versus

traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (GAL/TAN) or left-libertarian/right-authoritarianism, this second dimension has a significant effect on party positions on European integration.<sup>75</sup> TAN parties, both extreme right and mainstream conservative parties, are much less supportive of European integration (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 133); they oppose European integration because it weakens the traditional authority of the state. Thus, theoretically, GAL/TAN may also explain variation within the regional political party family. Figure 5.4 presents another unweighted scatterplot with GAL/TAN as the X-axis.

Figure 4. Regional Political Party Support for European Union Across GAL/TAN Dimension



<sup>75</sup> For political parties in Western Europe, left/right ideology and GAL/TAN are correlated at the 0.76 level; thus, the distinction between the two dimensions may not be quite as clear-cut as outlined. But the findings for ideology, extremism, and GAL/TAN are robust if both variables are included (Marks et al. 2006).


As expected, there is a negative linear relationship between GAL/TAN and support for European integration. The correlation is -0.47 and, reinforcing the results for the entire European national party system, the extreme TAN parties drive the relationship. In fact, without Vlaams Blok and Lega Nord, the correlation is insignificant (-0.01).

Similar to their extreme position on left/right ideology, the Vlaams Blok and Lega Nord are the extreme TAN parties and are more Euroskeptical. Unfortunately, with the small number of parties, it would be difficult to discriminate between the effects of left/right ideology and the effects of GAL/TAN, especially since the correlation between left/right and GAL/TAN for regional political parties is 0.76. But unlike with left/right ideology, there is no inverted U for GAL/TAN. Extreme GAL parties are highly pro-European Union while extreme left parties are not. Thus, the evidence suggests that the GAL/TAN dimension explains variation within the regionalist party family. This finding reinforces the use of GAL/TAN as an explanatory factor when predicting support for European integration.

Because Figure 5.1 relies on aggregated data at the party family level, the descriptive statistics and figures do not conclusively answer whether variation among regional political party positions occurs across issue areas or across time. In Figure 5.5, I show trends over time for six of the electorally larger regional political parties, including position on European integration, salience of the issue and internal dissent over this issue.

Figure 5. Trends in Regional Political Parties

Position on EU, Saliency and Dissent



For the Convergence and Union, Francophone Democratic Front, Scottish National party, and Flemish People’s Party, little variation in party position, saliency, or dissent occurs across time. The Swedish Peoples’ Party (SFP) became more supportive of European integration between 1988 and 1992. Since Finland was not yet a member of the European Union in that time, it is not altogether surprising the party’s position was in flux.

But Lega Nord did experience a significant decrease in support between 1996 and 1999. Surprisingly, this fairly significant positional change occurred without significant internal party dissent over European integration. As Figure 5.5 shows, European integration is simply not as salient for Lega Nord as for other regional political parties, particularly in the period when their support for European integration decreased significantly. In other words, Lega Nord is more Euroskeptical

in later years, but it is also less concerned with the integration process, at least according to the latest expert survey in 2002. This finding is consistent with research that shows that parties with extreme positions on integration tend to downplay, or lower the salience, of the issue because their position is not consistent with their voters (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Barring this exception, the attitudes toward European integration among regional political parties seem remarkably consistent over time.

In addition to time, it may be that variation in position for regional political parties occurs across issue areas. For instance, Marks, Wilson and Ray contend that regional political parties will be strongly in favor of economic integration but only moderately supportive of political integration (2002, 587). To address this possibility, I present the party positions on three aspects of European integration--a general EU question, powers of the European Parliament, and the internal market--for those parties from Figure 5.5 that competed in 2002.<sup>76</sup>


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<sup>76</sup> In the survey, experts evaluate party positions on several EU issues, including European Parliament, internal market and several policies, including employment, agricultural, cohesion, environmental, asylum, and foreign. None of the questions directly corresponds to either economic or political integration per se, but the internal market question seems closest to 'negative integration' and the EP question may serve as a proxy for extending political integration.

The wording of the questions are as follows:

- General EU: "First, how would you describe the **general position on European integration** that the party's leadership has taken over the **course of 2002**?"
- European Parliament: "First, take the position of the party leadership on the **powers of the European Parliament**. Some parties want more powers for the European Parliament. Other parties are opposed to expanding further the powers of the European Parliament. Where does the leadership of the following parties stand?"
- Internal Market: "Next consider the **internal market**. Some parties wish to strengthen EU powers to eliminate market barriers (i.e. free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor). Other parties oppose strengthening EU powers in this area. Where does the leadership of the following parties stand?"

Figure 6. Support for European Union  
By Regional Political Party and Issue Area



As expected from the viability hypothesis, regional political parties are generally more supportive of market integration than political integration. Among major regional political parties, only the Catalan Convergence and Union supports political integration more than market integration. The differences (and the sample size) are relatively small, though, so it would be imprudent to conclude regional political parties are more supportive of market integration than political integration. The data suggest that regional political parties are generally consistent in their support for European integration across issue area as they are across time and space.

This descriptive data analysis yields several conclusions. First, I find additional support for the viability argument in *Hypothesis 1*. I do not find evidence to support the main alternative hypothesis (*Hypothesis 2*) that regional political parties seek to increase electoral support by mobilizing anti-EU sentiments. Second, I

find further support for the GAL/TAN and U-curve hypotheses found in the literature and show that these factors appear to explain variation within the regional political party family. Finally, I find little evidence to show that support for integration among regional political parties significantly varies across time, region or issue area, with exceptions noted. In the next section of the paper, I extend this general analysis by considering a crucial case: the Scottish National Party.

### ***The SNP and the 'Independence in Europe' Policy***

To complement the cross-sectional analysis above, I consider the official positions of the Scottish National Party on European integration as a 'crucial-case' study (Eckstein 1975). The SNP provides fruitful ground for this research because it is not only one of the more electorally successful regional political parties, but also one of the few that actively promotes independence. Following the logic outlined in *Designing Social Inquiry*, I maximize the observations in this case by looking at the evolving SNP position over time (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Analysis of this single case may not confirm or disconfirm the main hypotheses, but it provides a 'plausibility probe' of the theory.

Consistent from the *Policy of the Scottish National Party* of 1947 to the most recent election manifestos (Scottish National Party 1947, 1949, 1974a, 1974c, 1974b, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005a), the Scottish

National Party's main identifiable goal is independence from the United Kingdom.<sup>77</sup> In the *Policy of the SNP* (1947) and the *Constitution and Rules of the SNP* (1949), the aim is explicitly stated: "Self-Government for Scotland—that is, the restoration of Scottish National Sovereignty by the establishment of a democratic Scottish government, freely elected by the Scottish people ..." At this early stage, and in the aftermath of World War II, the realization that independent countries cannot escape international ties and commitments is apparent (Scottish National Party 1947, 4). But the SNP's international concerns centered on the British Isles for most issue areas rather than Europe.

Between the 1940s and the 1960s, the SNP's position on a 'European Union' shifted from a positive view to a negative one (Lynch 1996, 27-30).<sup>78</sup> In the 1960s, the negative linkage can be traced to a lack of representation and fear of economic dislocation. They feared that a common market would hurt Scotland and argued that Scotland needed independence prior to joining in order to negotiate the best possible deal for Scotland (Lynch 1996, 31). Nevertheless, at this early stage of European integration, the issue was simply not particularly salient for the SNP (Lynch 1996, 21).

The 1974 SNP pamphlet, *SNP & You*, clearly stated the party's opposition to membership in the European Union for political and economic reasons. The SNP

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<sup>77</sup> The most recent SNP manifestos are available at the SNP website ([www.snp.org](http://www.snp.org)). SNP headquarters provided copies of the manifestos from 1979 to 1992. Earlier official documents were obtained directly from the National Library of Scotland.

<sup>78</sup> Over time, the nomenclature of the European Union as used by the Scottish National Party changes from the European Economic Community or the Common Market to the European Community to the European Union. For ease of reading, I use European Union throughout.

complained particularly that the organization was “highly bureaucratic, centralist, and undemocratic—remote from the control of ordinary people” (1974c, 6). In fact, they derisively labeled the Common Market yet another foreign “centralist empire” for whom Scotland’s interests are sacrificed (Scottish National Party 1974a, 5).

As an alternative, the SNP proposed an association of British states and an agreement with the European Union along the lines of Norway’s that “encourag[ed] trade but maintain[ed] genuine sovereignty” (1974c, 6). Lack of representation in the European Union, of both Scotland as a nation and its citizens, is clearly at the heart of SNP opposition to the common market (1974b, 7). In terms of the viability argument, throughout the SNP manifestos of 1974 (1974a; 1974b; 1974c), the SNP attempted to convince voters that Scotland was self-sufficient, thanks in no small part to the discovery of oil, and would be better equipped to promote economic growth as an independent country than as a region of the UK.

In the 1976 manifesto, *Scotland’s Future*, the SNP acknowledged that isolationism was not a viable strategy and that nations must yield a certain amount of sovereignty to promote peace and stability (1976, 3). Nevertheless, they continued to oppose British membership in the European Union. The SNP arguments focused on the ‘centralist thinking inherent in the Treaty of Rome,’ a lack of representation of Scotland, and on the belief that the Common Market was not necessarily beneficial for Scottish citizens (1976, 11).

By 1979, the SNP was softening its anti-European Union stance. But complaints about the European Union were actually more specific in the 1979

election manifesto. Consistent with later manifestos, the SNP complained that the European Union's tried to "virtually take over Scotland's fishing grounds" (1979, 5). The SNP also complained about unfair subsidized agricultural competition from other European Union member countries (1979, 8). But in the conclusion, the party endorsed negotiations with the European Union to resolve these complaints and guarantee Scottish control of energy resources and fishing limits (1979, 28). Only if such negotiations failed would the SNP oppose membership in a referendum campaign.

Despite more intra-party dissent over European integration in the early 1980s than in the 1970s (Lynch 1996), they maintained the stance in the 1983 manifesto that upon independence they would immediately call a referendum on membership and urge a 'no' vote (1983). Their main complaints concerned the Common Fisheries Policy and other agricultural matters. In the 1983 manifesto, they complained that United Kingdom had "sold Scottish fishermen short" on the Common Fisheries Policy. Again, a lack of representation for Scotland in the EU contributed to their disaffection.

The 1987 party manifesto shows a remarkably different stance on European integration (Scottish National Party 1987). While the SNP continued to warn against centralist tendencies in Brussels, they recommended membership in the European Union. Perhaps because of the major change in policy, the SNP listed several reasons why they supported membership in the European Union for an independent Scotland. Noting the influence and availability of regional and social funds, they demanded a

direct voice within the EU, which would be achieved by independence within the European Union. Beyond securing funds and support, the SNP guaranteed protection for the fishery industry as well as other Scottish interests, such as agriculture and industry (Sillars 1986, 187; Scottish National Party 1987). Finally, a seat at the table would allow Scotland to contribute more to European affairs (Scottish National Party 1987). In addition to these reasons, there were lower levels of dissent within the party over European integration and party elites saw the issue as a way to distance themselves from the Tories (Lynch 1996, 38-39). Utilizing the validity logic, Jim Sillars, a former SNP MP, argued that only by endorsing a strategy of ‘Independence in Europe’ could the SNP credibly argue that independence from the UK was a viable option (Sillars 1986, 186). This policy would guarantee mobility of labor and trade between Scotland and England after independence, thus negating a key argument of independence opponents. These factors contributed to the SNP’s newfound support for European integration.

The SNP’s policy of “Independence in Europe” was in full swing by the regional elections of 1990. In fact, while earlier manifestos open with claims of seeking independence or self-government for Scotland with no mention of Europe, the 1990 manifesto makes it clear that the EU is at the heart of the SNP independence strategy: “Scotland’s future lies as an independent member of the European Community. ... we can and must achieve the premier league status of an independent and equal partner in the European family of nations” (Scottish National Party 1990). The main priorities of this election were the removal of the poll tax and “to advance

the case for Independence in Europe.” This provides a stark contrast to the anti-EU stance of the 1970s.

More recent manifestos continue the push for ‘Independence in Europe.’ In 1992, the SNP discredited devolution as being insufficient for creating economic stability in Scotland (Scottish National Party 1992). Further, to answer critics of their ‘Independence in Europe’ policy, they claimed that legal opinion supports their assumption that an independent Scotland would continue to be part of the European Union, as a successor state (Scottish National Party 1992, 1997). Public opinion polls provided further support for the policy, as Scottish citizens were much more consistently pro-independence within the EU framework than in isolation from Europe (Lynch 1996, 43).

But it is in the 1997 manifesto where the viability argument becomes most evident and finds significant support. Noting the success of small European countries and of small countries in general (“25 out of the 35 most prosperous nations are *small* nations!”), the SNP highlights that an independent Scotland would be the eighth richest nation in the world (1997).<sup>79</sup> Explicitly in the 1999 manifesto, they admitted a desire to join the Euro as soon as effectively possible upon independence (Scottish National Party 1999). In doing so, they clearly consider devolution a stepping-stone to independence, and not an end in itself.

In the 2000s, the SNP continues to support membership in the EU, but also reject the possibility of a super-state headquartered in Brussels (Scottish National

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<sup>79</sup> The claims of the SNP regarding the wealth of their nation depend heavily on the distribution of oil revenue from the North Sea after independence.

Party 2001). In the 2001 manifesto especially, the European Union receives much more attention than in previous manifestos. While the “SNP stands for Scotland in Europe” and they admitted real advantages in membership, the SNP outlined areas in which they would not support further policy shifts to the European level, including natural resources and taxation. Significantly, though, they pay great attention to their potential representation effectiveness within the EU as an independent Scotland compared to a region of the UK, in terms of Commissioners, members of the European parliament, and the Council of Ministers (2001; 2003). This lack of representation at the EU level became more significant in the run-up to the EU constitution. In fact, the SNP opposed the constitution in part because it lacked effective representation in one of its key issues, Common Fisheries Policy (2005b).

Over time, the official SNP position on European integration evolved from opposition to support. Throughout the era of support, though, the SNP continued to point out areas of disagreement with the EU. But rather than return to opposition, they focused on the ability of an independent Scotland to challenge those policies only as a full-fledged independent member of the European Union. Consistent with the size of nations or viability logic, they argue that small states can succeed and even thrive in an interdependent Europe. Though this analysis does not confirm *Hypothesis 1* as a general law, it certainly provides support for it in the particular case of Scotland.

### *Discussion and Extensions*

Using cross-section time-series analysis, I previously demonstrated that deeper European integration increased electoral support for regional political parties; unfortunately, in that analysis, I could not discriminate between the two causal mechanisms: fear or viability. In this paper, I disentangle whether this effect can be attributed to Euroskepticism or Europhilia. I find that regional political parties support European integration more than most party families. This finding is consistent with the qualitative work on regional political parties (Lynch 1996; Kurzer 1997). In the discussion of the SNP manifestos, I find further support for this conclusion as the official party position changed from animosity towards Europe to support for independence within the European Union. More significantly, the findings suggest that the relationship between deeper European integration and increased electoral success of regional political parties can be attributed to the logic of the viability theory.

## Chapter 6

### **Assessing Public Opinion in the 1979 and 1997 Scottish Devolution Referenda**

Extending the analysis of the previous chapter, I shift the focus from elite attitudes to public opinion data to determine whether regional citizens are more likely to support greater autonomy because they find the idea of an independent region within Europe to be more viable. The devolution referenda in Scotland in two distinct time periods provide a quasi-experiment in which to explore this observable implication. In the first referendum, a slight majority voted for devolution but the margin was not enough to overcome the electoral threshold set by Westminster. In 1997, though, the result was overwhelmingly pro-devolution. With public opinion surveys from each referendum available, I evaluate whether deeper European integration increased Scottish support for autonomy, in both attitudes and voting behavior.

In the first half of the dissertation, I demonstrated that deeper integration does in fact increase both the probability of regional political parties competing in national parliamentary elections and their vote shares once they enter competition. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, at least two causal mechanisms predict that deeper integration at the European Union level will contribute to increased support for autonomy and, therefore, regional movements. In one argument, European integration decreases the necessity of traditional large states, thereby making smaller more homogeneous states more viable (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Therefore, the EU may be an unwitting ally of sub-national groups against central governments. In

the other line of reasoning, it is not decreased dependence on the central government but fear that drives the relationship between integration and regional political party support. Both fear of yet another foreign authority encroaching on local sovereignty and loathing of immigrants could drive regional voters to leave mainstream parties and support alternative parties. In regions with distinct cultural or linguistic histories, regional political parties provide a focal point for these feelings. For both theories, then, deeper integration leads to more sub-national mobilization in the form of support for regional political parties.

First, I introduce additional observable implications of the main theory of this dissertation that will adjudicate between these two alternatives and explain why the Scottish devolution referenda are an appropriate research. In particular, Scottish citizens should be more supportive of European integration in 1997 than 1979 and they should also be more favorably disposed to independence. Second, I discuss previous attempts to explain why devolution failed in 1979 but passed in 1997. Third, using data from the 1979 Scottish Election Study and the 1997 Scottish Referendum Study (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath, and Curtice 1998), I demonstrate that voters support devolution at higher rates, in terms of voting behavior, and they also have much more favorable attitudes toward independence from the United Kingdom--yet within the European Union--in the survey data. This finding provides further support for the conclusions in Chapter 5 that it is in fact the increased viability associated with European integration that encourages support for autonomy in Scotland.

With this chapter, I triangulate on the main research question with this detailed quantitative case study of these referenda. As the second chapter notes, the research question does not lend itself to direct and straight-forward empirical testing. Rather, I tease out numerous observable implications in a variety of research domains to maximize the observable implications and the observations available for testing. Individually, each part may be insufficient to confirm the optimal size of states theory is at work in the European case. But collectively, I present these chapters as evidence that deeper European integration does in fact encourage sub-national mobilization, in part because European integration makes smaller more homogeneous countries more viable independent entities. As an analysis of individual level data, therefore, this chapter builds upon and extends earlier chapters.

### ***Observable Implications for the Optimal Size of States Logic***

In Chapter 2, I introduced the size of states argument as a causal mechanism to explain why deeper European integration should lead to greater support for sub-national autonomy movements. In Chapters 3 and 4, I demonstrated that deeper political and economic European integration is in fact associated with more support for regional political parties, *ceteris paribus*. Yet, this empirical finding could be attributed to either the optimal size of states logic or an alternative, namely a fear of deeper integration. Thus, in this and the previous chapter, I present additional observable implications to adjudicate between these two alternatives.

The size of states theory hinges on rational behavior by two sets of actors, sub-national political elites and citizens. In the previous chapter, I consider the role of regional political elites. For the optimal size of states logic to be the causal mechanism for the empirical relationship between integration and regional parties, sub-national political elites must perceive the changing political opportunity structure and support European integration, in part as an ally against the central state. Using expert surveys of regional political party positions, I conclude that regional political parties are in fact supportive of European integration, over time, space, and issue area. In tracing the official party positions of the Scottish National Party, in particular, I find that European integration becomes an integral component in their strategy and rhetoric for independence.

In addition to elites, citizens must perceive that European integration has changed the political opportunity structure in favor of sub-national regions. If so, then public opinion among regionalist supporters should also shift in favor of European integration. In the specific case of the two Scottish devolution referenda, both the Labour party and the Scottish National Party became increasingly supportive of European integration during this period. For these party supporters, especially, I expect more support for European integration in the 1997 surveys than in 1979. Alternatively, if Scottish citizens do not show support for European integration, then it will cast some doubt on the optimal size of states logic being the causal mechanism.

More significantly, the revised political opportunity structure should affect attitudes toward independence within Scotland. An observable implication of the optimal size of states logic is that citizens perceive greater viability of an independent small country within the European Union than outside. In 1979, not only was European integration itself at a less developed stage, but the Scottish National Party did not yet see the EU as a potential partner in making its case for independence. By 1997, as shown in the tracing of the Scottish National Party (SNP) official party positions in the previous chapter, the Scottish National Party framed the EU as an integral component of its “Independence in Europe” policy. In part, Scottish National Party elites intended this strategy to demonstrate that Scotland would be a viable independent country apart from the United Kingdom. If the optimal size of states logic explains the relationship between European integration and regional political parties, then I would expect to see more Scottish citizens view independence as a viable option in 1997 than in 1979.<sup>80</sup> In the next section, I will briefly discuss the background of the devolution referenda in Scotland, paying particular attention to why this is a valuable research domain for testing this causal mechanism.

### ***The Scottish Referenda on Devolution***

In order to test these observable implications, I focus on the Scottish case. In addition to the significance of the recent decentralization in the United Kingdom,

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<sup>80</sup> As one observable implication of the optimal size of states logic, this finding alone would not ‘prove’ the theory is right. But finding the opposite would certainly cast some doubt on the theory’s applicability in Scotland.

Scotland presents a unique opportunity to test the main alternative causal mechanisms. First, Scotland is a region in Western Europe with a long and rich tradition of a regional autonomy movement. Second, the referenda on devolution at two different points in time provide an opportunity to analyze both attitudes toward autonomy and how those attitudes are translated into votes on devolution, as well as their change over time. Comparing the failed referendum in 1979 to the successful 1997 vote yields variation in both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable of interest (Dardanelli 2001, 2). Further, the questions available in the 1979 and 1997 surveys allow exploration of the European Union's role in determining attitudes toward self-government.

In both 1979 and 1997, the Labour party introduced a referendum for Scottish citizens to decide whether a Scottish Parliament would be established. While a majority of voters supported devolution in both referenda, it failed in 1979 due to the "Cunningham amendment," which stipulated that devolution must not only achieve a majority of support among voters but also meet at least a 40% threshold of the entire potential electorate (Harvie and Jones 2000, 115). In other words, abstention served as a de facto 'No' vote.<sup>81</sup> Unsurprisingly, as a result of the threshold, the referendum failed in 1979 and, after the Conservatives won that year's general election, the government promptly removed devolution from the agenda.

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<sup>81</sup> This poison pill, "a brilliant act of anti-democratic political manipulation" (Mitchell 1996, 47), influenced the outcome of the referendum as well as perceptions about the outcome. When newspapers referenced the vote, they gave the result as percentages of the electorate and not actual voters. So instead of a 52% - 48% outcome in favor of devolution, it appeared that only one-third of Scots supported devolution (Pittock 2001, 123). Indeed, even Scottish voters saw the result as indicative of a negative result (Mitchell 1996, 46-47).

During the 1997 general election campaign, Labour, under Tony Blair, promised another referendum on devolution. Labour supported a referendum rather than simply legislating devolution for multiple reasons. Uncertain of their eventual Parliamentary majority, they feared a difficult parliamentary battle over devolution as they faced in the 1970s. Also, a referendum could secure decentralization in the face of future Tory governments. Presumably, if devolution were granted after a referendum, then only a referendum could reverse the decision (Taylor, Curtice, and Thomson 1999, xxv-xxvi). Labour also used the referendum to avoid association with the potential higher taxes of a Scottish Parliament, the so-called Tartan tax. The two-part referendum asked voters to first choose whether to support a Scottish Parliament and then decide whether the Parliament should have tax-varying authority. The 1997 version of the devolution referendum passed by large majorities in every district in Scotland (Taylor, Curtice, and Thomson 1999, xxvii). Considering that during both years Scottish citizens claimed to support devolution, the positive outcome of the devolution referendum in 1997 compared to the negative outcome in 1979 yields a puzzle. In the next section, I consider the alternative explanations for the different outcomes and then explain why the European Union is a significant factor.

### *Similar Preferences, Different Outcomes?*

Since at least 1947, a majority of Scots have consistently supported devolution in opinion polls.<sup>82</sup> In 1979, in fact, 61% of respondents in the Scottish

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<sup>82</sup> In a 1947 survey, over three-quarters of Scots supported a Scottish parliament. In 1949, a Scottish Plebiscite Society poll in Kirriemuir in Angus found that 23% were in favor of an independent

Election Survey supported self-government, with 54.1% in favor of devolution and 6.9% supporting independence (Miller and Brand 1981). Yet, despite this consistent support of devolution in theory, a plurality of respondents in that same poll either voted ‘No’ or favored the ‘No’ position, with 44.7% against the referendum and only 38.1% in favor. Table 6.1 demonstrates the gap between respondents who claimed to favor devolution yet opposed the referendum.<sup>83</sup>

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Parliament, 69% supported a Parliament to deal with Scottish affairs, and only 5% favored the status quo (Mitchell 1996, 149).

<sup>83</sup> For 1979, I used the following questions to determine actual voting positions.

“30a. Did you vote in the recent Referendum on Devolution for Scotland?

IF YES Did you vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’?

IF NO Did you favour the ‘Yes’ side or the ‘No’ side?” [v315]

For 1997, I used the following questions:

“6a) The questions asked in the Referendum are set out on this card. How did you vote on the first question?” [refvote]

If the respondent did not vote, the survey followed up with this question:

“7a) The questions asked in the Referendum are set out on this card. If you had voted, how would you have voted on the first question?” [nvrefvote]

For both questions, I grouped spoiled ballots, would not vote, refused to answer, and don’t know into the don’t know category. In Table 6.1 and other tables in this chapter, actual voting numbers include those who either voted for or favored (or voted against or opposed) the referendum in the ‘Yes’ (or ‘No’) category.

To determine attitudes toward devolution, I used the following question on the 1979 survey:

“31a) Here are a number of suggestions which have been made about different ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest to your own view?

1. No devolution or Scottish Assembly of any sort
2. Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come up to Scotland for their meetings
3. An elected Scottish Assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster
4. A Scottish Parliament which would handle most Scottish affairs, including many economic affairs, leaving the Westminster Parliament responsible for defence, foreign policy and international economic policy
5. A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament
8. DK” [v322]

Following Dardanelli (2005). I group “No devolution” and Scottish Committees as status quo and the Scottish Assembly and Scottish parliament options as devolution.

For 1997, I use the following survey question:

“21a) Which of these statements comes closest to your view?

1. Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union
2. Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the EU

**Table 6.1 Attitudes and Actual Voting Positions on Devolution in 1979 and 1997**

	1979			1997			Change in Yes
	Yes	No	N	Yes	No	N	
<i>Devolution Attitudes</i>							
Status Quo	11.1%	79.9%	(189)	4.0%	92.1%	(126)	-64.0%
Devolution	54.1%	39.3%	(394)	86.2%	9.0%	(289)	59.3%
Independence	80.0%	12.0%	(50)	94.0%	3.5%	(232)	17.5%
Don't Know	8.3%	14.6%	(96)	34.5%	17.2%	(29)	315.7%
All	38.7%	44.7%	(729)	71.3%	22.9%	(676)	

Respondents at either end of the spectrum, either in favor of the status quo or in favor of independence, vote consistently either for or against the referendum in both surveys, though they do become more entrenched in 1997. But a slim majority of those respondents who favor devolution actually supported the referendum in 1979 while the vast majority of devolution supporters favored the referendum in 1997. Explaining this gap is essential to understanding why the referendum failed in 1979 but passed in 1997.

Alternative theories abound to explain why the referendum had such different outcomes in 1979 and 1997, including campaign coordination, support for (or opposition to) the Labour government, or resentment against the Conservative party, which governed the United Kingdom for eighteen years despite never winning the

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- 3. Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has **some** taxation powers
  - 4. Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has **no** taxation powers
  - 5. Scotland should remain part of the UK **without** an elected parliament
  - 8. (Don't know)" [srrefvw1]

For Table 6.1, the two independence and two devolution options are combined. All questions and survey responses are drawn from the 1979 Scottish Election Study and the 1997 Scottish Devolution Study (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath, and Curtice 1998), while all analyses were done with Stata9.

popular vote in Scotland (Taylor, Curtice, and Thomson 1999, xxiv). Compared to 1979, though, the 1997 vote was nearly consensual (SurrIDGE and McCrone 1999, 44). As Table 6.2 demonstrates,<sup>84</sup> nearly every social group supported devolution in 1997 except Conservative party supporters and those who self-identify as primarily British.

Table 6.2 Referendum Positions in 1979 and 1997,  
By Group Identity

	1979			1997			Change in Yes
	Yes	No	N	Yes	No	N	
<i>National Identity</i>							
British	28.8%	63.0%	(257)	41.3%	53.3%	(92)	43.4%
Scottish	51.3%	39.7%	(380)	76.2%	18.1%	(554)	48.4%
Other	14.0%	14.0%	(93)	73.3%	20.0%	(30)	424.6%
<i>Class Identity</i>							
Middle Class	29.6%	62.5%	(152)	55.8%	41.0%	(156)	88.4%
Working Class	46.5%	44.1%	(458)	77.5%	17.3%	(457)	66.6%
Other	20.2%	24.4%	(119)	65.1%	19.0%	(63)	222.7%
<i>Party Identity</i>							
Conservative	19.2%	66.9%	(239)	22.0%	71.5%	(123)	14.1%
Labour	45.1%	37.2%	(288)	85.4%	10.1%	(336)	89.2%
Liberal Democrat	40.0%	48.0%	(75)	62.7%	37.3%	(51)	56.9%
SNP	77.2%	7.6%	(79)	94.3%	3.3%	(122)	22.1%
Other	31.3%	35.4%	(48)	47.7%	22.7%	(44)	52.7%
All	38.7%	44.7%	(729)	71.3%	22.9%	(676)	84.3%

Notes: The 'Yes' and 'No' categories include respondents who either voted for or did not vote but favored that position in the referendum.

Several observations emerge from this table. Certain categories with relatively soft levels of support in 1979, such as Scottish self-identifiers, Labour supporters, and

<sup>84</sup> National identities were drawn from questions 66a and 66b in 1979 and X6a and X6b in 1997. I drew class identity from questions 62a and 62b in 1979 and 29a and 29b in 1997. Finally, party identification is given in questions 54a and 54b in 1979 and X5a and X5b in 1997. For each identity question, the respondent had an option to self-identify and then, if no choice was made, a follow-up question asked the respondent which option they would choose if forced (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath, and Curtice 1998).

working class citizens were much more supportive in 1997, with 76.2%, 85.4%, and 77.5% in favor respectively. Respondents in several categories shifted from the 'No' to the 'Yes' side, including the Liberal Democrats and the middle class. The increase in support among the middle class speaks to the observable implication discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the class distribution of autonomy supporters. If independence is a more viable economic option, then capitalists in particular will be more favorably disposed to independence. A mere 30% of the middle class supported the referendum in 1979, while over 56% favored devolution in 1997. Hence, this finding provides additional evidence for the theoretical argument regarding the optimal size of states.

Even respondents in those two categories on the 'No' side in 1997, Conservatives and British self-identifiers, were more likely to support the referendum in 1997 than 1979. Further, fewer respondents self-identify as either of these two categories in the latter referendum, further diminishing their significance in the outcome. The Conservative party fell from nearly a third of the respondents in 1979 to 18% in 1997, and from nearly as strong as Labour to basically level with the Scottish National Party. Similarly, over one-third of respondents primarily self-identified as British in 1979 but that number fell to 14% in 1997.

Thus, Table 6.2 demonstrates the outcome of the devolution referendum went from highly contested in 1979 to nearly consensual in 1997. But in both cases, a majority of Scots claimed to support devolution. What explanations might account for this disconnect? Paolo Dardanelli introduces several explanations prevalent in the literature (2005, 321-3). First, the actual content of the devolution package was more

contentious in 1979, with the First-Past-The-Post electoral system perceived as heavily Labour-biased. Further, the 1997 referendum focused on the powers that remained with Whitehall rather than which powers went to Scotland (Harvie and Jones 2000, 186). The observable implications of the Labour bias logic are that non-Labour party supporters would be expected to be anti-devolution while Labour party supporters would be supportive (Dardanelli 2005, 322). But in fact, apart from Tory supporters, who were strongly anti-devolution in each referendum, Liberal Democrats were slightly less supportive of devolution than Labour supporters while SNP supporters were much more favorable. Also, Labour supporters themselves were split, with a plurality in favor of devolution, but not a majority.

Second, many scholars point to Scotland's increasingly strong sense of being a perpetual political minority in the United Kingdom as the reason devolution gained support from 1979 to 1997 (McCrone and Lewis 1999, 18). Basically, Scotland voted for Labour in every general election from 1979 to 1992, but the Conservatives won in the rest of the United Kingdom and therefore governed, leaving the Conservatives increasingly unpopular in Scotland (Mitchell et al. 1998, 178). These anti-Tory sentiments could potentially fuel pro-devolution sentiment. If true, then Scots, especially non-Conservatives, should be less satisfied with the United Kingdom and devolution should be a higher priority for citizens. But Scottish nationalists are actually more satisfied in 1997 than 1979 and the issue of self-government is no more or less salient, casting some doubt on this hypothesis (Dardanelli 2005, 323).

The third main explanation is the (lack of) coherence and effectiveness of the pro-devolution campaign. In 1979, the political parties, especially Labour, sent mixed signals to the electorate, with a faction of the Labour party opposing the referendum with a 'Labour Vote NO' campaign (Denver 2002, 830). Further, little cross-party coordination existed among the 'Yes' campaign, with as many divisions among the pro-devolution parties as between them and the anti-devolution campaign. In 1979, a Labour party official disdainfully stated that Labour would not be "soiling our hands by joining any umbrella Yes group" (Mitchell et al. 1998, 167). In all, the 'No' campaign in 1979 was more effective in terms of funding, coordination, and campaigning than the 'Yes' campaign (Mitchell 1996, 163).

But in 1997, the pro-devolution parties, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and the Scottish National Party, supported a double 'Yes'--for a Scottish Parliament and for tax-varying authority--and coordinated their campaign as "Scotland FORward" (McCrone and Lewis 1999, 24). In doing so, they sent clearer messages to their party supporters as to their constitutional preferences. In the 1997 campaign, 90% of Labour party and 86% of Scottish National Party supporters knew their party favored devolution (Denver 2002, 830). The pro-devolution campaign also successfully convinced businesses that devolution was not a threat to their livelihood, undercutting a major supporter of the 'No' campaign in 1979 (Mitchell et al. 1998, 175). Finally, the 'Think Twice' campaign against devolution, led by the Conservative party, lacked sufficient resources or supporters to oppose the devolution referendum (Mitchell et al. 1998, 174). Thus, the strength and coordination of the

campaigns clearly shifted in favor of a ‘Yes’ vote. But, this explanation still has some difficulty explaining why so many Scots voted against devolution even though they favored the concept in surveys (Dardanelli 2005, 323).

***Devolution Attitudes and Referendum Behavior***

The gap between supporters of devolution and supporters of the devolution referendum in 1979 is stark. Table 6.1 demonstrates that only 54% of those who claim to support devolution actually favored the ‘Yes’ position on the referendum in 1979 while 86% of devolution supporters voted ‘Yes’ in 1997. Supporters of the status quo and independence were both strongly in the ‘No’ or ‘Yes’ camps, respectively, in each of the campaigns. So, the shift among devolution supporters in actual voting behavior explains much of the difference between the 33% increase in support of the referendum between 1979 and 1997. In Table 6.3, I present the actual ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ positions and the expected positions based on attitudes toward devolution.

Table 6.3 Expected and Actual Voting Positions on Devolution in 1979 and 1997

	1979			1997		
	'Yes'	'No'	Don't Know	'Yes'	'No'	Don't Know
Actual	38.7%	44.7%	16.6%	71.3%	22.9%	5.8%
Expected	60.9%	25.9%	13.2%	77.1%	18.6%	4.3%
Difference	-22.2%	18.8%	3.4%	-5.8%	4.3%	1.5%

Notes: Expected 'Yes' and 'No' based on attitudes toward devolution, with self-identified supporters of self-government, either devolution or independence, counted as Expected 'Yes' and supporters of the status quo counted as Expected 'No.'

In both 1979 and 1997, fewer Scots supported the referendum than expected from their attitudes toward devolution. But the gap diminished significantly. In 1979, 61%

claimed to support self-government but only 39% either voted for or favored the devolution referendum. Only 6% fewer Scots favored the 'Yes' position in 1997 than expected from their attitudes. In addition, by 1997, attitudes toward devolution had crystallized to a degree that significantly fewer respondents did not have an attitude on devolution (17% compared to 6%). As discussed above, though, explaining this discrepancy between self-identified supporters of self-government and those who actually voted for the referendum is critical.

Paolo Dardanelli argues that preference orderings are the key to understanding this gap between expected and actual behavior in the failed referendum vote of 1979 (2001; Dardanelli 2005). Whereas attitudes about devolution, independence and the status quo can be kept conceptually distinct in surveys, the preference ordering actually affected voting behavior (Dardanelli 2005, 326). For instance, if a citizen preferred devolution to the status quo, then observers would expect that citizen to vote for the referendum. But if that citizen preferred the status quo to independence, and expected independence to be a likely outcome of devolution, then the citizen would be more likely to oppose the referendum. In other words, if citizens perceive a high probability of devolution leading to independence, then the referendum vote appears to be a choice between the status quo and independence rather than status quo and devolution (Dardanelli 2001, 10). And voters in both referenda thought that independence was a likely outcome of devolution (Dardanelli 2005, 326). This perception provided reason for citizens with this

preference ordering to strategically oppose rather than sincerely support the referendum.

To determine the distribution of voter preferences I reconstructed the preference orderings in Table 6.4 using a series of questions in the 1979 survey which asks respondents to rank each constitutional option from highly unfavorable to very much in favor.<sup>85</sup>

Table 6.4 Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1979

1st Preference	SQ	2nd Preference			N
		Devolution	Independence	Don't Know	
Status Quo	-	78.3%	0.0%	21.7%	(189)
Devolution	59.4%	-	25.1%	15.5%	(394)
Independence	4.0%	80.0%	-	16.0%	(50)
N	(236)	(188)	(99)	(206)	

Not surprisingly, Scots who favored the status quo preferred devolution as their second best alternative. Similarly, nationalist Scots, or those who chose independence as their first preference, much preferred devolution to the status quo. These preference orderings yield little explanatory power, though, for respondents in both categories are strongly in their respective camps regardless of their second preference.

But as Dardanelli contends, for devolution supporters, the second preference is critical in determining behavior on the referendum (2001, 9). Devolution

<sup>85</sup> To extract a preference ordering for 1979, I used the attitude toward devolution question above to determine first preference then turned to the follow-up questions [v323-v327] (Miller and Brand 1981), which asked the respondent to say whether they were very much in favor of (or against), somewhat in favor of (or somewhat against) each constitutional option. Knowing each respondent's first preference, I evaluated which constitutional option they favored second best and created an index variable for the various preference orderings. For example, if a respondent favored the status quo, I determined whether they ranked independence or devolution higher. If the respondent ranked devolution higher, then I coded them as Status Quo > Devolution > Independence. In the case of ties, I coded the respondent as don't know. Coding is available upon request.

supporters who consider independence their second best preference should be supportive of the referendum because even if independence is a likely outcome of devolution, it is preferable to the status quo. Table 6.4 shows that only 25% of the devolution supporters share this preference ordering. But devolution supporters who fear independence and favor the status quo over independence should be more skeptical of the referendum (Dardanelli 2005, 9). In 1979, a majority of Scots with devolution as their first preference consider the status quo to be their preferred alternative. Table 6.5 shows the referendum positions of devolution supporters split by their second preferences.

Table 6.5 Referendum Positions in 1979,  
By Preference Ordering

	Yes	No
Devolution > Independence > Status Quo	75.8%	18.2%
Devolution > Status Quo > Independence	44.9%	49.6%
All Devolution Supporters	54.1%	39.3%

Table 6.5 clearly demonstrates that those who favor devolution over independence over the status quo supported the referendum by a large majority while those devolution supporters who favored the status quo over independence were actually slightly opposed to the referendum.<sup>86</sup> Combined with the consistent opposition of

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<sup>86</sup> In Table 6.5, respondents who said they voted for the referendum and those who said they did not vote but favored the 'Yes' Position are included. The ratios are similar if abstentions are excluded from the analysis, with the Devolution > Independence > Status Quo group voting for the referendum 85% of the time and the Devolution > Status Quo > Independence group split evenly between a negative and favorable vote.

status quo supporters, the divided cohort of devolution supporters contributed to the gap between expected and actual support for the referendum.

Because the Parliament instituted the threshold on the referendum vote in 1979, abstentions acted as de facto votes against devolution. The preference orderings of these respondents show them to be much more likely to favor the status quo as either their first or second choice. Unsurprisingly, 46% of abstentions did not know their attitude toward devolution. But 40% favored the status quo as their first (16%) or second best constitutional option (24%). Only 14% favored independence as their first (4%) or second favorite option (10%). The abstentions, therefore, provide further support that those who feared independence or at least considered it their least preferred constitutional option did not support the referendum, yielding a cumulative negative vote on devolution in 1979.

By 1997, preference orderings shifted to a degree that the majority of citizens either favored independence as their first or second most preferred constitutional option. Table 6.6 shows first and second preferences among Scots in 1997.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> For 1997, the preference ordering was much more straightforward than in 1979 because the survey asked a follow-up question [21b] to the attitudes toward devolution question that asked respondents to list their second most preferred constitutional option (Jowell, Heath, and Curtice 1998).

Table 6.6 Preference Ordering on Devolution in 1997

1st preference	2nd Preference						N
	SQ	No Tax	Tax	in EU	no EU	Don't Know	
Status Quo	-	60.3%	11.9%	5.6%	0.0%	22.2%	(126)
Parliament							
<i>No Tax</i>	30.6%	-	43.6%	8.1%	3.2%	14.5%	(62)
<i>With Tax</i>	12.8%	31.3%	-	29.1%	5.7%	21.1%	(227)
Independence							
<i>in EU</i>	2.9%	4.1%	54.9%	-	26.6%	11.6%	(173)
<i>from EU</i>	0.0%	5.1%	32.2%	52.5%	-	10.2%	(59)
N	(53)	(159)	(156)	(109)	(61)	(138)	

As in 1979, status quo supporters favor devolution over independence by a large margin. Within the devolution options, they prefer the weaker devolution option, sans tax-varying authority, to the option that eventually won. Similarly, nationalist Scots clearly preferred devolution to the status quo. But as in 1979, these preference orderings hardly matter as over 90% of respondents in each category either favor or oppose devolution, respectively.

But whereas devolution supporters in 1979 preferred the status quo over independence, the majority of devolution supporters preferred independence to the status quo in 1997. Excluding the alternative devolution option, for those who favor a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying authority, independence is the preferred second option. For those who favor the weaker devolution option, more prefer the status quo to independence, but there are significantly fewer respondents in this category (22% compared to 78%). And 65% of those devolution supporters that preferred the status quo as their second option still supported the referendum. The combination of low numbers and still strong support of the referendum clearly did not adversely affect

the referendum positions of the devolution supporters, as 86% of those who favor devolution either voted for or favored the referendum.

Another significant shift is evident in the tables above. In 1979, a majority of respondents claimed to support devolution as their most preferred constitutional option, with a sizeable group favoring the status quo and a very a small minority favoring independence. By 1997, this distribution of first preferences changed dramatically. Support for the status quo and devolution decreased 7% and 11%, respectively, while support for independence increased 28%. I present this data in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7 Attitudes on Devolution in 1979 and 1997

	1979	1997	Change
<b>Status Quo</b>	<b>25.9%</b>	<b>18.6%</b>	<b>-7.3%</b>
<b>Self-Government</b>	<b>60.9%</b>	<b>77.1%</b>	<b>16.2%</b>
<i>Devolution</i>	54.1%	42.8%	-11.3%
<i>Independence</i>	6.9%	34.3%	27.5%
<i>In EU</i>		25.6%	25.6%
<i>Out of EU</i>		8.7%	8.7%
Don't Know	13.2%	4.3%	-8.9%
N	(729)	(676)	

Significantly, the increase in support for independence occurs across all party groups. Only 4% of Labour party supporters favored independence in 1979 while 36% did so in 1997. For Scottish National Party supporters, independence became the most preferred option, increasing from 35% to 72%. Even 6% more Conservatives supported independence in 1997 than in 1979. Because many respondents believe independence is a likely consequence of devolution, the increased support for independence as a first option significantly affected the outcome of the 1997

referendum. But this finding only raises another question: why is independence so much more popular in 1997 than 1979?

### ***European Integration and Attitudes toward Independence***

As Table 6.1 shows, Scottish nationalists, or those who claim independence as their most preferred constitutional alternative, are highly likely to support the devolution referendum. Further, as Table 6.7 shows, Scots are much more likely to support independence in 1997 than in 1979. Drawing from the optimal size of states argument considered in Chapter 2, I contend that Scots perceive independence to be more viable in 1997 due to European integration. If true, I will find evidence for several observable implications.

First, Scots should be more likely to support European integration. In the previous chapter, I showed that political elites frame the European Union as a mechanism to achieve independence without economic upheaval. In other words, European integration increases the viability of Scotland as an independent country. Thus, nationalists should perceive the European Union more positively in 1997 than in 1979.

Among all Scots, support for European integration increased 25% from 1979 to 1997 (Miller and Brand 1981; Jowell, Heath, and Curtice 1998), while support for European integration among all Europeans dropped nearly 14% (Schmitt and Scholz 2005).<sup>88</sup> Within Scotland, supporters of the status quo remain more skeptical, with

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<sup>88</sup> According to the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, which compiles and standardizes the many individual Eurobarometer surveys, approximately 58% of Europeans surveyed thought the EU was a

only a 13% increase in support for the European Union. But nationalists are much more favorably disposed to European integration. Only 13% of Scottish National Party supporters thought the European Union was a ‘good thing’ in 1979, but 48% did so in 1997.<sup>89</sup> Similarly, 34% more nationalists thought the EU was a ‘good thing’ in 1997 than 1979. This trend follows the rhetoric of the Scottish National Party, outlined above in Chapter 6, which shifted from being anti-integration to supporting the European Union specifically as a lever against the United Kingdom.

Second, support for independence should be related to European integration. As shown above, Scottish National Party officials used the European Union to diminish fears of economic displacement associated with independence (Harvie and Jones 2000, 152; Pittock 2001, 127). Further, Dardanelli argues that attitudes toward the European Union actually determine perceived costs of secession (Dardanelli 2005, 328). Thus, increased support for European integration implies lower costs of secession, or increased viability of independence. And, in fact, Table 6.7 demonstrates clearly that it is the “Independence in Europe” option that drives the increased support for independence. Fewer respondents conceive of independence outside of Europe as a viable option. The existence of the EU as an alternative

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‘good thing’ in 1979 (58.9% in Eurobarometer 11 and 57.9% in Eurobarometer 12), while 50% or fewer respondents thought it was a ‘good thing’ in 1997 (48.2% in Eurobarometer 47, 48.6% in EB 47.1, 47.2% in EB47.2, and 50.8% in EB48) (Schmitt and Scholz 2005).

<sup>89</sup> In 1997, the survey asked the standard Eurobarometer question about European integration that is commonly used in analysis of support for European integration (Gabel 1998; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005): whether the respondent thinks the EU is a ‘good thing,’ a ‘bad thing,’ or neither [eugood]. In 1979, the survey asked respondents to score the Common Market on a ten-point scale [v467]. Following Dardanelli (2005), I standardized this variable to compare to the 1997 version by grouping 0-3 as bad for Scotland, 4-6 as neither good nor bad, and 7-10 as good for Scotland.

political opportunity structure, though, allows citizens to favor independence much more strongly, either as a first or second option. By convincing its supporters that the European Union was a ‘good thing,’ the Scottish National Party shifted the debate over self-government itself, making independence a more reasonable option and increasing support for devolution in the referendum in the process (Dardanelli 2001, 14).

### *Discussion*

Using the 1979 Scottish Election Survey and the 1997 Scottish Referendum Study, I evaluated why the referendum failed in 1979 but passed in 1997 despite having a majority in favor of devolution in both years. The fear of independence, coupled with a preference ordering where the second choice for devolution supporters was the status quo, explained the strategic voting behavior in 1979. Increased support for independence, as both a first and second option for Scots, fuelled the dramatic increase in sincere voting for devolution in 1997. I also presented evidence to support the contention that European integration, especially the Scottish National Party’s successful framing of the EU as a mechanism to reduce the costs of secession, contributed to this increase in support for independence.

On explaining support for devolution, in attitudes and behavior, though, much work remains to be done. Alternative causal mechanisms, such as a better coordinated ‘Yes’ campaign, certainly explain some of the variance between the outcomes in 1979 and 1997. These alternative mechanisms deserve greater attention.

Further, while it is clear that the increase in attitudinal support for independence explains much of the increase in support for the devolution referendum, the factors that contribute to this identity change also deserves more attention.

In the context of this dissertation, though, this chapter provides evidence that it is in fact the viability, or optimal size of states logic, that is at work in explaining the relationship between deeper integration and more sub-national mobilization. The findings of this chapter suggest that the optimal size of states logic, in terms of the increased viability of an independent Scotland, is at work at the individual level, just as Chapter 5 demonstrated at the political party level of analysis.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

In 1997, the citizens of Scotland and Wales voted to support the devolution of power to regional parliaments. In 2005, the Catalan regional parliament voted for a constitutional statute that could grant Catalonia the right to be called a ‘nation’ as well as an independent legal system and tax-raising authority (*Economist* 2005). Across Europe, these and other regional movements continue to gain strength vis-à-vis the central state. Yet these movements are under-studied and under-theorized. In particular, the relationship between European integration and sub-national movements has been virtually ignored in political science. In this dissertation, I seek to develop a better understanding of the link between supranational integration and state fragmentation to fill this gap in the literature.

Though extensions to this research project are numerous and varied, I argue the empirical research in this dissertation provides a significant test of one implication of the optimal size of states theory in the European context, namely that “political separatism should go hand in hand with economic integration” (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 1042). In this context, two research questions motivated this dissertation. First, does European integration encourage sub-national mobilization within member states? And second, is it the optimal size of states logic that explains this finding? In both cases, the answer is yes.

With this dissertation, I demonstrate that deeper political and economic integration at the European level has in fact encouraged sub-national mobilization in the form of regional political parties. Though political parties are just one form of

sub-national mobilization for autonomy, I consider regional political parties to be major players in the bargaining game between the regions and the central government. If regional political parties are stronger, regional movements have more bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the state. Further, I contend that it is precisely the context of the European Union, which makes smaller, more homogeneous states more viable, which explains why European integration strengthens sub-national movements.

In this chapter, I have two main goals. First, I summarize the main theoretical and empirical findings and consider their academic and policy contributions. Next, I discuss extensions and applications of this research with which I will further test the viability theory in Europe and elsewhere. In this section, I begin to sketch a bargaining model over autonomy between the central state and the regions, as a framework for theorizing sub-national mobilization. Because it diminishes the advantages of large states and strengthens sub-national movements, the European Union is a crucial player in this bargaining game.

### ***Main Findings***

Drawn from the economics literature on the optimal size of states, the viability theory at the heart of this dissertation predicts that deeper economic and political integration will actually strengthen sub-national movements. In Chapter 2, I develop the causal mechanism that could explain this relationship between supranational integration, on one hand, and sub-national fragmentation, on the other.

European integration creates a new political opportunity structure for sub-national regions, such that these small potential states no longer need the traditional states to be economically viable. In terms of the size of economic market, public goods, and regional insurance, European integration diminishes the advantages of large state size to the advantage of small potential states, such as Scotland or Catalonia, thereby increasing the incentives of sub-national groups to mobilize for autonomy.

To test this theory, I pursued a multi-faceted research design. First, I explored the descriptive inference that European integration did in fact strengthen sub-national movements, in the form of regional political parties. In Chapters 2 and 3, I test this inference against the main alternative, which is the null hypothesis. In the literature on regional political parties, the null hypothesis, or simply the theory that European integration has no effect on support for these parties, is frequently assumed rather than tested. Thus, in Part 1, I evaluate these alternatives by studying the determinants of regional political party entry and success in national elections.

Second, I considered two implications of the viability theory, with which I evaluate the inference that it is precisely the increased viability attributable to European integration that explains this relationship between the European Union and regionalist parties. If the viability theory is the causal mechanism, then both elites and citizens must recognize and take advantage of the new political opportunity structure. For elites, I analyze whether regional political parties are supportive of the European Union in their party manifestos. This observable implication allows insight into whether and how regional political parties utilize the European Union in a

manner predicted by the viability theory. For citizens, I analyze whether European integration strengthens support for greater autonomy and even independence. If citizens recognize the changes in the political opportunity structure, they will not only favor the European Union but also be more supportive of independence as their region becomes a more viable potential polity. Below, I briefly summarize the main empirical findings and then return to the broad questions that motivated this research.

In Part 1, I demonstrate that European integration does in fact have a clear and significant effect on the electoral success of regional political parties. Prior to elections, European integration makes regional political parties more likely to compete in national parliamentary elections. Once they enter competition, European integration encourages voters to support these parties. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of the viability theory, I present consistent and robust evidence to support the descriptive inference that European integration strengthens regional political parties and, therefore, sub-national movements. This finding is robust after controlling for a variety of statistical specifications and other theoretically relevant explanatory variables, such as preference heterogeneity between the region and the rest of the state. With this analysis, I extend and validate earlier research on the significance of cultural factors in sub-national mobilization, contributing to the cumulative knowledge of regional movements in Western Europe largely based on qualitative research methods. Further, these robust findings on European integration, based on the cross-national time-series analysis of entry and success of regional political parties, suggest that scholars too often ignore the interaction between the

supranational and sub-national levels of multi-level governance. The implicit assumption among most scholars that European integration has no effect is, therefore, unjustified and unwarranted.

But, as discussed above, this observable implication supports the descriptive inference and allows for the disconfirmation of the null hypothesis, but it cannot adequately discriminate between alternative theories that predict greater support for regional political parties. For validity, the viability theory depends on both elite and average citizen behavior. By analyzing the attitudes of regional political parties toward European integration, I show that regional political parties are Europhiles, not Euroskeptics. This finding is consistent across time, regions, and even issue area. Hence, regional political parties frame the European Union in a positive way, consistent with the theoretical expectations of the viability theory.

Further, with the in-depth analysis of the official positions of the Scottish National Party, I show that, in this critical case, the regional political party explicitly places the European Union at the heart of its independence policy, using the European Union to reduce the fears of citizens that independence will inevitably lead to economic dislocation and lost income. Thus, with Chapter 5, I find significant support for the optimal size of states, or viability, logic. This evidence proves that regional political parties view the European Union positively and, at least in the Scottish case, frame the EU as an ally in their struggle for autonomy with the central state.

Beyond elite rhetoric and behavior, I evaluated the causal mechanism at the individual-level with a statistical case study of Scottish public opinion. With the analysis of the 1979 and 1997 devolution referenda in Scotland in Chapter 6, I find further evidence in favor of the viability logic. Scottish citizens favored devolution in 1997 much more than in 1979 in large part because independence was a more favorable constitutional option in 1997. The data suggest that the option of “Independence in Europe,” as favored by the Scottish National Party, nearly entirely explains the increased support for independence among Scottish respondents, thereby explaining the increased support for the devolution referendum. In other words, Scots are more likely to view independence favorably, which increased the likelihood they would support the devolution referendum in 1997. Also, the distribution of supporters of independence in Scotland changed so that more middle class, or capitalist, respondents favored independence. This shift in opinion suggests that independence is a more viable constitutional option within the European Union. These findings show that the viability logic is at work at the individual-level, which, along with the evidence from party elites, provides significant support for the viability theory.

Thus, by triangulating on the research question with multiple techniques and levels of analysis, I show that European integration does strengthen sub-national movements, as predicted by the optimal size of states theory. Supranational integration and sub-national fragmentation are, therefore, not merely coincidental phenomenon but are related in a theoretical and predictable way.

### *Contributions*

This research project contributes to several literatures in comparative politics, international relations and political economy. First, it is the first truly comparative, cross-national analysis of either the incidence or electoral support for regional political parties. Much of the previous literature is qualitative in nature and not necessarily focused on generalizable results for regional political parties in Europe. Of the quantitative studies, most focus on either one country or even one region. With the inclusion of all regions in Western Europe rather than just those with active regional political parties, I extended the analysis to explain when, where, and why regional political parties compete in national elections as well as their relative success.

Along with the findings on European integration, which suggest much of the previous literature on regional political parties has neglected a significant explanatory variable, the auxiliary hypotheses and findings have implications for the burgeoning literature on new or niche parties (Kitschelt 1995; Hug 2001; Meguid 2005; Tavits 2006). Both the political opportunity structure, in terms of decentralization, and strategic behavior, in terms of mainstream party behavior, affect the decisions of regional political party elites to enter competition as well as their success upon entering. In the general case of new or niche parties, the lessons of regional political parties, as an example where both push and pull variables prove significant, shed light on the empirical puzzles that remain.

Generalizing beyond regional political parties, I also provide another example of international organizations influencing the domestic politics of its member states. The causal mechanism in Western Europe is more strategic than direct, but the effects are clear and present and suggest that scholars must reconsider the role of the European Union in their analysis of domestic politics in Europe. Finally, while much of the work in economics on the optimal size of states is formal in nature, this empirical analysis provides compelling evidence that this implication of the optimal size of states logic, in the framework developed by Alesina and Spolaore (2003), is empirically valid in the most likely case of Europe and is worthy of future empirical research.

### ***Empirical Extensions to Study the Viability Theory***

In future work, I will extend this research project by testing the internal and external validity of the empirical result that deeper European integration increases support for regional political parties. To maximize internal validity, I will survey European party system experts to investigate how deeper supranational integration affects the incentives of sub-national groups to mobilize for autonomy. In this research, I will be paying particular attention to the attitudes of regional political parties toward the European Union and whether European integration has increased the relative bargaining power of regional groups vis-à-vis the central government.

Further, in addition to studying political party support and activity within EU countries, which I concentrate on in this dissertation, there are many other forms of

mobilization, including lobbying, street-level protests or riots, and even cultural organizations. Lobbying activity at the European Union level provides an opportunity to study additional observable implications of the viability theory. Gary Marks, Richard Haesly, and Heather Mbaye (2002) find that regional offices in Brussels pursue a variety of goals, including information gathering and dissemination, networking with other regional groups, and influencing decision making in the EU. In doing so, many regional groups attempt to increase the influence of sub-national groups at the supranational level. Along similar lines, I will investigate the relative use of European forums, such as the European Court of Justice, by regional groups to pursue their goal of autonomy. These European Union institutions provide new “opportunity structures” to the regions to pursue their goals, thereby encouraging demand by creating supply (van Houten 2003, 4). If surveys or qualitative research find that sub-national lobbying groups in Brussels or Strasbourg attempt to, or successfully, gather support for their movement from either other regions or the European Union, the evidence would demonstrate that sub-national movements utilize the deeper European Union as a tool to pursue autonomy. If regional lobbyists are particularly vocal in their support of further integration, then they may be trying to contribute to the potential of the EU as an ally against the traditional states. Either outcome would provide additional support for the conclusions of the current research project.

Next, I will investigate the effect of European integration on street-level mobilization, such as protests and riots and demonstrations. From this alternative

perspective, I will address the overarching question that underpins my dissertation, namely whether supranational integration affects sub-national mobilization.

Demonstrations are an outlet for citizens to show support for sub-national autonomy. For instance, in the Basque country, the representatives of Herri Batasuna do not rely on elected assemblies for influence, but focus on their ability to mobilize activists to demonstrate in the streets (MacClancy 1993, 92). These demonstrations are costly, in the rational cost-benefit sense, and are therefore a useful indicator for support for autonomy. This extension will test whether the theory and conclusions are generalizable to political action beyond political parties.

As another opportunity to evaluate the link between European integration and sub-national movements, I will examine the strategies and goals of sub-national movements. The demands of various sub-national groups vary greatly depending on group and state contexts (Allardt 1979). Options for activists include traditional secession (exit), autonomy (religious, cultural, or political), access (power-sharing), and control of traditional states (Roessingh 1996, 25). For instance, in the past fifty years, the Scottish National Party shifted from pursuing complete independence to independence within the British Commonwealth to “Independence in Europe.” In the early twentieth century, rapid industrialization tied the Basque country to the Spanish center, leading moderate Basque leaders to shift from seeking independence to regional autonomy (Heiberg 1989, 73). More recently, Basque nationalist objectives transitioned from seeking autonomy through *fueros* to independence within the European Union (van Amersfoort and Beck 2000, 454). Van Houten (2001) contends

that economic integration, measured by export volume, does not affect the nature of sub-national group demands. But the theory in chapter 2 extends beyond simple economic integration with the global market, incorporating political as well as economic integration. Hence, much work remains to be done on the goals of regional movements.

### ***Toward A Better Measure of Regional Integration***

In addition to these empirical extensions into other issues and forms of mobilization, I plan to develop a more nuanced and theoretically relevant measure of regional political and economic integration. Thus far, scholars either use measures of international trade as a proxy for economic integration (van Houten 2001) or even a simple dummy variable for the existence of European Union. In this research project, I focused on a variety of measures, including a fairly blunt index of integration based on treaty stages and another indicator drawn from expert survey data on the level, European or national, at which decisions are made in twenty-eight different issue areas (Hooghe and Marks 2001).

Unfortunately, problems with these measures exist, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, using international trade measures is problematic because it only incorporates one aspect of integration and it is difficult to differentiate between effects of European integration and effects of globalization, generally. Further, the index of treaty stages and Supranational Governance Index are simply not nuanced enough. They change periodically rather than annually. Also, they do not

distinguish between countries with high compliance rates and other countries. Yet despite the problems with each individual measure, I am confident in the statistical results because the various measures are highly correlated and yield robustly consistent results in the regression analysis. As Chapters 3 and 4 show, the variables yield robust results regardless of the measure of integration utilized. Further, the statistical model is consistent in both the test dataset and the replication set, showing the results are not simply an artifact of data-mining or curve-fitting (Beck, King, and Zeng 2004; de Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski 2004).

In a future research project, though, I will tackle this issue directly. Political and economic integration is a latent underlying variable, which I plan to extract from a variety of other measures, including some of those discussed above but also incorporating compliance rates. This research extension will clearly enhance the internal validity of the research in this dissertation, by creating a more valid and reliable explanatory variable, but it will also contribute significantly to the literature on international organizations. An externally valid measure of regional integration would allow comparison within Europe over time as well as across different regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur, or the African Union.

Using this measure, for generalizability or external validity, I will consider the implications of my dissertation both for the newly expanded European Union as well as other regional blocs of countries that are considering deeper integration. Examples are Quebec's relations with Canada before and after the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) contend that several small Eastern European countries may not have chosen independence if trade restrictions in the global market had been higher. Potential membership in the European Union, and its even lower trade barriers with Western Europe, would only encourage this trend even more. Also, as ASEAN and Mercosur, or the Southern Common Market, continue to evolve, the potential group of test cases increases. These additional regions provide an opportunity to increase the reliability and external validity of the results by expanding the number of observations.

### ***Beyond the Optimal Size of States Theory***

In the sections above, I consider extensions to this dissertation that would test the theory in other contexts and with other observable implications to improve the reliability of the results. Stepping away from the viability theory, though, another theoretical and empirical extension to this project presents itself.

As this dissertation demonstrates, European integration is one factor that encourages sub-national movements for autonomy. But it is only one factor in a wide array of ideological, cultural and institutional factors that affect sub-national movements. Placing it within a broader bargaining model framework would not only add to the theoretical contribution of this research project, but it would also increase the observable implications available to test the optimal size of states theory in the

European context. Further, it would allow scholars to understand better the bargaining game between the central state and regional movements.

In the research thus far, I compared regions with and without active sub-national movements. But it may be that central states can actually preempt movements altogether by anticipating potential demands. If the theory has validity, then as the EU expands, the region should gain bargaining leverage over the central state. Even if secession is not plausible, the threat is more credible for smaller states to have independence within the EU. Thus, traditional states may be more likely to placate sub-national group demands rather than ignore or repress them, thereby potentially preempting regional mobilization altogether. Potential concessions include public policies and devolution to appease the demands of a group and reduce the advantages of seeking independence. As the region achieves its goals, the incentive to mobilize decreases.

Following this logic, I present a typology of strategies available to the central state and regional movements, which may allow more insight into the strategic dimensions of the situation, in Table 7.1:

Table 7.1 Typology of Strategies of  
Central States and Regional Movements

		Regional Aggressiveness	
		High	Low
State Accommodation	High	Insatiable (I)	Preemptive (II)
	Low	Confrontational (III)	Invisible (IV)

By only counting regions with active movements, we would simply be looking for either of the boxes where regional aggressiveness is highest. This would ignore the “Preemptive” box where the state accommodated the region without waiting for regional mobilization based on the region’s increased leverage.

On the left-hand side of the matrix, I contrast a state’s willingness to accommodate regional demands for autonomy. On the top, I measure a region’s aggressiveness in asserting its demands. If a state is in the Invisible (IV) box, then neither the state nor the region is motivated to deal with autonomy issues. If the state is highly concessionary and the region continues an aggressive push for autonomy, then the type is Insatiable (I). I expect this type to be rare as it implies that concessions cannot appease the region and secession may be the actual goal, with the Basques, Corsicans, and Scots as possible examples.

Two types in the matrix stand out as strategies that would confirm the theory and occur more frequently than Insatiable (I): either the Preemptive (II) or the Confrontational (III). In the Preemptive type (II), the state would make concessions to the regions and the region would not mobilize for more autonomy. Regions that benefit from other intra-national regions’ pursuit of autonomy come to mind, such as Wales or regions of Spain outside of Basque country or Catalonia. The EU may have encouraged movements in these areas as well, but the concessions from the state undercut the movement and diminished the incentives for groups to mobilize. In the Confrontational type (III), states are stubborn and a conflict occurs with the

aggressive region. Corsica, Scotland and the Basque country could also be cases in this type.

Of course, these boxes are ideal types and the theoretical foundation of the bargaining model needs to be further developed before thorough empirical testing. But this sketch demonstrates how the interaction between sub-national groups and the state can be conceived and how European integration can fit within this type of framework, thereby adding to the agenda for future research. This theoretical model would be a more nuanced and sophisticated framework for analyzing sub-national mobilization, and it would incorporate European integration along with other relevant institutional and cultural variables. This immense theoretical project and its associated empirical testing is likely beyond the capacity of any one researcher, though, and is more a goal for the cumulative knowledge in the discipline. Nevertheless, contextualizing this research within such a model, along with other complementary works, would be a valuable enterprise.

### ***Conclusion***

In this dissertation, I evaluate whether supranational integration facilitates or impedes this trend toward fragmentation of traditional states and, if so, the political mechanisms through which European integration strengthens sub-national autonomy movements. I find that European integration does strengthen sub-national movements, in the form of regional political parties. I also demonstrate that it is the

increased viability of small states within the European Union that drives the relationship between integration and regional political parties.

Because this dissertation provides convincing support for the descriptive and causal inferences, it has implications for both future academic work and regional economic and political regimes. In the future, national political actors must consider the unintended consequence of increased sub-national mobilization when considering deeper regional integration.

For Europe, the implications of the dissertation seem clear, even if the future of the European Union is less so. The days of autarky in Europe are gone. Increasing interdependence between member states and between regions will continue, and these interactions will continue to shift the balance of power between central states and sub-national groups. If a Europe of regions, or a thorough fragmentation of member states, is not likely in the near future, increasing decentralization of authority will continue to threaten state sovereignty from below as European integration and globalization threatens it from above.

Appendix A. Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
<b>Austria</b>		
National	German, standard	Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Burgenland	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Karnten	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Niederosterreich	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Oberosterreich	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Salzburg	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Steiermark	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Tirol	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Vorarlberg	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Wien	German, standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
<b>Belgium</b>		
National	Dutch	Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
National	French	Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Vlaams Gewest	Vlaams	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Vlaams Gewest	Dutch	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Brussels	Dutch	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Brussels	French	(2) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Region Wallonne	French	(2) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
<b>Denmark</b>		
National	Danish	Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Arhus	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Bornholm	Skåne	(6) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Bornholm	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Frederiksborg	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Fyn	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Kobenhavn	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Nordjylland	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Ribe	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Ringkobing	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Roskilde	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Sonderjylland	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Staden Kobenhavn	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Storstrom	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Vejle	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Vestsjællands amt	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
Viborg amt	Danish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Danish-Bokmal, Danish
<b>Finland</b>		
National	Finnish	Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Baltic-Finnic, Finnic
Etälä-Suomen lääni	Finnish	(10) Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Baltic-Finnic, Finnic
Länsi-Suomen lääni	Finnish	(10) Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Baltic-Finnic, Finnic
Itä-Suomen lääni	Finnish	(10) Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Baltic-Finnic, Finnic
Oulun lääni	Finnish	(10) Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Baltic-Finnic, Finnic

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
Finland (cont.)		
Lappi lääni	Finnish	(10) Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Baltic-Finnic, Finnic
Lappi lääni	Saami	(7) Uralic, Finno-Ugric, Finno-Permic, Finno-Cheremistic, Finno-Mordvinic, Finno-Lappic, Lappic, Central
Åland	Swedish	(1) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
France		
National	French	Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Alsace	Alemannisch (Alsatian)	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Upper German, Alemannic
Aquitaine	Basque, Souletin	(1) Basque
Aquitaine	Gascon	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc
Auvergne	Auvergnat	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc
Basse-Normandie	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Bourgogne	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Bretagne	Breton	(2) Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Brythonic
Centre	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Champagne-Ardenne	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Corse	Corsican	(4) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Southern, Corsican
Franche-Comte	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Haute-Normandie	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Ile-de-France	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Languedoc-Roussillon	Languedocien	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc
Limousin	Limousin	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
France (cont.)		
Lorraine	Luxem- bourgeois	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, Moselle Franconian
Mid-Pyrenees	Gascon	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc
Mid-Pyrenees	Languedocien	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc
Nord-Pas-de-Calais	Picard	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Pays de la Loire	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Picardie	Picard	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Poitou-Charentes	French	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur	Provençal	(7) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, Oc
Rhone Alpes	Franco-Provençal	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, Southeastern
Germany		
National	German, Standard	Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Baden-Wurttemberg	Alemannisch	(6) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Upper German, Allemanic
Bayern [Bavaria]	Bavarian	(6) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Upper German, Bavarian-Austrian
Berlin	German, Standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Berlin	Saxon, Low	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Brandenburg	Saxon, Low	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Bremen	Saxon, Low	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Hamburg	Plautdietsch	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Hessen	German, Standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Saxon, Low	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Niedersachsen	Saxon, Low	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
<b>Germany (cont.)</b>		
Nordrhein-Westfalen	Kolsch	(7) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, West Middle German, Ripuarian Franconian
Nordrhein-Westfalen	Westphalien	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Rheinland-Pfalz	Main-frankisch	(7) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, West Middle German, Moselle Franconian
Rheinland-Pfalz	Pfaelzisch	(7) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, West Middle German, Rhenisch Fraconian
Saarland	German, Standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Sachsen	Saxon, Upper	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Sachsen-Anhalt	Saxon, Upper	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Schleswig-Holstein	Frisian, Northern	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Frisian
Schleswig-Holstein	Saxon, Low	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Thuringen	German, Standard	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
<b>Greece</b>		
National	Greek	Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Attica	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Central Greece	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Central Macedonia	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Crete	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
East Macedonia and Thrace	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Epirus	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Ionian Islands	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
North Aegean	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Peloponnesos	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
South Aegean	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
Thessaly	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
West Greece	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
West Macedonia	Greek	(10) Indo-European, Greek, Attic
<b>Ireland</b>		
National	English	Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
Border, Midland, and Western	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
Ireland (cont.)		
Southern and Eastern	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
Italy		
National	Italian	Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Abruzzo	Italian (Abruzzese)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Basilicata	Napoletano-Calabrese	(6) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Calabria	Napoletano-Calabrese	(6) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Campania	Napoletano-Calabrese	(6) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Emilia-Romagna	Emiliano-Romagnolo	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Italian
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	Friulian	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Rhaetian
Lazio	Italian (Laziale)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Liguria	Ligurian	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Italian
Lombardia	Lombard	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Italian
Marche	Italian (Marchigiano)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Molise	Italian (Molisano)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Piemonte	Piemontese	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Italian
Puglia	Italian (Pugliese)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Sardegna	Sardinian	(4) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Southern, Sardinian
Sicilia	Sicilian	(6) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Toscana	Italian (Tuscan)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Trentino-Alto Adige	German	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Middle German, East Middle German
Umbria	Italian (Umbrian)	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Italo-Dalmatian
Valle d'Aosta	Walser	(2) Indo-European, Germanic, West, High German, German, Upper German, Allemannic
Valle d'Aosta	Franco-Provencal	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, Southeastern

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
Italy (cont.)		
Valle d'Aosta	French	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Rhaetian, Oil, French
Veneto	Venetian	(5) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Gallo-Romance, Gallo-Italian
Netherlands		
National	Dutch	Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Drenthe	Drents	(5) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Friesland	Frisian, Western	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Frisian
Gelderland	Achterhoeks	(5) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Groningen	Gronings	(5) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Flevoland	Dutch	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Limburg	Dutch	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Noord-Brabant	Dutch	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Noord-Holland	Dutch	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Overijssel	Sallands	(5) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Saxon
Utrecht	Dutch	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Zeeland	Vlaams	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Zuid-Holland	Dutch	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, Low Saxon-Low Franconian, Low Franconian
Portugal		
National	Portuguese	Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Madeira	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Azores	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Alentejo	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
<b>Portugal (cont.)</b>		
Lisboa	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Centro	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Algarve	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Norte	Portuguese	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
<b>Spain</b>		
National	Spanish	Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Andalucia	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Aragon	Aragonese	(6) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Pyrenean-Mozarabic, Pyrenean
Asturias	Asturian	(9) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Asturo-Leonese
Canarias	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Cantabria	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Castilla-La Mancha	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Castilla y Leon	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Cataluna	Catalan-Valencian-Balear	(8) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, East Iberian
Extremadura	Extremaduran	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Galicia	Galician	(9) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Portuguese-Galician
Islas Baleares	Catalan-Valencian-Balear	(8) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, East Iberian
La Rioja	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Madrid	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
Spain (cont.)		
Murcia	Spanish	(10) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian
Navarra	Basque	(1) Basque
Pais Vasco	Basque	(1) Basque
Valenciana	Catalan- Valencian- Balear	(8) Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, East Iberian
Sweden		
National	Swedish	Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Stockholms lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Uppsala lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Sodermanlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Ostergotlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Orebro lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Vastmanlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Blekinge lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Skane lan	Skåne	(7) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Varmlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Dalarnas lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Gavleborgs lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Vasternorrlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Jamtlands lan	Jamska	(4) Indo-European, Germanic, North, West Scandinavian
Vasterbottens lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Norrbottens lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Jonkopings lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Kronobergs lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Kalmar lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish

Appendix A. (cont.) Coding Cultural Difference by Language Families

Region	Language (Language Family)	Classification
Sweden (cont.)		
Gotlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Hallands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
Vastra Gotlands lan	Swedish	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, North, East Scandinavian, Danish-Swedish, Swedish
United Kingdom		
National	English	Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
London	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
South East	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
South West	Cornish	(2) Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Brythonic
West Midlands	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
North West	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
North East	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
Yorkshire and the Humber	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
East Midlands	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
East of England	English	(10) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
Wales	Welsh	(2) Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Brythonic
Scotland	Gaelic, Scots	(2) Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Goidelic
Scotland	Scots	(5) Indo-European, Germanic, West, English
Northern Ireland	Gaelic, Irish	(2) Indo-European, Celtic, Insular, Goidelic

Note: Coding based on Grimes (2000) Language Family data and the coding procedure described in Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Fearon and van Houten (2002).

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